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A Logical Characterization of the Preferred Models of Logic Programs with Ordered Disjunction
Abstract
Logic Programs with Ordered Disjunction (LPODs) extend classical logic
programs with the capability of expressing alternatives with decreasing degrees
of preference in the heads of program rules. Despite the fact
that the operational meaning of ordered disjunction is clear, there exists an
important open issue regarding its semantics. In particular, there does not exist
a purely model-theoretic approach for determining the most preferred models
of an LPOD. At present, the selection of the most preferred models is performed
using a technique that is not based exclusively on the models of the program and in certain
cases produces counterintuitive results. We provide a novel, model-theoretic semantics
for LPODs, which uses an additional truth value in order to identify the most preferred
models of a program. We demonstrate that the proposed approach overcomes the shortcomings of
the traditional semantics of LPODs. Moreover, the new approach can be used to define
the semantics of a natural class of logic programs that can have both ordered and
classical disjunctions in the heads of clauses. This allows programs that can
express not only strict levels of preferences but also alternatives that are
equally preferred.
This work is under consideration for acceptance in TPLP.
keywords:
Ordered Disjunction, Answer Sets, Logic of Here-and-There, Preferences.1 Introduction
Logic Programs with Ordered Disjunction (LPODs) extend classical logic programs with the capability of expressing ordered alternatives in the heads of program rules. In particular, LPODs allow the head of a program rule to be a formula , where “” is a propositional connective called “ordered disjunction” and the ’s are literals. The intuitive explanation of is “I prefer ; however, if is impossible, I can accept ; ; if all of are impossible, I can accept ”. Due to their simplicity and expressiveness, LPODs are a widely accepted formalism for preferential reasoning, both in logic programming and in artificial intelligence.
At present, the semantics of LPODs is defined [Brewka (2002), Brewka et al. (2004)] based on the answer set semantics, using a two-phase procedure. In the first phase, the answer sets of the LPOD are produced. This requires a modification of the standard definition of answer sets. In the second phase, the answer sets are “filtered”, and we obtain the set of “most preferred” answer sets, which are taken as the meaning of the initial program. Notice that both phases are not purely model-theoretic: the first one requires the construction of the reduct of the program and the second one is performed using the so-called “degree of satisfaction of rules”, a concept that relies on examining the rules of the program to justify the selection of the most preferred answer sets. Apart from its logical status, the current semantics of LPODs produces in certain cases counterintuitive most preferred answer sets. This discussion leads naturally to the question: “Is it possible to specify the semantics of LPODs in a purely model-theoretic way?”.
An important first step in this direction was performed by \citeNlpod-cabalar, who used Equilibrium Logic [Pearce (1996)] to logically characterize the answer sets produced in the first phase described above. However, to our knowledge, the second phase (namely the selection of the most preferred answer sets), has never been justified model-theoretically. We consider this as an important shortcoming in the theory of LPODs. Apart from its theoretical interest, this question also carries practical significance, because, as we are going to see, the present formalization of the second phase produces in certain cases counterintuitive (and in our opinion undesirable) results. The main contribution of the present paper is to provide a purely model-theoretic characterization of the semantics of LPODs. The more specific contributions are the following:
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We propose a new semantics for LPODs which uses an additional truth value in order to select as most preferred models those in which a top preference fails only if it is impossible to be satisfied. We demonstrate that the proposed approach overcomes the shortcomings of the traditional semantics of LPODs. In this way, the most preferred models of an LPOD can be characterized by a preferential ordering of its models.
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We demonstrate that our approach can be seamlessly extended to programs that allow both ordered and classical disjunctions in the heads of clauses. In particular, we define a natural class of such programs and demonstrate that all our results about LPODs transfer, with minimal modifications, to this new class. In this way we provide a clean semantics for a class of programs that can express not only strict levels of preference but also alternatives that are equally preferred.
Section 2 introduces LPODs and gives relevant background. Sections 3 and 4 describe the shortcomings of LPOD semantics and give an intuitive presentation of the proposed approach for overcoming these issues. The remaining sections give a technical exposition of our results. The proofs of all results have been moved to corresponding appendices.
2 Background on LPODs
Logic programs with ordered disjunction are an extension of the logic programs introduced by \citeNGL91, called extended logic programs, which support two types of negation: default (denoted by ) and strong (denoted by ). Strong negation is useful in applications but it is not very essential from a semantics point of view: a literal is semantically treated as an atom . For the basic notions regarding extended logic programs, we assume some familiarity with the work of \citeNGL91.
Definition 1
A (propositional) LPOD is a set of rules of the form:
where the , and are ground literals.
The intuitive explanation of a formula is “I prefer ; however, if is impossible, I can accept ; ; if all of are impossible, I can accept ”.
An interpretation of an LPOD is a set of literals. An interpretation is called consistent if there does not exist any atom such that both and belong to . The notion of model of an LPOD is defined as follows.
Definition 2
Let be an LPOD and an interpretation. Then, is a model of iff for every rule
if and then there exists .
To obtain the preferred answer sets of an LPOD, a two-phase procedure was introduced by \citeNlpod-brewka. In the first phase, the answer sets of the LPOD are produced. This requires a modification of the standard definition of answer sets for extended logic programs. In the second phase, the answer sets are “filtered”, and we obtain the set of “most preferred” ones. The first phase is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3
Let be an LPOD. The -reduct of a rule of of the form:
with respect to a set of literals , is denoted by and is defined as follows:
The -reduct of with respect to is denoted by and is the union of the reducts for all in .
Definition 4
A set of literals is an answer set of an LPOD if is a consistent model of and is the least model of .
The second phase produces the “most preferred” answer sets using the notion of the degree of satisfaction of a rule. Formally:
Definition 5
Let be an answer set of an LPOD . Then, satisfies the rule:
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to degree if , for some , or , for some ,
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to degree , , if all , no , and
The degree of a rule in the answer set is denoted by .
The satisfaction degrees of rules are then used to define a preference relation on the answer sets of a program. Given a set of literals , let . The preference relation is defined as follows.
Definition 6
Let be answer sets of an LPOD . Then, is inclusion-preferred to iff there exists such that , and for all , .
Example 1
Consider the program:
wine beer. |
The above program has the answer sets and . The most preferred one is because it satisfies the unique fact of the program with degree 1 (while the answer set satisfies the fact with degree 2). Consider now the program:
This has the unique answer set (the set is rejected due to its inconsistency). Therefore, is also the most preferred answer set.
Notice that \citeNlpod-brewka originally defined only the preference relation of Definition 6. In the follow-up paper [Brewka et al. (2004)] two more preference relations were introduced, namely the cardinality and the Pareto, in order to treat cases for which the inclusion preference did not return the expected results. All these relations do not rely exclusively on the models of the source program, and are therefore subject to similar criticism. For this reason, in this paper we focus attention on the inclusion preference relation.
3 Some Issues with the Semantics of LPODs
From a foundational point of view, the main issue with the semantics of LPODs is that, in its present form, it is not purely model-theoretic. Despite the simplicity and expressiveness of ordered disjunction, one can not characterize the meaning of a program by just looking at its set of models. Recall that this principle is one of the cornerstones of logic programming since its inception: the meaning of positive logic programs is captured by their minimum Herbrand model [van Emden and Kowalski (1976)] and the meaning of extended logic programs is captured by their equilibrium models [Pearce (1996)]. How can the most preferred models of LPODs be captured model-theoretically? The existing issues regarding the semantics of LPODs are illustrated by the following examples.
3.1 The Logical Status of LPODs
Consider the following two programs:
a b. |
and:
b a. |
According to Definition 2, both programs have exactly the same models, namely , , and . Moreover, both have the same answer sets, namely and . However, there is no model-theoretic explanation (namely one based on just the sets of models of the programs) of why the most preferred model of the first program is while the most preferred model of the second program is . As a conclusion, in order for the semantics of LPODs to be properly specified, a model-based approach needs to be devised.
3.2 Inaccurate Preferential Ordering of Answer Sets
Apart from the fact that Definition 5 is not purely model-theoretic, in many cases it also gives inaccurate preferential orderings of answer sets. Such inaccurate orderings have already been reported in the literature [Balduccini and Mellarkod (2003)]. The following program illustrates one such simple case.
Example 2
Consider the following program111Our example is identical (up to variable renaming) to an example given by \citeNlpod-crprolog. This work was brought to our attention by one of the reviewers of the present paper. whose declarative reading is “I prefer to buy a Mercedes than a BMW. In case a Mercedes is available, I prefer a gas model to a diesel one. A gas model (of Mercedes) is not available”.
The program has two answers sets: and . satisfies the first rule with degree 1, the second rule with degree 2, and the third rule with degree 1. satisfies the first rule with degree 2, the second rule with degree 1 (because the body of the rule evaluates to false), and the third rule with degree 1. According to Definition 6, the two answer sets are incomparable. However, it seems reasonable that the most preferred model is : the first rule, which is a fact, specifies unconditionally a preference; the preferences of the second rule seem to be secondary, because they depend on the choice that will be made in the first rule.
The problems in the above example appear to be related to Definition 5: it assigns degree 1 in two cases that are apparently different: a rule that has a false body gets the same degree of satisfaction as a rule with a true body in whose head the first choice is satisfied. These are two different cases which, however, it is not obvious how to handle if we follow the satisfaction degree approach of Definition 5.
3.3 Unsatisfiable Better Options
It has been remarked [Brewka et al. (2004), discussion in page 342] that the inclusion-preference is sensitive to the existence of unsatisfiable better options. The following example, taken from the paper by \citeNlpod-BNS04, motivates this problem.
Example 3
Assume we want to book accommodation for a conference (in the post-COVID era). We prefer a 3-star hotel from a 2-star hotel. Moreover, we prefer to be in walking distance from the conference venue. This can be modeled by the program:
Consider now the scenario where the only available 3-star hotel (say ), is not in walking distance. Moreover, assume that the only available 2-star hotel (say ), happens to be in walking distance. According to Definition 6, these two options are incomparable because satisfies the first rule to degree 2 and the second rule to degree 1, while satisfies the first rule to degree 1 and the second rule to degree 2.
Assume now that the above program is revised after learning that there also exists a 4-star hotel, which however is not an option for us (due to restrictions imposed by our funding agencies). The new program is:
In the new program, satisfies the first rule to degree 2 and the second rule to degree 2, while satisfies the first rule to degree 1 and the second rule to degree 3. According to Definition 6, is our preferred option.
The above example illustrates that under the “degree of satisfaction of rules” semantics, a small (and seemingly innocent) change in the program, can cause a radical change in the final preferred model. This sensitivity to changes is another undesirable consequence that stems from the fact that the second phase of the semantics of LPODs is not purely model-theoretic.
4 An Intuitive Overview of the Proposed Approach
The main purpose of this paper is to define a model-theoretic semantics for LPODs. In other words, we would like to be able to choose the most preferred answer sets of a program using preferential reasoning on the answer sets themselves. Actually, such an approach should also be applicable directly on the models of the source program, without the need to first construct the answer sets of the program. We would expect that such an approach would also provide solutions to the shortcomings of the previous section.
But on what grounds can we compare the answer sets (or, even better, the models) of a program and decide that some of them satisfy in a better way our preferences than the others? This seems like an impossible task because the answer sets (or the models) do not contain any information related to the ordered disjunction preferences of the program.
It turns out that we can introduce preferential information inside the answer sets of a program by slightly tweaking the underlying logic. The answer sets of extended logic programs are two-valued, ie., a literal is either (true) or (false). We argue that in order to properly define the semantics of LPODs, we need a third truth value, which we denote by . The intuitive reading of is “impossible to make true”.
To understand the need for , consider again the intuitive meaning of : we prefer only if it is impossible for us to get . Impossible here means that if we try to make true, then the interpretation will become inconsistent. Therefore, we seem to need two types of false, namely and : means “false by default” while means “impossible to make true”. The following example demonstrates these issues.
Example 4
Consider the program:
As we are going to see in the coming sections, the most preferred answer set according to our approach is . Notice that wine receives the value because if we tried to make wine equal to , the interpretation would become inconsistent (because wine is ). Notice also that, as we are going to see, the interpretation is not a model of the program.
The above discussion suggests the following semantics for “” in the proposed logic. Let . Then:
The intuition of the above definition is that we return the value only if it is impossible to satisfy ; in all other cases, we return .
We now get to the issue of how we can use the value to distinguish the most preferred answer sets: we simply identify those answer sets that are minimal with respect to their sets of atoms that have the value . As we have mentioned, the value means “impossible to make true”. By minimizing with respect to the values, we only keep those answer sets in which a top preference fails only if it is impossible to be satisfied.
The above discussion gives a description of how we can select the “most preferred (three-valued) answer sets” of an LPOD. However, it is natural to wonder whether it is possible to also characterize the answer sets model-theoretically, completely circumventing the construction of the reduct. A similar question was considered by \citeNlpod-cabalar, who demonstrated that the (two-valued) answer sets of an LPOD coincide with the equilibrium models of the program. We adapt \citeANPlpod-cabalar’s characterization to fit in our setting. More specifically, we extend our three-valued logic to a four-valued one by adding a new truth value , whose intuitive meaning is “not false but its truth can not be established”. We then demonstrate that the three-valued answer sets of an LPOD are those models of that are minimal with respect to a simple ordering relation and do not contain any values. In this way we get a two-step, purely model-theoretic characterization of the most-preferred models of LPODs: in the first step we use the values as a yardstick to identify those models that correspond to answer-sets, and in the second step we select the most preferred ones, by minimizing with respect to the values.
Finally, we consider the problem of characterizing the semantics of logic programs that contain both disjunctions and ordered disjunctions in the heads of rules. This is especially useful in cases where some of our preferences are equally important. For example:
states that wine and beer are our top preferences (but we have no preference among them), and soda and juice are our secondary preferences. We consider the class of programs in which the heads of rules consist of ordered disjunctions where each ordered disjunct is an ordinary disjunction (as in the above program). We demonstrate that the theory of these programs is very similar to that of LPODs. All our results for LPODs transfer with minimal modifications to this extended class of programs. This suggests that this is a natural class of programs that possibly deserves further investigation both in theory and in practice.
5 Redefining the Answer Sets of LPODs
In this section we provide a new definition of the answer sets of LPODs. The new definition is based on a three-valued logic which allows us to discriminate the most preferred answer sets using a purely model-theoretic approach. In Section 6 we demonstrate that by extending the logic to a four-valued one, we can identify directly the most preferred models of a program (without first producing the answer sets).
Definition 7
Let be a nonempty set of propositional literals. The set of well-formed formulas is inductively defined as follows:
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Every element of is a well-formed formula,
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The 0-place connective is a well-formed formula,
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If and are well-formed formulas, then , , , , and , are well-formed formulas.
The meaning of formulas is defined over the set of truth values which are ordered as . Given two truth values , we write iff either or .
Definition 8
A (three-valued) interpretation is a function from to the set . We can extend to apply to formulas, as follows:
It is straightforward to see that the meanings of “”, “”, and “” are associative and therefore we can write , , and unambiguously (without the need of extra parentheses). Moreover, given literals we will often write instead of .
The ordering (respectively, ) on truth values extends in the standard way on interpretations: given interpretations we write (respectively, ), if for all literals , (respectively, ).
When we consider interpretations of an LPOD program, we assume that the underlying set is the set of literals of the program. The following definition will be needed.
Definition 9
An interpretation is a model of an LPOD if every rule of evaluates to under . An interpretation of is called consistent if there do not exist literals and in such that .
We can now give the new definitions for reduct and answer sets for LPODs.
Definition 10
Let be an LPOD. The -reduct of a rule of of the form:
with respect to an interpretation , is denoted by and is defined as follows:
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If for some , , then is the empty set.
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If for all , , then is the set that contains the rules:
where is the least index such that and either or .
The -reduct of with respect to is denoted by and is the union of the reducts for all in .
The major difference of the above definition from that of Definition 3, are the clauses of the form . These clauses are included so as that the value can be produced for when . Notice that if these clauses did not exist, there would be no way for the value to be produced by the reduct.
Definition 11
Let be an LPOD and an interpretation of . We say that is a (three-valued) answer set of if is consistent and it is the -least model of .
Notice that the least model of in the above definition, can be constructed using the following immediate consequence operator :
Notice that since the set is a complete lattice under the ordering , it is easy to see that the set of interpretations is also a complete lattice under the ordering . Moreover, the operator is monotonic over the complete lattice of interpretations; this follows from the fact that the meanings of conjunction (namely, ) and that of disjunction (namely, ), are monotonic. Then, by Tarski’s fixed-point theorem, has a least fixed-point, which can be easily shown to be the -least model of .
The following lemma guarantees that our definition is a generalization of the well-known one for extended logic programs [Gelfond and Lifschitz (1991)].
Lemma 1
Let be a consistent extended logic program. Then the three-valued answer sets of coincide with the standard answer sets of .
The following lemmas, which hold for extended logic programs, also extend to LPODs.
Lemma 2
Let be an LPOD and let be an answer set of . Then, is a model of .
Lemma 3
Let be a model of an LPOD . Then, is a model of .
The answer sets of extended logic programs are minimal with respect to the classical truth ordering . As it turns out, the answer sets of LPODs are minimal but with respect to an extended ordering, which is defined below.
Definition 12
The ordering on truth values is defined as follows: and . For all , we write if either or . Given interpretations , we write (respectively, ) if for all literals , (respectively, ).
Lemma 4
Every (three-valued) answer set of an LPOD , is a -minimal model of .
As in the case of the original semantics of LPODs, we now need to define a preference relation over the answer sets of a program. Intuitively, we prefer those answer sets that maximize the prospect of satisfying our top choices in ordered disjunctions. This can be achieved by minimizing with respect to values. More formally, we define the following ordering:
Definition 13
Let be an LPOD and let be answer sets of . Let and be the sets of literals in and respectively that have the value . We say that is preferred to , written , if .
Definition 14
An answer set of an LPOD is called most preferred if it is minimal among all the answer sets of with respect to the relation.
The intuition behind the definition of is that we prefer those answer sets that minimize the need for values. In other words, an answer set will be most preferred if all the literals that get the value , do this because there is no other option: these literals must be false in order for the program to have a model. We now examine the examples of Section 3 under the new semantics introduced in this section.
Example 5
Consider again the two programs discussed in Subsection 3.1. Under the proposed approach, the first program has two answer sets, namely and , and the most preferred one (ie., the minimal with respect to ) is . The second program also has two answer sets, namely and , and the most preferred one is . Notice that now the two programs have different sets of models and different answer sets and therefore it is reasonable that they have different most preferred ones.
Example 6
Consider the “cars” program of Subsection 3.2. It is easy to see that it has two answer sets, namely:
According to the ordering, the most preferred answer set is .
Example 7
Consider the “hotels” program from Subsection 3.3. Under the restriction that there does not exist any 3-star hotel in walking distance and also there does not exist any 2-star hotel outside walking distance, we get the two incomparable answer sets:
Consider now the modified program given in Subsection 3.3 (which contains the unsatisfiable better option of a 4-star hotel). Under the same restrictions as above, we get the two answer sets:
Under the proposed approach, the above two answer sets are also incomparable, and the problem identified in Subsection 3.3 no longer exists.
We close this section by stating a result that establishes a relationship between the answer sets produced by our approach (Definition 4) and those ones produced by the original formulation [Brewka (2002), Brewka et al. (2004)].
Definition 15
Let be a three-valued interpretation of LPOD . We define to be the set of literals in such that .
Lemma 5
Let be an LPOD and be a three-valued answer set of . Then, is an answer set of according to Definition 4.
Lemma 6
Let be an answer set of according to Definition 4. There exists a unique three-valued interpretation such that and is a three-valued answer set of .
In other words, there is a bijection between the answer sets produced by our approach and the original ones. Moreover, each three-valued answer set only differs from the corresponding two-valued one in that some literals of the former may have a value instead of an value. However, these values play an important role because they allow us to distinguish the most preferred answer sets.
6 A New Logical Characterization of the Answer Sets of LPODs
In this section we demonstrate that the answer sets of LPODs can be characterized in a purely logical way, namely without even the use of the reduct. In particular, we demonstrate that the answer sets of a given program coincide with a well-defined subclass of the minimal models of in a four-valued logic. This logic is an extension of the three-valued one introduced in Section 5 and minimality is defined with respect to a four-valued relation that extends the three-valued one of Definition 12. The new logic is based on four truth values, ordered as follows:
The value can be read as “not false but its truth can not be established”. The connections of this logic with Equilibrium Logic [Pearce (1996)] are discussed in Section 8.
An interpretation is now a function from to the set . The semantics of formulas with respect to an interpretation is defined identically as in Definition 8. The notions of interpretation, consistent interpretation, and model are defined as in Definition 9. Moreover, we extend the three-valued relation of Definition 12, as follows:
Definition 16
The (four-valued) ordering is defined as follows: , , , and . Given two truth values , we write if either or . Given interpretations of a program , we write (respectively, ) if for all literals in , (respectively, ).
The following special kind of interpretations plays an important role in our logical characterization.
Definition 17
An interpretation of LPOD is called solid if for all literals in , it is .
We can now state the logical characterization of the answer sets of an LPOD.
Theorem 1
Let be an LPOD. Then, is a three-valued answer set of iff is a consistent -minimal model of and is solid.
In conclusion, given an LPOD we can purely logically characterize its most preferred models by first taking its consistent -minimal models that are solid and then keeping the -minimal ones (see Definitions 13 and 14).
An extended study of the properties of the proposed four-valued logic is outside the scope of the present paper. Figure 1 lists some useful equivalences; the first column is for classical connectives, while the second column contains equivalences involving the “” operator. We note the interaction of with because this will be the central theme of the next section. It is easy to see that:
We note that this equivalence does not hold, a fact which will be referenced in the next section.
7 Answer Sets of Disjunctive LPODs
We now extend the ideas of the previous sections to programs that also allow standard disjunctions in the heads of rules. The case of disjunctive LPODs (DLPODs), was initially considered by \citeNtowards-dlpods and reexamined by \citeNlpod-cabalar.
The main idea of using disjunctions in the heads of LPOD rules is described [Kärger et al. (2008)] as follows: “we use ordered disjunction to express preferences and disjunction to express indifferences”.
Example 8 (taken from the paper by \citeNtowards-dlpods)
The program:
expresses the fact that our top choice is going to the pub; if this is not possible, then our secondary preference can be satisfied by either going to the cinema or watching tv.
towards-dlpods consider rules whose heads are arbitrary combinations of atoms and the operators and . A set of transformations is then used in order to bring the heads of rules into “Ordered Disjunctive Normal Form (ODNF)”. More specifically, each head is transformed into a formula of the form where each is an ordered disjunction of literals. The resulting normalized rules are then used to obtain the preferred answer sets of the original program.
Example 9
The program of Example 8 is transformed to:
This program is then used to get the preferred answer sets of the original one.
However, as observed by \citeNlpod-cabalar, one of the transformations used by \citeNtowards-dlpods to obtain the ODNF, can not be logically justified: the formula is not logically equivalent to the formula in terms of the logic of Here-and-There. As discussed at the end of Section 6, these two formulas are also not equivalent under our four-valued logic.
As an alternative approach to the semantics of DLPODs, \citeNlpod-cabalar proposes to use the logical characterization on rules with heads that are arbitrary combinations of disjunctions and ordered disjunctions. We could extend this approach to get a logical characterization of the most preferred models of arbitrary DLPODs: given such a program , we could at first consider all the -minimal models of that are solid, and then select the -minimal among them. Such an approach is certainly general. However, we believe that not every such program carries computational intuition. A good example of this is given in [Cabalar (2011), Example 2], where a program with both disjunction and ordered disjunction is given, and whose computational meaning is far from clear.
In the following, we define a class of programs which, as we claim, have a clear computational interpretation and at the same time retain all properties that we have identified for LPODs. Intuitively, we allow the head of a program rule to be a formula where each is an ordinary disjunction of literals. Notice that the program in Example 8 belongs to this class, while the program in Example 9, does not. We believe that the programs of this class have a clear preferential interpretation. Intuitively, the rule heads of the programs we consider, denote a hierarchy of preferences imposed by the operator; in each level of this hierarchy, we may have literals that have equal preference (this is expressed by standard disjunction).
It is important to stress that if we allowed arbitrary combinations of disjunctions and ordered disjunctions, the preferential intuition would be lost. To see this, consider for example the formula (a b) (c d). This gives us the information that (a b) is at the same level of preference as (c d), and that a is more preferred than b and c is more preferred than d; however, for example, it gives us no information of whether a is more preferred than c. On the other hand, a formula of the fragment we consider, such as (a b) (c d) gives us a total order of a, b, c, and d.
Definition 18
A (propositional) DLPOD is a set of rules of the form:
where the and are ground literals and each is a disjunction of ground literals.
As it turns out, the answer sets of such programs can be defined in an almost identical way as those of LPODs.
Definition 19
Let be a DLPOD. The -reduct of a rule of of the form:
with respect to an interpretation , is denoted by and is defined as follows:
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If for some , , then is the empty set.
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If for all , , then is the set that contains the rules:
where is the least index such that and either or .
The -reduct of with respect to is denoted by and is the union of the reducts for all in .
Definition 20
Let be a DLPOD and a (three-valued) interpretation of . Then, is an answer set of if is consistent and is a minimal model of the disjunctive program .
As it turns out, all the results we have obtained in the previous section, hold for DLPODs. The proofs of these results are (surprisingly) almost identical (modulo some minor notational differences) to the proofs of the corresponding results for LPODs. For reasons of completeness, the corresponding proofs are given in the appendix. The extended results are stated below.
Lemma 7
Let be a consistent disjunctive extended logic program. Then, the answer sets of according to Definition 20, coincide with the standard answer sets of .
Lemma 8
Let be a DLPOD and let be an answer set of . Then, is a model of .
Lemma 9
Let be a model of a DLPOD . Then, is a model of .
Lemma 10
Every answer set of a DLPOD , is a -minimal model of .
Theorem 2
Let be a DLPOD. Then, is an answer set of iff is a consistent -minimal model of and is solid.
The similarity of the definitions and of the theoretical results of DLPODs to those of standard LPODs, makes us believe that this is indeed an interesting class of programs that deserves further attention.
8 Related and Future Work
The work on LPODs is closely related to “Qualitative Choice Logic” (QCL) [Brewka et al. (2004)]. QCL is an extension of propositional logic with the preferential connective “”, which has the same intuitive meaning as in LPODs: is read “if possible , but if is impossible then at least ”. Essentially, QCL is the propositional logic underlying LPODs. It is worth noting that the semantics of QCL is based on the “degree of satisfaction” of formulas, which is connected to the idea of the degree of satisfaction of the rules of LPODs (Definition 5). Moreover, as remarked by one of the reviewers of the present paper, the DLPODs introduced in Section 7 are closely connected to the “basic choice formulas” of QCL [Brewka et al. (2004), Section 3.1, Definition 8]. It would be interesting to investigate whether our four-valued logic can be used to provide an alternative semantics for QCL.
The work reported in this paper is closely connected to the work of \citeNlpod-cabalar, who first considered the problem of expressing logically the semantics of LPODs. The key difference between the two works is that ours provides a characterization of both phases of the production of the most preferred models of an LPOD, while Cabalar’s work concentrates on the first one.
It is important to stress here that both our work as well as the work of \citeNlpod-cabalar, are influenced by the work of \citeNPearce96 who first gave a logical characterization of the answer sets of extended logic programs, using Equilibrium Logic. This is a non-monotonic logic which is defined on top of the monotonic logic of Here-and-There [Heyting (1930)], using a model preference approach. The technique we have proposed in this paper, when applied to a consistent extended logic program , produces the standard answer sets of ; this is a direct consequence of Theorem 1 and Lemma 1. Therefore, for extended logic programs, the Equilibrium Logic gives the same outcome as our approach which is based on a four-valued logic and -minimal models that are solid. We believe that a further investigation of the connections of our approach with that of Equilibrium Logic is a worthwhile topic.
Our work is the first to provide a purely model-theoretic characterization of the semantics of LPODs. To our knowledge, the four-valued logic we have utilized does not appear to be a well-known variant/extension of Here-and-There. However, some seemingly related logics have been used in the literature of answer set extensions. The original definition of Equilibrium Logic included a second constructive negation, which corresponds to Nelson’s strong negation [Nelson (1949)]. This gave rise to a five-valued extension of Here-and-There, called . Also, a logic called , that is closely connected to , was recently proposed by \citeNACF0PV19 in order to capture the semantics of arbitrary combinations of explicit negation with nested expressions. Both and appear to be connected to our four-valued logic due to the different notions of false and true that they employ in order to capture aspects that arise in answer set semantics. However, the ordering of the truth values and the semantics of the logical connectives are different, and the exact correspondence (if any) between these logics and the present one, is not straightforward to establish. This is certainly an interesting topic for further investigation.
Another promising topic for future work is the characterization of the notion of strong equivalence [Lifschitz et al. (2001)] for LPODs and DLPODs. When two logic programs are strongly equivalent, we can replace one for the other inside a bigger program without worrying that the semantics of the bigger program will be affected. Characterizations of strong equivalence for LPODs have already been obtained by \citeNFaberTW08. It would be interesting to investigate if the logical characterization of the semantics of LPODs and DLPODs developed in the present paper, can offer advantages compared with their work.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers of our paper for their careful and insightful comments.
This research is co-financed by Greece and the European Union (European Social Fund- ESF) through the Operational Programme “Human Resources Development, Education and Lifelong Learning 2014- 2020” in the context of the project “Techniques for implementing qualitative preferences in deductive querying systems” (5048151).
References
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Appendix A Proofs of Section 5
Lemma1 Let be a consistent extended logic program. Then the three-valued answer sets of coincide with the standard answer sets of . \@endtheorem
Proof A.3.
By taking in Definition 10, we get the standard definition of reduct for consistent extended logic programs.
Lemma2 Let be an LPOD and let be an answer set of . Then, is a model of . \@endtheorem
Proof A.4.
Consider any rule in of the form:
If , then for some , . But then, the body of the rule evaluates to under , and therefore satisfies . Consider now the case where is nonempty and consists of the following rules:
We distinguish cases based on the value of :
Case 1: . Then, for some , . Then, rule is trivially satisfied by .
Case 2: . This implies that . We distinguish two subcases. If then because, by the definition of it is and we also know that . Thus, in this subcase satisfies . If , then by the definition of , ; however, we know that , and thus . Thus, in this subcase also satisfies .
Case 3: . Then, for all , . Since is a model of , we have . Moreover, by the definition of , . This implies that .
Lemma3 Let be a model of an LPOD . Then, is a model of . \@endtheorem
Proof A.5.
Consider any rule in of the form:
and assume satisfies . If for some , , then no rule is created in for . Assume therefore that . By the definition of the following rules have been added to :
where is the least index such that and either or . Obviously, the first rules above are satisfied by . For the rule we distinguish two cases based on the value of . If , then, the rule is trivially satisfied. If , then, since rule is satisfied by and , it has to be . Therefore, the rule is satisfied by .
Lemma4 Every (three-valued) answer set of an LPOD , is a -minimal model of . \@endtheorem
Proof A.6.
Assume there exists a model of with . We will show that is also a model of . Since , we also have . Since is the -least model of , we will conclude that .
Consider any rule in of the form:
Assume that is nonempty. This means that there exists some , , such that and either or . Then, consists of the following rules:
We show that satisfies the above rules. We distinguish cases based on the value of :
Case 1: . Then, and the above rules are trivially satisfied by .
Case 2: . Then, since , it is . If then trivially satisfies all the above rules. Assume therefore that . Recall now that for all , . Moreover, it has to be , because otherwise would not satisfy the rule . Since , it can only be for all , and , because otherwise would not be a model of . Therefore, satisfies the given rules of .
Case 3: . Then, since , it is either or . If then trivially satisfies all the above rules. Assume therefore that . Recall now that for all , . Moreover, it has to be , because otherwise would not satisfy the rule . Since , it can only be for all , and , because otherwise would not be a model of . Therefore, satisfies the given rules of .
In the proofs that follow, we will use the term Brewka-model to refer to that of Definition 2 and Brewka-reduct to refer to that of Definition 3 (although, to be precise, this definition of reduct was initially introduced in the paper by \citeNlpod-BNS04).
Proposition A.7.
Let be an LPOD and let be a three-valued model of . Then, is a Brewka-model of .
Proof A.8.
Consider any rule of of the form
If there exists or there exists then then trivially satisfies . Assume that and . By Definition 15 it follows that . Since is a three-valued model of , it must satisfy and therefore . Then, there exists such that and by Definition 15 we get that . Therefore, satisfies rule .
Proposition A.9.
Let be an LPOD and be a Brewka-model of . Then, is also a model of the Brewka-reduct .
Proof A.10.
Consider any rule in of the form:
and assume satisfies . If there exists for some , then no rule is created in the Brewka-reduct for . Moreover, if for all , then also no rule is created in the Brewka-reduct. Assume therefore that and there exists such that and . By the definition of the only rule added to because of is . Since the rule is satisfied by .
Proposition A.11.
Let be an LPOD and let be three-valued answer sets of such that . Then, .
Proof A.12.
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that . We define:
It is and . We claim that is a model of . This will lead to contradiction because, by Lemma 4, and are -minimal models of .
Consider any rule in of the form:
If for some , , then satisfies the rule. Assume therefore that for all , . We distinguish cases:
Case 1: . Then, obviously, satisfies .
Case 2: . Then, and . Since, by Lemma 2, and are models of it follows that and . First assume that . This implies that there exists such that and for all . Since, by assumption it follows that and therefore . Moreover, it must be for all because we have already established that . Therefore, and and satisfies the rule. Now assume that . It is easy to see that the only case is for all . Since has the same collapse with it follows that and because it also follows that . By definition of , for all and .
Case 3: . Then, and and therefore and . This implies that there exists such that , and . Therefore, and , which implies that , and therefore satisfies .
Lemma5 Let be an LPOD and be a three-valued answer set of . Then, is an answer set of according to Definition 4. \@endtheorem
Proof A.13.
Since is an answer set of , then by Lemma 2, is also a model of . Moreover, by Proposition A.7, is a Brewka-model of . It also follows from Proposition A.9 that is a model of the Brewka-reduct . It suffices to show that is also the minimum model of . Assume there exists that is a model of and . We define as
It is easy to see that . We will show that is also model of leading to contradiction because we assume that is the minimum model of . Consider first a rule of the form . Since is an answer set of it must be . By the definition of it follows that and satisfies the rule. Now consider a rule of the form . We distinguish cases based on the value of .
Case 1: . Then, since it is and the rule is trivially satisfied.
Case 2: . Then, and there exists such that . It follows that and therefore . Moreover, by the construction of , for all we have and therefore . Since is a model of , . Again, by the construction of we have and the rule is satisfied.
Case 3: . By the construction of the rule is a result of a rule in of the form
and it must be for all and for all . It follows that and . Moreover, since is a model of we get that and it follows that . By the construction of the Brewka-reduct, there exists a rule in . We distinguish two cases. If then because is a model of . It follows by the construction of that and satisfies the rule. Otherwise, there exists , such that . Notice also that , so . Therefore, and . Moreover, since , we have that satisfies the rule.
Lemma6 Let be an answer set of according to Definition 4. There exists a unique three-valued interpretation such that and is a three-valued answer set of . \@endtheorem
Proof A.14.
We construct iteratively a set of literals that must have the value in . Let be the sequence:
We construct as
First we prove that is a model of . Consider first any rule of the form . By the construction of , such a rule exists because ; therefore satisfies this rule. Now consider any rule of the form . Such a rule was produced by a rule in of the form
By the construction of it follows that for all . Therefore and also for all . Moreover, it must be for all , so . We distinguish cases based on the value of .
Case 1: If then the rule is trivially satisfied by .
Case 2: If then for some , . By the construction of , it follows that . It follows by the definition of that and therefore .
Case 3: If then and since is an answer set according to Definition 4 it follows that is a model of . It follows that there exists a least such that . Since we have already established that for all , it must be . But, if then and by the construction of it must be . If , then, by the construction of , the rule for should be of the form . So, it must and . Therefore, and satisfies the rule.
Therefore, we have established that is a model of . It remains to show that is the -least model of . Assume now that there exists that is a model of and . Let . We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: and thus differs from only on some atoms such that and . First, by the construction of , if then . We show by induction on that for every , . This leads to contradiction and therefore is minimal.
Induction base: : the statement is satisfied vacuously.
Induction step: : Every atom must occur in a head of a rule in . such that and therefore . It follows then that for . By the construction of , for every atom there must be a rule in either of the form or of the form . Moreover, since it follows that . Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, . Since is also a model of it must satisfy those rules thus .
Case 2: . We show that is a model of leading to contradiction because, by definition, is the minimum model of . Consider a rule of the form in . The rule has been produced by a rule in of the form:
such that and .
If there exists then also and the rule is trivially satisfied by . Assume, on the other hand, that . It follows, by the definition of , that , for and . Therefore, there exist a rule in of the form . If or then there exists and again satisfies the rule. If then since is a model of it follows that . Since is the collapse of it is and . Therefore, satisfies the rule in .
The uniqueness of follows directly from Proposition A.11.
Appendix B Proofs of Section 6
In order to establish Theorem 1, we show two lemmas (which essentially establish the left-to-right and the right-to-left directions of the theorem, respectively).
Lemma B.15.
Let be an LPOD program and let be an answer set of . Then, is a -minimal model of and is solid.
Proof B.16.
Since is an answer set of , then, by Lemma 2, is a model of . Moreover, is solid because our definition of answer sets does not involve the value . It remains to show that it is minimal with respect to the ordering. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists a model of with . By Lemma 4, is (three-valued) -minimal. Therefore, can not be solid. We first show that can not be a model of the reduct . Assume for the sake of contradiction that is a model of . We construct the following interpretation :
We claim that must also be a model of . Consider first a rule of the form . Since is a model of , it is . By the definition of , it is and therefore satisfies this rule. Consider now a rule of the form in . We show that also satisfies this rule. We perform a case analysis:
Case 1: . Then, and trivially satisfies the rule.
Case 2: . Then, . Moreover, because is a model of . By the definition of , it is , and therefore satisfies the rule.
Case 3: . Then, . Moreover, because is a model of . By the definition of , it is , and therefore satisfies the rule.
Case 4: . Then, . Moreover, because is a model of . By the definition of , it is , and therefore satisfies the rule.
Therefore, must also be a model of . Moreover, by definition, is solid and . This contradicts the fact that, by construction, is the -least model of . In conclusion, can not be a model of .
We now show that can not be a model of . As we showed above, is not a model of , and consequently there exists a rule in that is not satisfied by . Such a rule in must have resulted due to a rule of the following form in :
According to the definition of , for all , , , and since , it is also . Moreover, there exists some such that and either or . Since , it is for all , . Consider now the rule that is not satisfied by in . If it is of the form , , , then and . This implies that and therefore does not satisfy the rule . If the rule that is not satisfied by in is of the form , then and therefore, since for all , , it is:
Thus, is not a model of .
Lemma B.17.
Let be an LPOD program and let be a -minimal model of and is solid. Then, is an answer set of .
Proof B.18.
First observe that, by Lemma 3, is also a model of . We demonstrate that is actually the -least model of . Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that is the -least model of . Then, will differ from in some atoms such that . We distinguish two cases. In the first case all the atoms such that have . In the second case there exist at least one atom such that .
In the first case it is easy to see that . We demonstrate that is also model of leading to contradiction since is -minimal. Assume that is not a model of . Then, there exists in a rule of the form:
such that . Notice that this implies that . Therefore, . We distinguish cases based on the value of :
Case 1: . This case leads immediately to contradiction because trivially satisfies .
Case 2: . Then, . Since is a model of , it is . This implies that there exists some , , such that and . By the definition of the reduct, the rule exists in . Since is a model of , we get that . Moreover, should also satisfy the rules for . Since and we get and . Therefore and (contradiction).
In the second case we construct the following interpretation :
It is easy to see that . We demonstrate that is a model of , which will lead to a contradiction (since we have assumed that is -minimal).
Assume is not a model of . Then, there exists in a rule of the form:
such that . Notice that this implies that . Therefore, . We distinguish cases based on the value of : Case 1: . This case leads immediately to contradiction because trivially satisfies .
Case 2: . Then, by the definition of , . Since is a model of , it is . This implies that either or there exists such that and . By the definition of , we get in both cases (contradiction).
Case 3: . Then, by the definition of , . Since is a model of , it is . This implies that there exists some , , such that and . By the definition of , we get that (contradiction).
Case 4: . Then, by the definition of , and . Since is a model of , it is . This implies that there exists some , , such that and . By the definition of the reduct, the rule exists in . Since is a model of , we get that . Thus, and , and therefore (contradiction).
Theorem1 Let be an LPOD. Then, is a three-valued answer set of iff is a consistent -minimal model of and is solid. \@endtheorem
Appendix C Proofs of Section 7
Lemma7 Let be a consistent disjunctive extended logic program. Then, the answer sets of according to Definition 20, coincide with the standard answer sets of . \@endtheorem
Proof C.20.
By taking in Definition 19, we get the standard definition of reduct for consistent disjunctive extended logic programs.
Lemma8 Let be a DLPOD program and let be an answer set of . Then, is a model of . \@endtheorem
Proof C.21.
Consider any rule in of the form:
If , then for some , . But then, the body of the rule evaluates to under , and therefore satisfies . Consider now the case where is nonempty and consists of the following rules:
We distinguish cases based on the value of :
Case 1: . Then, for some , . Then, rule is trivially satisfied by .
Case 2: . This implies that . We distinguish two subcases. If then because, by the definition of it is and we also know that . Thus, in this subcase satisfies . If , then by the definition of , ; however, we know that , and thus . Thus, in this subcase also satisfies .
Case 3: . Then, for all , . Since is a model of , we have . Moreover, by the definition of , . This implies that .
Lemma9 Let be a model of a DLPOD . Then, is a model of . \@endtheorem
Proof C.22.
Consider any rule in of the form:
and assume satisfies . If for some , , then no rule is created in for . Assume therefore that . By the definition of the following rules have been added to :
where is the least index such that and either or . Obviously, the first rules above are satisfied by . For the rule we distinguish two cases based on the value of . If , then, the rule is trivially satisfied. If , then, since rule is satisfied by and , it has to be . Therefore, the rule is satisfied by .
Lemma10 Every answer set of a DLPOD , is a -minimal model of . \@endtheorem
Proof C.23.
Assume there exists a model of with . We will show that is also a model of . Since , we also have . Since is the -least model of , we will conclude that .
Consider any rule in of the form:
Assume that is nonempty. This means that there exists some , , such that and either or . Then, consists of the following rules:
We show that satisfies the above rules. We distinguish cases based on the value of :
Case 1: . Then, and the above rules are trivially satisfied by .
Case 2: . Then, since , it is . If then trivially satisfies all the above rules. Assume therefore that . Recall now that for all , . Moreover, it has to be , because otherwise would not satisfy the rule . Since , it can only be for all , and , because otherwise would not be a model of . Therefore, satisfies the given rules of .
Case 3: . Then, since , it is either or . If then trivially satisfies all the above rules. Assume therefore that . Recall now that for all , . Moreover, it has to be , because otherwise would not satisfy the rule . Since , it can only be for all , and , because otherwise would not be a model of . Therefore, satisfies the given rules of .
Theorem2 Let be a DLPOD. Then, is an answer set of iff is a consistent -minimal model of and is solid. \@endtheorem The proof of the above theorem follows directly by the following two lemmas.
Lemma C.24.
Let be an DLPOD and let be an answer set of . Then, is a consistent -minimal model of and is solid.
Proof C.25.
Since is an answer set of , then, by Lemma 8, is a model of . Moreover, is solid because our definition of answer sets does not involve the value . It remains to show that it is minimal with respect to the ordering. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists a model of with . By Lemma 10, is (three-valued) -minimal. Therefore, can not be solid. We first show that can not be a model of the reduct . Assume for the sake of contradiction that is a model of . We construct the following interpretation :
We claim that must also be a model of . Consider first a rule of the form . Since is a model of , it is . By the definition of , it is and therefore satisfies this rule. Consider now a rule of the form in . We show that also satisfies this rule. We perform a case analysis:
Case 1: . Then, and trivially satisfies the rule.
Case 2: . Then, . Moreover, because is a model of . By the definition of , it is , and therefore satisfies the rule.
Case 3: . Then, . Moreover, because is a model of . By the definition of , it is , and therefore satisfies the rule.
Case 4: . Then, . Moreover, because is a model of . By the definition of , it is , and therefore satisfies the rule.
Therefore, must also be a model of . Moreover, by definition, is solid and . This contradicts the fact that, by construction, is the -least model of . In conclusion, can not be a model of .
We now show that can not be a model of . As we showed above, is not a model of , and consequently there exists a rule in that is not satisfied by . Such a rule in must have resulted due to a rule of the following form in :
According to the definition of , for all , , , and since , it is also . Moreover, there exists some such that and either or . Since , it is for all , . Consider now the rule that is not satisfied by in . If it is of the form , , , then and . This implies that and therefore does not satisfy the rule . If the rule that is not satisfied by in is of the form , then and therefore, since for all , , it is:
Thus, is not a model of .
Lemma C.26.
Let be an DLPOD and let be a consistent -minimal model of and is solid. Then, is an answer set of .
Proof C.27.
First observe that, by Lemma 9, is also a model of . We demonstrate that is actually the -least model of . Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that is the -least model of . Then, will differ from in some atoms such that . We distinguish two cases. In the first case all the atoms such that have . In the second case there exist at least one atom such that .
In the first case it is easy to see that . We demonstrate that is also model of leading to contradiction since is -minimal. Assume that is not a model of . Then, there exists in a rule of the form:
such that . Notice that this implies that . Therefore, . We distinguish cases based on the value of :
Case 1: . This case leads immediately to contradiction because trivially satisfies .
Case 2: . Then, . Since is a model of , it is . This implies that there exists some , , such that and . By the definition of the reduct, the rule exists in . Since is a model of , we get that . Moreover, should also satisfy the rules for . Since and we get and . Therefore and (contradiction).
In the second case we construct the following interpretation :
It is easy to see that . We demonstrate that is a model of , which will lead to a contradiction (since we have assumed that is -minimal).
Assume is not a model of . Then, there exists in a rule of the form:
such that . Notice that this implies that . Therefore, . We distinguish cases based on the value of :
Case 1: . This case leads immediately to contradiction because trivially satisfies .
Case 2: . Then, by the definition of , . Since is a model of , it is . This implies that either or there exists such that and . By the definition of , we get in both cases (contradiction).
Case 3: . Then, by the definition of , . Since is a model of , it is . This implies that there exists some , , such that and . By the definition of , we get that (contradiction).
Case 4: . Then, by the definition of , and . Since is a model of , it is . This implies that there exists some , , such that and . By the definition of the reduct, the rule exists in . Since is a model of , we get that . Thus, and , and therefore (contradiction).