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Attack-Resilient Distributed Convex Optimization of Linear Multi-Agent Systems Against Malicious Cyber-Attacks over Random Digraphs

Zhi Feng and Guoqiang Hu This work was supported by Singapore Ministry of Education Academic Research Fund Tier 1 RG180/17(2017-T1-002-158) and in part by the Wallenberg-NTU Presidential Postdoctoral Fellow Start-Up Grant. Z. Feng and G. Hu are with the School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798 (E-mail: zhifeng@ntu.edu.sg; gqhu@ntu.edu.sg).
Abstract

This paper addresses a resilient exponential distributed convex optimization problem for a heterogeneous linear multi-agent system under Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks over random digraphs. The random digraphs are caused by unreliable networks and the DoS attacks, allowed to occur aperiodically, refer to an interruption of the communication channels carried out by the intelligent adversaries. In contrast to many existing distributed convex optimization works over a prefect communication network, the global optimal solution might not be sought under the adverse influences that result in performance degradations or even failures of optimization algorithms. The aforementioned setting poses certain technical challenges to optimization algorithm design and exponential convergence analysis. In this work, several resilient algorithms are presented such that a team of agents minimizes a sum of local non-quadratic cost functions in a safe and reliable manner with global exponential convergence. Inspired by the preliminary works in [15, 17, 16, 18], an explicit analysis of frequency and duration of attacks is investigated to guarantee exponential optimal solutions. Numerical simulation results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed design.

Index Terms:
Distributed convex optimization, Linear multi-agent system, Heterogeneous network, Random digraph, DoS attack.

I Introduction

Distributed convex optimization over a multi-agent system has attracted growing attention over the last decade due to its potential applications involving source localization in sensor networks [1], resource allocation in multi-cell networks [2], energy and thermal comfort optimization in smart building [3], economic dispatch in smart grid [4], etc. The gradient-based distributed algorithms have been widely provided in the existing works, which build on either continuous-time or discrete-time agent dynamics to seek an optimal solution [6, 7, 8, 5, 10, 11, 9, 12, 13]. Each agent needs to calculate a global optimizer based on the information exchange over a communication network. The network security plays a fundamental yet important role in information transmission. Unfortunately, due to malicious attacks, (e.g., DoS attacks, deception attacks (false data injections, replay attacks), disclosure attacks (eavesdropping), and Byzantine attacks (faulty agents)), the secure network environment is hardly guaranteed in practice. The malicious attacks interrupt, incorrect, or tamper transmitting information so that efficiency of distributed optimization algorithm is degraded significantly or even failed. In light of wide applications of distributed optimization algorithms in cyber-physical systems (safety-critical), and inspired by studies of security issues in consensus works (e.g., [14, 15, 17, 16, 18, 20, 19]), it is highly desirable to determine how resilient distributed optimization algorithms are against cyber-attacks. Motivated by the observation, we aim to address resilient problems of distributed optimization with certain resilience against DoS attacks over unreliable networks.

I-A Related Literature Review

Continuous-Time Distributed Convex Optimization: paralleled with the discrete-time optimization schemes, the continuous-time distributed optimization algorithms have attracted much attention due to the well-developed continuous-time analysis techniques in control and the real-world cyber-physical system. In particular, the Zero-gradient-sum [5] and Newton-Raphson [6] algorithms are designed based on the positive and bounded Hessian of the local cost functions, while the Lagrangian-based algorithm based on the local gradients is adopted in [7]. The penalty-based optimization strategies are developed in [5] and [8], while the works investigate the multi-agent system with single-integrator dynamics only. The authors in [9] further consider distributed optimization of second-order multi-agent systems. Adaptive schemes are designed in [10] to achieve distributed optimization of linear agents via nonsmooth signum functions and gradients that satisfy special structures. All above designs require continuous communication. To remove this requirement, the time-based and event-triggered based strategies are presented in [11, 12, 13] over undirected and connected graphs. Besides, these algorithms need known initial states of each agent, which is difficult to verify in practice.

Resilient Distributed Convex Optimization: the closest related works on this topic have been recently published in [21, 22, 23, 24] in which the optimal solutions are obtained for first-order discrete-time multi-agent systems under Byzantine attacks (faulty nodes). In particular, the authors in [21] present the resilient optimization algorithm by removing FF (maximum amount of tolerable faults) nodes’ largest and smallest states at each iteration, such that the optimal solution converges to a convex hull of the set of all non-faulty nodes’ local minimizers. This algorithm is adopted in [22] to deal with constrained optimization problems. The local filtering consensus-based algorithms against FF faulty nodes are developed in [23], where the optimal solution is achieved under the rr-robust condition. The modified algorithm named RDO-T is developed in [24], where the number of faulty agents is allowed to be any large. These aforementioned works assume that the faulty nodes and the removal of FF states are known a prior to the designer. Moreover, these algorithms rely on the network connectivity of the complete graph or the undirected and connected graph.

I-B Main Contributions

This paper is concerned with a resilient study of distributed optimization algorithms against cyber-attacks over random digraphs. The malicious DoS attacks, allowed to occur aperiodically, aim to interrupt information transmission. In addition to DoS attacks, the random digraphs are induced by unreliable networked constraints. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows. (1) inspired by our designs in [15, 17, 16, 18], this is the first to present time-based and event-based distributed optimization algorithms to achieve resilient distributed optimization of heterogeneous linear multi-agent networks against DoS attacks over random digraphs. The proposed algorithms that rely on a consensus-based gradient strategy with a switching system method to constrain DoS attacks, are capable of exactly seeking the optimal solutions under attacks over random digraphs. The global exponential convergence of the proposed algorithm can be ensured, provided that the frequency and duration of attacks satisfy certain bounded conditions; (2) these proposed resilient distributed optimization algorithms avoid continuous-time communication in many existing works (see [6, 7, 8, 5, 9, 10]). The proposed dynamic event-based distributed optimization scheme is proven to be free of Zeno behavior, and avoid fixed and periodic transmissions used in the time-based scheme; and (3) in contrast to related optimization works that require known positive Hessians of the local cost functions [5] and [6], known gradients satisfying special linear structures [10], known initial agent states [11, 12, 13], the proposed algorithms in this work remove those limitations to facilitate practical applications. Moreover, compared to optimization works in [21, 22, 23, 24] that consider Byzantine faults on nodes and require the removal of their states to be known a prior, these DoS attacks on communication networks are time-sequence based and allowed to occur aperiodically. Another contribution of this paper is that unlike works in [6, 7, 8, 5, 10, 11, 9, 12, 13] and [21, 22, 23, 24] over the undirected graph or weight-balanced digraph, the studied graphs are directed and time-varying, and under cyber-attacks, the graphs can be even disconnected or totally paralyzed.

II Preliminaries and Problem Formulation

II-A Notation

Denote \mathbb{R}, n\mathbb{R}^{n}, and n×m\mathbb{R}^{n\times m} as the sets of the real numbers, real nn-dimensional vectors and real n×mn\times m matrices, respectively. Let +\mathbb{N}^{+} be the set of positive natural numbers. Let 0 (1) be the vector with all zeros (ones) with proper dimensions. Let col(x1,,xn)(x_{1},...,x_{n}) and diag{a1,,an}\{a_{1},...,a_{n}\} be a column vector with the entries xix_{i} and a diagonal matrix with the entries aia_{i}, i=1,2,,ni=1,2,\cdots,n, respectively. \otimes and \left\|\cdot\right\| represent the Kronecker product and Euclidean norm, respectively. For a real matrix M=MTM=M^{T}, let M>0M>0 be positive definite. Let λmin(M)\lambda_{\min}(M), λmax(M)\lambda_{\max}(M) be its minimum and maximum eigenvalues, respectively. Besides, σmax(M)\sigma_{\max}(M) represents the maximum singular value of a matrix MM. For a differentiable function f:nf:\mathbb{R}^{n}\rightarrow\mathbb{R}, f\triangledown f is the gradient of ff, and ff is strongly convex over a convex set n\mathbb{R}^{n}, if (xy)T(f(x)f(y))>ιxy2(x-y)^{T}(\triangledown f(x)-\triangledown f(y))>\iota||x-y||^{2} for x,yn,xy\forall x,y\in\mathbb{R}^{n},x\neq y and a scalar ι>0\iota>0. ff is locally Lipschitz at xnx\in\mathbb{R}^{n} if there exists a neighbourhood 𝒲\mathcal{W} and a scalar ll so that f(x)f(y)lxy||f(x)-f(y)||\leq l||x-y|| for x,y𝒲\forall x,y\in\mathcal{W}; ff is locally Lipschitz on n\mathbb{R}^{n} if it is locally Lipschitz at xx for xn\forall x\in\mathbb{R}^{n}.

II-B Graph Theory

Static Digraph: let 𝒢\mathcal{G} == {𝒱,}\left\{\mathcal{V},\mathcal{E}\right\} be a graph and 𝒱\mathcal{V} \in {1,,N}\left\{1,...,N\right\} be the set of vertices. The set of edges is denoted as \mathcal{E} \subseteq 𝒱×𝒱\mathcal{V\times V}. 𝒩i\mathcal{N}_{i} == {j𝒱(j,i)}\left\{j\in\mathcal{V\mid}(j,i)\in\mathcal{E}\right\} is the neighborhood set of vertex ii. For a directed graph 𝒢\mathcal{G}, (i,j)(i,j)\in\mathcal{E} means that the information of node ii is accessible to node jj, but not conversely. A matrix AA == [aij]\left[a_{ij}\right] is the adjacency matrix of 𝒢\mathcal{G}, where aij>0a_{ij}>0 if (j,i)(j,i)\in\mathcal{E}, else aij=0a_{ij}=0. A matrix =[lij]\mathcal{L}=[l_{ij}] is called the Laplacian matrix of 𝒢\mathcal{G}, where lii=j=1Naijl_{ii}=\sum^{N}_{j=1}a_{ij} and lij=aijl_{ij}=-a_{ij}, iji\neq j.

Markovian Random Digraph: let 𝒢(t)={𝒱,r(t)}\mathcal{G}(t)=\left\{\mathcal{V},\mathcal{E}_{r(t)}\right\} be a time-varying digraph with r(t)\mathcal{E}_{r(t)} being a set of edges, and r(t):[0,)𝒮={1,2,,s}r(t):[0,\infty)\\ \rightarrow\mathcal{S}=\{1,2,...,s\} is a piecewise constant function with 𝒮\mathcal{S} being an index set of possible digraphs. The piecewise-constant function r(t)r(t) is a Markovian signal. 𝒜(t)\mathcal{A}(t) =[aijr(t)]=[a_{ij}^{r(t)}] is the adjacency matrix, where aijr(t)>0a_{ij}^{r(t)}>0 if (j,i)r(t)(j,i)\in\mathcal{E}_{r(t)}, else aijr(t)=0.a_{ij}^{r(t)}=0. The neighboring set is denoted by 𝒩i(t)={j𝒱,(j,i)r(t)}\mathcal{N}_{i}(t)=\left\{j\in\mathcal{V},(j,i)\in\mathcal{E}_{r(t)}\right\}. Denote (t)=[lijr(t)]\mathcal{L}(t)=[l^{r(t)}_{ij}], where liir(t)=j=1Naijr(t)l^{r(t)}_{ii}=\sum^{N}_{j=1}a^{r(t)}_{ij} and lijr(t)=aijr(t)l^{r(t)}_{ij}=-a^{r(t)}_{ij}, iji\neq j.

II-C Heterogeneous Linear Multi-Agent Model

Consider a multi-agent system consisting of NN agents governed by the following heterogeneous linear dynamics:

x˙i(t)=Aixi(t)+Biui(t),yi(t)=Cixi(t),i𝒱,\dot{x}_{i}(t)=A_{i}x_{i}(t)+B_{i}u_{i}(t),\ y_{i}(t)=C_{i}x_{i}(t),\ i\in\mathcal{V}, (1)

where xinix_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{i}} denotes the state of agent ii, uipiu_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{p_{i}} denotes the control input of agent ii, yiqy_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{q} is its output, and Aini×niA_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{i}\times n_{i}}, Bini×piB_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{i}\times p_{i}}, Ciq×niC_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{q\times n_{i}} are constant system matrices. Suppose that the matrix pair (Ai,Bi)(A_{i},B_{i}) is controllable and

rank[CiBi0q×piAiBiBi]=ni+q,i𝒱.\hskip 20.00003pt\text{rank}\left[\begin{array}[]{cc}C_{i}B_{i}&0_{q\times p_{i}}\\ -A_{i}B_{i}&B_{i}\\ \end{array}\right]=n_{i}+q,\ i\in\mathcal{V}. (2)

General Distributed Optimization Problem: design a distributed scheme ui(t)u_{i}(t) for (1) using local interaction and information over a communication network so that the output of all agents can reach the optimal state θ\theta^{*} that minimize: F(θ)=i=1Nfi(θ),θq\mathrm{F}(\theta)=\sum_{i=1}^{N}f_{i}(\theta),\ \theta\in\mathbb{R}^{q}, where fi(θ):qf_{i}(\theta):\mathbb{R}^{q}\rightarrow\mathbb{R} is the private cost function known to agent ii only, and θ\theta is the global decision variable to be optimized. From [7], it is equivalent to solve:

minyNqf~(y)=i=1Nfi(yi),yiq,subject to(1)andyi=yj,i,j𝒱={1,2,,N},\begin{split}&\min\limits_{y\in\mathbb{R}^{Nq}}\ \tilde{f}(y)=\sum_{i=1}^{N}f_{i}(y_{i}),\ y_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{q},\\ \text{subject to}\ &(\ref{Dynamics})\ \text{and}\ y_{i}=y_{j},\ \forall i,j\in\mathcal{V}=\{1,2,\cdots,N\},\end{split} (3)

where yiqy_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{q} is a local estimate on the optimal solution θ\theta^{*}, and y=col(y1,,yN)y=\text{col}(y_{1},\cdots,y_{N}) is its stack vector of all estimates.

To solve the problem, two standard assumptions are introduced.

Assumption 1

There exists y=1qθy^{*}=1_{q}\otimes\theta^{*} that minimizes the team cost function, i.e., f~(y)=minθqF(θ)\tilde{f}(y^{*})=\min_{\theta\in\mathbb{R}^{q}}F(\theta).

Assumption 2

Each function fi:qf_{i}:\mathbb{R}^{q}\rightarrow\mathbb{R} is differentiable, strongly convex, and its gradient is locally Lipschitz on q\mathbb{R}^{q}.

Remark 1

Assumption 1 guarantees the optimal solution set is nonempty. By Assumption 2, fi(xi)fi(yi)lixiyi,xi,yiq||\triangledown f_{i}(x_{i})-\triangledown f_{i}(y_{i})||\leq l_{i}||\triangledown x_{i}-y_{i}||,\ \forall x_{i},y_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{q}, where fi(xi)\triangledown f_{i}(x_{i}) and fi(yi)\triangledown f_{i}(y_{i}) are the gradients, and li>0l_{i}>0 is the Lipschitz constant.

II-D Unreliable Random Communication Network

In large-scale cyber-physical systems, the wireless communication may not be reliable due to certain physical uncertainties, e.g., failures, quantization errors, and packet losses in a digital communication [25]. We consider an unreliable network consisting of NN agents whose integrated wireless communication links are time-varying and failure-prone with certain probabilities. As considered in [25], a random Markov chain model can be adopted to capture this situation. This random process describes dynamic changes of topologies. Let r(t)r(t) be a right-continuous homogeneous Markovian process on the probability space taking values in a finite state space 𝒮={1,2,,s}\mathcal{S}=\{1,2,...,s\} with an infinitesimal generator Υ=(γpq)\Upsilon=(\gamma_{pq}), given by Ppq(t)=Prob{r(t+h)=q|r(t)=p}=γpqh+o(h)\mathrm{P}_{pq}(t)=\mathrm{\Pr ob}\{r(t+h)=q|r(t)=p\}=\gamma_{pq}h+o(h), if pqp\neq q, else, 1+γpph+o(h)1+\gamma_{pp}h+o(h), where γpq0\gamma_{pq}\geq 0 is the transition rate from the state pp to the state qq, while γpp=q=1,pqsγpq,\gamma_{pp}=-\sum^{s}_{q=1,p\neq q}\gamma_{pq}, and o(h)o(h) satisfies: limh0o(t)/h=0\lim_{h\rightarrow 0}o(t)/h=0.

II-E Malicious DoS Attack Model

As studied in [18], the DoS attack refers to the interruption of the communication channels. Without loss of generality, suppose that there exists an attack sequence {am}m\{a_{m}\}_{m\in\mathbb{N}} when a DoS attack is lunched at ama_{m}, and let the duration of this attack be τm0\tau_{m}\geq 0. Then, the mm-th DoS attack strategy can be generated with 𝒜m\mathcal{A}_{m} == am[am,am+τm){a_{m}}\cup[a_{m},a_{m}+\tau_{m}) with am+1>am+τma_{m+1}>a_{m}+\tau_{m} for all m.m\in\mathbb{N}. Thus, for given tt0t\geq t_{0}, the sets of time instants where communication is denied (unsuccessful) are described by

Ξa(t0,t)=𝒜m[t0,t],m,\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t)=\cup\ \mathcal{A}_{m}\cap\ [t_{0},t],\ m\in\mathbb{N}, (4)

which implies that on the interval [t0,t][t_{0},t], the sets of time instants where communication is allowed are: Ξs(t0,t)=[t0,t]Ξa(t0,t)\Xi_{s}(t_{0},t)=[t_{0},t]\setminus\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t). In words, |Ξa(t0,t)||\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t)| and |Ξs(t0,t)||\Xi_{s}(t_{0},t)| represent the total lengths of the attacker being active and sleeping over [t0,t][t_{0},t], respectively.

Definition 1 (Attack Frequency)

For any T2>T1t0T_{2}>T_{1}\geq t_{0}, let Na(T1,T2)N_{a}(T_{1},T_{2}) denote the total number of DoS attacks over [T1,T2)[T_{1},T_{2}). Then, Fa(T1,T2)=Na(T1,T2)T2T1F_{a}(T_{1},T_{2})=\frac{N_{a}(T_{1},T_{2})}{T_{2}-T_{1}} denotes the attack frequency over [T1,T2)[T_{1},T_{2}) for T2>T1t0\forall T_{2}>T_{1}\geq t_{0}, where there exists scalars N0,Tf>0N_{0},T_{f}>0 such that Na(T1,T2)N0+(T2T1)/Tf.N_{a}(T_{1},T_{2})\leq N_{0}+(T_{2}-T_{1})/T_{f}.

Definition 2 (Attack Duration)

For any T2>T1t0,T_{2}>T_{1}\geq t_{0}, let |Ξa(T1,T2)||\Xi_{a}(T_{1},T_{2})| be the total time interval under attacks over [T1,T2).[T_{1},T_{2}). The attack duration over [T1,T2)[T_{1},T_{2}) is defined as: there exist scalars T00T_{0}\geq 0, Ta>1T_{a}>1 so that |Ξa(T1,T2)|T0+(T2T1)/Ta.|\Xi_{a}(T_{1},T_{2})|\leq T_{0}+(T_{2}-T_{1})/T_{a}.

Remark 2

As mentioned in the preliminary works [15, 17, 16, 18] for multi-agent systems under malicious cyber-attacks, Definitions 1 and 2 are firstly introduced in [15] to specify DoS attack signals in terms of the frequency and time-ratio constraints.

II-F Main Objective

The main objective of the paper is to solve a resilient distributed optimization issue of heterogeneous linear multi-agent systems.

Problem 1

(Resilient Distributed Convex Optimization against DoS Attacks over Random Digraphs)
Develop a resilient distributed algorithm uiu_{i} so that the output of each agent cooperatively seeks θ\theta^{*} under DoS attacks over random digraphs. The problem in (3) is reformulated as

minyNqf~(y)=i=1Nfi(yi),yiq,subject tox˙i(t)=Aixi(t)+Biui(t),yi(t)=Cixi(t),and((t)Iq)y=0,tΞs(t0,t)Ξa(t0,t).\begin{split}&\min\limits_{y\in\mathbb{R}^{Nq}}\ \tilde{f}(y)=\sum_{i=1}^{N}f_{i}(y_{i}),\ y_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{q},\\ \text{subject to}\ &\dot{x}_{i}(t)=A_{i}x_{i}(t)+B_{i}u_{i}(t),y_{i}(t)=C_{i}x_{i}(t),\\ \text{and}\ &(\mathcal{L}(t)\otimes I_{q})y=\textbf{0},\ t\in\Xi_{s}(t_{0},t)\cup\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t).\end{split} (5)
Remark 3

Solving resilient exponential distributed optimization in Problem 1 is much more challenging in fourfold: (1) Agent dynamics: we investigate general linear multi-agent systems with nonidentical dynamics and dimensions; (2) Communication: the unreliable communication network leads to time-varying directed graphs and moreover, the interruptions of communication channels caused by DoS attacks make existing distributed optimization algorithms degraded or totally failed; (3) Assumptions: the local gradient is nonlinear without needing to satisfy special structures in many existing works and only the local Lipschitz property is required; and 4) Design requirements: propose the initialization-free resilient distributed optimization algorithms with the discrete-time communication nature to provide global exponential convergence and resilience features against DoS attacks over random digraphs. The existing designs in [6, 7, 8, 5, 10, 11, 9, 12, 13] cannot be directly applied.

III Resilient Exponential Distributed Optimization Against Dos ATTACKS over Random Networks

Due to unreliable networks described in the subsection II-D, the underlying topologies are time-varying and random. As stated in [26], define that a sequence of Laplacian matrices {(t)}\{\mathcal{L}(t)\} admits a common stationary distribution π>0\pi>0 if (t)π=0\mathcal{L}(t)\pi=\textbf{0}. Let s(t)\mathcal{L}_{s}(t) be a mirror of un(t)\mathcal{L}_{un}(t), i.e., s(t)=(un+unT)/2\mathcal{L}_{s}(t)=(\mathcal{L}_{un}+\mathcal{L}_{un}^{T})/2, where un=p=1NLp(t)\mathcal{L}_{un}=\sum_{p=1}^{N}L_{p}(t) is Laplacian matrix of a union of digraphs. Define the minimum cut of {(t)}\{\mathcal{L}(t)\} as lc(t)=min𝒮𝒱,𝒮i𝒮,j𝒮¯s(t)l_{c}(t)=\min_{\mathcal{S}\subset\mathcal{V},\mathcal{S}\neq\emptyset}\sum_{i\in\mathcal{S},j\in\bar{\mathcal{S}}}\mathcal{L}_{s}(t), where 𝒮¯\bar{\mathcal{S}} is the complement of 𝒮\mathcal{S}. Then, we say that this sequence of {(t)}\{\mathcal{L}(t)\} has a minimum cut cc, if lc(t)c>0l_{c}(t)\geq c>0.

Assumption 3

Assume that the sequence of Laplacian matrices {(t)}\{\mathcal{L}(t)\} has a stationary distribution π\pi with a minimum cut.

Lemma 1

By Assumption 3, let (t)\mathcal{L}(t) be the Laplacian matrix with a stationary distribution π>0\pi>0. Then, there exists a weighted matrix Q(t)=(t)Π+ΠT(t)Q(t)=\mathcal{L}(t)\Pi+\Pi\mathcal{L}^{T}(t), Π=diag{π}\Pi=\text{diag}\{\pi\}, so that for πmin=minp𝒱{πp}\pi_{min}=\min_{p\in\mathcal{V}}\{\pi_{p}\} and a vector ξN\xi\in\mathbb{R}^{N} satisfying πTξ=0\pi^{T}\xi=0, we have

ξTQ(t)ξ=i=1Nj𝒩(t)Qij(t)(ξiξj)2πmincN2ξ2.\xi^{T}Q(t)\xi=\sum_{i=1}^{N}\sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}(t)}Q_{ij}(t)(\xi_{i}-\xi_{j})^{2}\geq\frac{\pi_{min}c}{N^{2}}||\xi||^{2}. (6)
Proof:

without loss of generality, we suppose that ξ0||\xi||\neq 0, where it satisfies ξ1ξ2ξN\xi_{1}\leq\xi_{2}\leq\cdots\leq\xi_{N}. Since ξ0||\xi||\neq 0 and πTξ=0\pi^{T}\xi=0, we have ξ1<0\xi_{1}<0 and ξN>0\xi_{N}>0. Define iargmaxi2|ξiξi1|i_{*}\in\text{argmax}_{i\geq 2}|\xi_{i}-\xi_{i-1}| and ε=|ξiξi1|\varepsilon=|\xi_{i_{*}}-\xi_{i_{*}-1}|. Then, we obtain that

ξTQ(t)ξ\displaystyle\xi^{T}Q(t)\xi =i=1Ni<jQij(t)(ξiξj)2iii<jQij(t)ε2\displaystyle=\sum_{i=1}^{N}\sum_{i<j}Q_{ij}(t)(\xi_{i}-\xi_{j})^{2}\geq\sum_{i\leq i_{*}}\sum_{i_{*}<j}Q_{ij}(t)\varepsilon^{2}
πminlc(t)ε2πmincN2ξ2,\displaystyle\geq\pi_{min}l_{c}(t)\varepsilon^{2}\geq\frac{\pi_{min}c}{N^{2}}||\xi||^{2}, (7)

where the fact |ξi|Nε|\xi_{i}|\leq N\varepsilon is used to get the last inequality. ∎

III-A Distributed Time-Based Strategy Against DoS Attacks

Based on the DoS attack model in the subsection II-E, without loss of generality, suppose that there exists an infinite sequence of uniformly bounded non-overlapping time intervals [tk,tk+1),k=0,1,2[t_{k},t_{k+1}),k=0,1,2\cdots. Each agent ii thus updates its controller ui(t)u_{i}(t) over time intervals [tk,tk+1)[t_{k},t_{k+1}). Then, in the presence of the DoS attacks, we denote the attack-induced new time sequence as 0=t0=a0<t1<a1<a1+τ1t2<<tk<ak<ak+τktk+1<0=t_{0}=a_{0}<t_{1}<a_{1}<a_{1}+\tau_{1}\leq t_{2}<\cdots<t_{k}<a_{k}<a_{k}+\tau_{k}\leq t_{k+1}<\cdots.

Next, we propose the following distributed algorithm to analyze the effect of DoS attacks over random digraphs.

ui\displaystyle u_{i} =Kixi(UiKiXi)ϱi+Wiϑi,\displaystyle=-K_{i}x_{i}-(U_{i}-K_{i}X_{i})\varrho_{i}+W_{i}\vartheta_{i}, (8a)
ϱ˙i\displaystyle\dot{\varrho}_{i} =ϑi=fi(yi)βeϱziαβeyi,\displaystyle=\vartheta_{i}=-\triangledown f_{i}(y_{i})-\beta e_{\varrho zi}-\alpha\beta e_{yi}, (8b)
z˙i\displaystyle\dot{z}_{i} =αβeyi,t[tk,tk+1),i𝒱,\displaystyle=\alpha\beta e_{yi},t\in[t_{k},t_{k+1}),\ i\in\mathcal{V}, (8c)

where α,β\alpha,\beta\in\mathbb{R} are positive constant gains, ϑi\vartheta_{i} is the intermediate variable, and eϱzie_{\varrho zi}, eyie_{yi} are consensus errors under DoS attacks

eϱzi={j𝒩i(t)aij(t)(ϱiϱj+zizj), ift[tk,ak),0, ift[ak,tk+1),k=0,1,2,e_{\varrho zi}=\left\{\begin{array}[]{c}\sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_{i}(t)}a_{ij}(t)(\varrho_{i}-\varrho_{j}+z_{i}-z_{j}),\text{ if}\ t\in[t_{k},a_{k}),\\ \textbf{0},\text{ if}\ t\in[a_{k},t_{k+1}),\ k=0,1,2\cdots,\end{array}\right. (9)
eyi={j𝒩i(t)aij(t)(yiyj), ift[tk,ak),0, ift[ak,tk+1),k=0,1,2,e_{yi}=\left\{\begin{array}[]{c}\sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_{i}(t)}a_{ij}(t)(y_{i}-y_{j}),\text{ if}\ t\in[t_{k},a_{k}),\\ \textbf{0},\text{ if}\ t\in[a_{k},t_{k+1}),\ k=0,1,2\cdots,\end{array}\right. (10)

where ϱi,ziq\varrho_{i},z_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{q} denote the auxiliary states. In (8), Kipi×niK_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{p_{i}\times n_{i}} and (Ui,Wi,Xi)(U_{i},W_{i},X_{i}) is the solution to the following equations:

BiUi=AiXi,BiWi=Xi,CiXi=Iq,i𝒱.B_{i}U_{i}=A_{i}X_{i},\ B_{i}W_{i}=X_{i},\ C_{i}X_{i}=I_{q},\ i\in\mathcal{V}. (11)
Remark 4

The proposed algorithm in (8)-(11) has properties: 1) it is distributed as each agent communicates with its neighbors only; 2) each agent transmits exchange information over random digraphs, while in the presence of DoS attacks, the information is interrupted; and 3) j𝒩i(t)aij(t)(zizj)\sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_{i}(t)}a_{ij}(t)(z_{i}-z_{j}) in eϱzie_{\varrho zi} is relative internal state information, which is used to avoid zero-sum initial requirements. Besides, the solution of (11) is ensured by (2).

Define ~(t)=(t)Iq\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)=\mathcal{L}(t)\otimes I_{q}. Substituting (8)-(10) into (1) gives the following closed-loop system under attacks and random digraphs.

χ˙={[(ABK)x+BWϑB(UKX)ϱf~(y)αβ~(t)yβ~(t)(ϱ+z)αβ~(t)y], ift[tk,ak),k=0,1,2[(ABK)x+BWϑB(UKX)ϱf~(y)0], ift[ak,tk+1),k=0,1,2\dot{\chi}=\left\{\begin{array}[]{l}\left[\begin{array}[]{ccc}(A-BK)x+BW\vartheta-B(U-KX)\varrho\\ -\triangledown\tilde{f}(y)-\alpha\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)y-\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)(\varrho+z)\\ \alpha\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)y\end{array}\right],\\ \text{ if}\ t\in[t_{k},a_{k}),k=0,1,2\cdots\\ \left[\begin{array}[]{ccc}(A-BK)x+BW\vartheta-B(U-KX)\varrho\\ -\triangledown\tilde{f}(y)\\ \textbf{0}\end{array}\right],\\ \text{ if}\ t\in[a_{k},t_{k+1}),k=0,1,2\cdots\end{array}\right. (12)

where χ=col(x,ϱ,z)\chi=\text{col}(x,\varrho,z) and x,ϱ,z,ϑ,f~(y)x,\varrho,z,\vartheta,\triangledown\tilde{f}(y) are stacked vectors of xix_{i}, ϱi\varrho_{i}, ziz_{i}, ϑi\vartheta_{i}, fi(yi)\triangledown f_{i}(y_{i}), and A,B,C,K,U,W,XA,B,C,K,U,W,X are stacked block diagonal matrices of AiA_{i}, BiB_{i}, CiC_{i}, KiK_{i}, UiU_{i}, WiW_{i}, XiX_{i}, respectively.

Next, we present the exponential resilient distributed optimization result against DoS attacks and random digraphs.

Theorem 1

Given Assumptions 1-3, Problem 1 is solvable for any xi(0)x_{i}(0), ϱi(0)\varrho_{i}(0), and zi(0)z_{i}(0) under the proposed resilient distributed optimization algorithm in (8)-(10), provided that KiK_{i} is chosen so that AiBiKiA_{i}-B_{i}K_{i} is Hurwitz, Ui,Wi,XiU_{i},W_{i},X_{i} are solutions to (11), and for scalars λa,λb,u>0\lambda_{a},\lambda_{b},u>0 to be determined later, the following two arrack-related conditions are satisfied:

(1). There exists constants η(0,λa)\eta^{\ast}\in(0,\lambda_{a}) and μ1\mu\geq 1 so that TfT_{f} in the attack frequency Definition 1 satisfies the condition:

Tf>Tf=ln(μ)/η,T_{f}>T^{*}_{f}=\ln(\mu)/\eta^{\ast}, (13)

(2). There exist constants λa\lambda_{a}, λb>0\lambda_{b}>0 such that TaT_{a} in the attack duration Definition 2 satisfies the condition:

Ta>Ta=(λa+λb)/(λaη).\hskip 20.00003ptT_{a}>T^{*}_{a}=(\lambda_{a}+\lambda_{b})/(\lambda_{a}-\eta^{\ast}). (14)

Moreover, the estimated states converge exponentially, i.e.,

χ~(t)2ςeη(tt0)χ~(t0)2,t00,\|\tilde{\chi}(t)\|^{2}\leq\varsigma e^{-\eta(t-t_{0})}||\tilde{\chi}(t_{0})||^{2},\ \forall t_{0}\geq 0, (15)

where χ~=col(x~Xϱ~,ϱ~+z~,y~)\tilde{\chi}=\text{col}(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho},\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z},\tilde{y}) with x~=xx¯\tilde{x}=x-\bar{x}, ϱ~=ϱϱ¯\tilde{\varrho}=\varrho-\bar{\varrho}, and z~=zz¯\tilde{z}=z-\bar{z} representing the state transformations, ς\varsigma is a positive scalar to be determined later, and η=λa(λa+λb)/Taη>0\eta=\lambda_{a}-(\lambda_{a}+\lambda_{b})/T_{a}-\eta^{*}>0.

Proof:

the idea is to show the convergence of (x,ϱ,z)(x,\varrho,z) to the equilibrium point, which will include four steps below:
i) consider the case that the communication is not subject to DoS attacks, i.e., t[tk,ak)t\in[t_{k},a_{k}). We first show that the output yiy_{i} at the equilibrium point is an optimal solution of (5).

In the absence of DoS attacks, (12) can be rewritten as

x˙\displaystyle\dot{x} =(ABK)x+BWϑB(UKX)ϱ,\displaystyle=(A-BK)x+BW\vartheta-B(U-KX)\varrho, (16a)
ϱ˙\displaystyle\dot{\varrho} =ϑ=f~(y)αβ~(t)yβ~(t)(ϱ+z),\displaystyle=\vartheta=-\triangledown\tilde{f}(y)-\alpha\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)y-\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)(\varrho+z), (16b)
z˙\displaystyle\dot{z} =αβ~(t)y.\displaystyle=\alpha\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)y. (16c)

By (11), we obtain the equilibrium point (x¯,ϱ¯,z¯)(\bar{x},\bar{\varrho},\bar{z}) from

x¯˙\displaystyle\dot{\bar{x}} =0(ABK)(x¯Xϱ¯)+Xϱ¯˙=0,\displaystyle=\textbf{0}\ \Longrightarrow\ (A-BK)(\bar{x}-X\bar{\varrho})+X\dot{\bar{\varrho}}=\textbf{0}, (17a)
ϱ¯˙\displaystyle\dot{\bar{\varrho}} =0f~(y)αβ~(t)y¯β~(t)(ϱ¯+z¯)=0,\displaystyle=\textbf{0}\ \Longrightarrow\ -\triangledown\tilde{f}(y)-\alpha\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)\bar{y}-\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)(\bar{\varrho}+\bar{z})=\textbf{0}, (17b)
z¯˙\displaystyle\dot{\bar{z}} =0αβ~(t)y¯=αβ~(t)Cx¯=0.\displaystyle=\textbf{0}\ \Longrightarrow\ \alpha\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)\bar{y}=\alpha\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)C\bar{x}=\textbf{0}. (17c)

In the sequel, we show that the equilibrium point is the solution. Deducing from (17), the equilibrium point satisfies

(ABK)(x¯Xϱ¯)=0,i=1Nf~i(y¯i)=0,y¯i=Cix¯i=y,(A-BK)(\bar{x}-X\bar{\varrho})=\textbf{0},\ \sum_{i=1}^{N}\triangledown\tilde{f}_{i}(\bar{y}_{i})=\textbf{0},\ \bar{y}_{i}=C_{i}\bar{x}_{i}=y^{*}, (18)

where yqy^{*}\in\mathbb{R}^{q}, and since f~\tilde{f} is strongly convex, i=1Nf~i(y)=0\sum_{i=1}^{N}\triangledown\tilde{f}_{i}(y^{*})=\textbf{0} implies that yy^{*} is the optimal solution. Since KK is selected such that ABKA-BK is Hurwitz, it follows from (11) and (18) that

x¯=Xϱ¯andy¯=ϱ¯=1y.\bar{x}=X\bar{\varrho}\ \ \text{and}\ \ \bar{y}=\bar{\varrho}=\textbf{1}\otimes y^{*}. (19)

Thus, (x¯,ϱ¯,z¯)=(Xϱ¯,ϱ¯,z¯)(\bar{x},\bar{\varrho},\bar{z})=(X\bar{\varrho},\bar{\varrho},\bar{z}), and yiy_{i} at the equilibrium point is the optimal solution of (5) in the absence of attacks.

Let F=f~(y~+y¯)f~(y¯)F=\triangledown\tilde{f}(\tilde{y}+\bar{y})-\triangledown\tilde{f}(\bar{y}) and y~=Cx~\tilde{y}=C\tilde{x}. Since x~=xx¯\tilde{x}=x-\bar{x}, ϱ~=ϱϱ¯\tilde{\varrho}=\varrho-\bar{\varrho}, z~=zz¯\tilde{z}=z-\bar{z}, we further have the following system

x~˙\displaystyle\dot{\tilde{x}} =(ABK)(x~Xϱ~)+Xϱ~˙,\displaystyle=(A-BK)(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})+X\dot{\tilde{\varrho}}, (20a)
ϱ~˙\displaystyle\dot{\tilde{\varrho}} =Fαβ~(t)y~β~(t)(ϱ~+z~),\displaystyle=-F-\alpha\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)\tilde{y}-\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z}), (20b)
z~˙\displaystyle\dot{\tilde{z}} =αβ~(t)y~.\displaystyle=\alpha\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)\tilde{y}. (20c)

Choose the following nonnegative Lyapunov function candidate Va=V1a+V2a+V3aV_{a}=V_{1a}+V_{2a}+V_{3a}, where

V1a\displaystyle V_{1a} =(x~Xϱ~)TPa(x~Xϱ~),\displaystyle=(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})^{T}P_{a}(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho}), (21a)
V2a\displaystyle V_{2a} =12(ϱ~+z~)T(ΠIq)(ϱ~+z~),\displaystyle=\frac{1}{2}(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})^{T}(\Pi\otimes I_{q})(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z}), (21b)
V3a\displaystyle V_{3a} =12y~T(ΠIq)y~,\displaystyle=\frac{1}{2}\tilde{y}^{T}(\Pi\otimes I_{q})\tilde{y}, (21c)

where Pa>0P_{a}>0 and Π=diag{π}\Pi=\text{diag}\{\pi\} is defined in Lemma 1.

Then, the time derivatives of (21a) along (20) is described by

V˙1a\displaystyle\dot{V}_{1a} =(x~Xϱ~)T(PaA~+A~TPa)(x~Xϱ~)\displaystyle=(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})^{T}(P_{a}\tilde{A}+\tilde{A}^{T}P_{a})(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho}) (22)
=(x~Xϱ~)TO(x~Xϱ~)ϵ0(x~Xϱ~)T(x~Xϱ~),\displaystyle=-(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})^{T}O(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})\leq-\epsilon_{0}(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})^{T}(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho}),

where A~=ABK\tilde{A}=A-BK is Hurwitz so that there is a positive define matrix OO satisfying PaA~+A~TPa=OP_{a}\tilde{A}+\tilde{A}^{T}P_{a}=-O and ϵ0=λmin(O)>0\epsilon_{0}=\lambda_{min}(O)>0. Then, it follows from (21) and (20b)-(20c) that

V˙2a\displaystyle\dot{V}_{2a} =(ϱ~+z~)T(ΠIq)(ϱ~˙+αβ~(t)y~),\displaystyle=(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})^{T}(\Pi\otimes I_{q})(\dot{\tilde{\varrho}}+\alpha\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)\tilde{y}),
=(ϱ~+z~)T(ΠIq)(Fβ~(t)(ϱ~+z~))\displaystyle=(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})^{T}(\Pi\otimes I_{q})(-F-\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z}))
=(ϱ~+z~)T(ΠIq)Fβ(ϱ~+z~)TQ(t)(ϱ~+z~).\displaystyle=-(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})^{T}(\Pi\otimes I_{q})F-\beta(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})^{T}Q(t)(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z}). (23)

The time derivative of (21c) is expressed as

V˙3a\displaystyle\dot{V}_{3a} =y~T(ΠIq)Cx~˙=y~T(ΠIq)C(A~(x~Xϱ~)+Xϱ~˙)\displaystyle=\tilde{y}^{T}(\Pi\otimes I_{q})C\dot{\tilde{x}}=\tilde{y}^{T}(\Pi\otimes I_{q})C(\tilde{A}(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})+X\dot{\tilde{\varrho}})
=y~T(ΠIq)CA~(x~Xϱ~)y~T(ΠIq)F\displaystyle=\tilde{y}^{T}(\Pi\otimes I_{q})C\tilde{A}(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})-\tilde{y}^{T}(\Pi\otimes I_{q})F
+y~T(ΠIq)CX(αβ~(t)y~β~(t)(ϱ~+z~))\displaystyle\ \ \ +\tilde{y}^{T}(\Pi\otimes I_{q})CX(-\alpha\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)\tilde{y}-\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z}))
ϵ1ΠC2y~Ty~+A~24ϵ1(x~Xϱ~)T(x~Xϱ~)\displaystyle\leq\epsilon_{1}||\Pi C||^{2}\tilde{y}^{T}\tilde{y}+\frac{||\tilde{A}||^{2}}{4\epsilon_{1}}(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})^{T}(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})
+y~T(ΠIq)(Fαβ~(t)y~β~(t)(ϱ~+z~)),\displaystyle\ \ \ +\tilde{y}^{T}(\Pi\otimes I_{q})(-F-\alpha\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)\tilde{y}-\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})), (24)

where CiXi=IqC_{i}X_{i}=I_{q} in (11) and the Young inequality are used to derive the last inequality, and ϵ1\epsilon_{1} is a positive constant.

Let ιmin=mini𝒱{ιi}\iota_{min}=\min_{i\in\mathcal{V}}\{\iota_{i}\}, lmax=maxi𝒱{li}l_{max}=\max_{i\in\mathcal{V}}\{l_{i}\} and ϵ2>0\epsilon_{2}>0 is a scalar. Due to the fact that F=f~(y~+y¯)f~(y¯)F=\triangledown\tilde{f}(\tilde{y}+\bar{y})-\triangledown\tilde{f}(\bar{y}) and according to Assumption 2, we can further obtain that

y~T(ΠIq)Fιminπminy~2,Flmaxy~,\displaystyle\tilde{y}^{T}(\Pi\otimes I_{q})F\geq\iota_{min}\pi_{min}||\tilde{y}||^{2},\ ||F||\leq l_{max}||\tilde{y}||, (25a)
(ϱ~+z~)T(ΠIq)F(ΠIq)F24ϵ2+ϵ2ϱ~+z~2.\displaystyle(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})^{T}(\Pi\otimes I_{q})F\leq\frac{||(\Pi\otimes I_{q})F||^{2}}{4\epsilon_{2}}+\epsilon_{2}||\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z}||^{2}. (25b)

Thus, combining (22)-(25) gives rise to

V˙a\displaystyle\dot{V}_{a} [A~24ϵ1ϵ0](x~Xϱ~)T(x~Xϱ~)+ϵ1(ΠIq)C2y~Ty~\displaystyle\leq[\frac{||\tilde{A}||^{2}}{4\epsilon_{1}}-\epsilon_{0}](\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})^{T}(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})+\epsilon_{1}||(\Pi\otimes I_{q})C||^{2}\tilde{y}^{T}\tilde{y}
ιminπminy~Ty~αβy~TQ(t)y~βy~T(ΠIq)~(t)(ϱ~+z~))\displaystyle-\iota_{min}\pi_{min}\tilde{y}^{T}\tilde{y}-\alpha\beta\tilde{y}^{T}Q(t)\tilde{y}-\beta\tilde{y}^{T}(\Pi\otimes I_{q})\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z}))
+lmax2πmax24ϵ2y~2+ϵ2ϱ~+z~2β(ϱ~+z~)TQ(t)(ϱ~+z~)\displaystyle+\frac{l^{2}_{max}\pi^{2}_{max}}{4\epsilon_{2}}||\tilde{y}||^{2}+\epsilon_{2}||\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z}||^{2}-\beta(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})^{T}Q(t)(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})
[x~Xϱ~ϱ~+z~y~]TΩa[x~Xϱ~ϱ~+z~y~]λaVa,\displaystyle\leq-\left[\begin{array}[]{ccc}\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho}\\ \tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z}\\ \tilde{y}\end{array}\right]^{T}\varOmega_{a}\left[\begin{array}[]{ccc}\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho}\\ \tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z}\\ \tilde{y}\end{array}\right]\leq-\lambda_{a}V_{a}, (32)

where λa=λmin(Ωa)/λmax(Γa)\lambda_{a}=\lambda_{min}(\varOmega_{a})/\lambda_{max}(\varGamma_{a}), Γa=12diag{2Pa,ΠIq,ΠIq}\varGamma_{a}=\frac{1}{2}\text{diag}\{2P_{a},\Pi\otimes I_{q},\Pi\otimes\\ I_{q}\}, Ωa=[Ωa100Ωa2Ωa3Ωa4]>0\varOmega_{a}=\left[\begin{array}[]{ccc}\varOmega^{1}_{a}&\textbf{0}&\textbf{0}\\ &\varOmega^{2}_{a}&\varOmega^{3}_{a}\\ &*&\varOmega^{4}_{a}\end{array}\right]>0, Ωa1=(ϵ0A~24ϵ1) I\varOmega^{1}_{a}=(\epsilon_{0}-\frac{||\tilde{A}||^{2}}{4\epsilon_{1}})\textbf{ I}, Ωa2=(βπmincN2ϵ2)I\varOmega^{2}_{a}=(\beta\frac{\pi_{min}c}{N^{2}}-\epsilon_{2})\textbf{I}, Ωa3=β2(ΠIq)~\varOmega^{3}_{a}=\frac{\beta}{2}(\Pi\otimes I_{q})\tilde{\mathcal{L}}, Ωa4=(αβπmincN2+lminπminϵ1(ΠIq)C2lmax2πmax24ϵ2)I\varOmega^{4}_{a}=(\alpha\beta\frac{\pi_{min}c}{N^{2}}+l_{min}\pi_{min}-\epsilon_{1}||(\Pi\otimes I_{q})C||^{2}-\frac{l^{2}_{max}\pi^{2}_{max}}{4\epsilon_{2}})\textbf{I}, where πmax=maxi𝒱{πi}\pi_{max}=\max_{i\in\mathcal{V}}\{\pi_{i}\} and I is the identify matrix with proper dimensions.

Hence, denote χ~=col(x~Xϱ~,ϱ~+z~,y~)\tilde{\chi}=\text{col}(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho},\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z},\tilde{y}) and there exists scalars ϵi>0\epsilon_{i}>0, i=0,1,2i=0,1,2 and matrices Γa=diag{Pa,ΠIq,ΠIq}\varGamma_{a}=\text{diag}\{P_{a},\Pi\otimes I_{q},\Pi\otimes I_{q}\}, Pa>0P_{a}>0, Π=diag{π}\Pi=\text{diag}\{\pi\}, such that we have

Va=12χ~TΓaχ~V˙aλaVa,t[tk,ak).V_{a}=\frac{1}{2}\tilde{\chi}^{T}\varGamma_{a}\tilde{\chi}\ \Rightarrow\ \dot{V}_{a}\leq-\lambda_{a}V_{a},\ t\in[t_{k},a_{k}). (33)

ii) consider the case that in the presence of DoS attacks, i.e., t[ak,tk+1)t\in[a_{k},t_{k+1}), we choose the Lyapunov function candidate as

Vb=12χ~TΓbχ~,Γb=[2Pb00SIq0SIq],V_{b}=\frac{1}{2}\tilde{\chi}^{T}\varGamma_{b}\tilde{\chi},\ \varGamma_{b}=\left[\begin{array}[]{ccc}2P_{b}&\textbf{0}&\textbf{0}\\ &S\otimes I_{q}&\textbf{0}\\ &*&S\otimes I_{q}\end{array}\right], (34)

where Pb>0P_{b}>0, and S>0S>0 is a diagonal matrix.

Then, the time derivative of VbV_{b} along (12) is given by

V˙b\displaystyle\dot{V}_{b} =(x~Xϱ~)T(PbA~+A~TPb)(x~Xϱ~)(ϱ~+z~)T(SIq)F\displaystyle=(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})^{T}(P_{b}\tilde{A}+\tilde{A}^{T}P_{b})(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})-(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})^{T}(S\otimes I_{q})F
+y~T(SIq)CA~(x~Xϱ~)y~T(SIq)F\displaystyle\ \ \ +\tilde{y}^{T}(S\otimes I_{q})C\tilde{A}(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})-\tilde{y}^{T}(S\otimes I_{q})F
[A~24ϵ~1ϵ~0](x~Xϱ~)T(x~Xϱ~)+ϵ~1(SIq)C2y~Ty~\displaystyle\leq[\frac{||\tilde{A}||^{2}}{4\tilde{\epsilon}_{1}}-\tilde{\epsilon}_{0}](\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})^{T}(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})+\tilde{\epsilon}_{1}||(S\otimes I_{q})C||^{2}\tilde{y}^{T}\tilde{y}
ιminλmin(S)y~Ty~+lmax24ϵ~2y~Ty~+ϵ~2(ϱ~+z~)T(ϱ~+z~)\displaystyle\ \ \ -\iota_{min}\lambda_{min}(S)\tilde{y}^{T}\tilde{y}+\frac{l^{2}_{max}}{4\tilde{\epsilon}_{2}}\tilde{y}^{T}\tilde{y}+\tilde{\epsilon}_{2}(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})^{T}(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})
χ~TΩbχ~λbVb,\displaystyle\leq\tilde{\chi}^{T}\varOmega_{b}\tilde{\chi}\leq\lambda_{b}V_{b}, (35)

where λb=σmax(Ωb)>0\lambda_{b}=\sigma_{max}(\varOmega_{b})>0, and Ωb\varOmega_{b} can be described by

Ωb=[(A~24ϵ~1ϵ~0) I00ϵ~2I0ϵ~3I],\varOmega_{b}=\left[\begin{array}[]{ccc}(\frac{||\tilde{A}||^{2}}{4\tilde{\epsilon}_{1}}-\tilde{\epsilon}_{0})\textbf{ I}&\textbf{0}&\textbf{0}\\ &\tilde{\epsilon}_{2}\textbf{I}&\textbf{0}\\ &*&\tilde{\epsilon}_{3}\textbf{I}\end{array}\right], (36)

where ϵ~0=λmin(O~)\tilde{\epsilon}_{0}=\lambda_{min}(\tilde{O}) with PbA~+A~TPb=O~P_{b}\tilde{A}+\tilde{A}^{T}P_{b}=-\tilde{O}, ϵ~3=ϵ~1(SIq)C2+lmax24ϵ~2ιminλmin(S)\tilde{\epsilon}_{3}=\tilde{\epsilon}_{1}||(S\otimes I_{q})\\ C||^{2}+\frac{l^{2}_{max}}{4\tilde{\epsilon}_{2}}-\iota_{min}\lambda_{min}(S), and ϵ~1,ϵ~2,ϵ~3>0\tilde{\epsilon}_{1},\tilde{\epsilon}_{2},\tilde{\epsilon}_{3}>0.

iii) we analyze the exponential convergence of the closed-loop system from a hybrid perspective in [15, 17, 16, 18].

Denote δ(t){a,b}\delta(t)\in\{a,b\} as a switching signal. Then, we can select a piecewise Lyapunov function candidate: V(t)=Va(χ~)V(t)=V_{a}(\tilde{\chi}), if t[tk,ak)t\in[t_{k},a_{k}), and V(t)=Vb(χ~)V(t)=V_{b}(\tilde{\chi}), if t[ak,tk+1),t\in[a_{k},t_{k+1}), where Va(χ~)V_{a}(\tilde{\chi}) and Vb(χ~)V_{b}(\tilde{\chi}) are defined in (33) and (34), respectively.

We suppose that VaV_{a} is activated in [tk,ak)[t_{k},a_{k}), while VbV_{b} is activated in [ak,tk+1)[a_{k},t_{k+1}). Then, it follows from (33) and (35) that we get

V(t)={eλa(ttk)Va(tk),ift[tk,ak),eλb(tak)Vb(ak), ift[ak,tk+1).V(t)=\left\{\begin{array}[]{c}e^{-\lambda_{a}(t-t_{k})}V_{a}(t_{k}),\ \text{if}\ t\in[t_{k},a_{k}),\\ e^{\lambda_{b}(t-a_{k})}V_{b}(a_{k}),\ \text{ if}\ t\in[a_{k},t_{k+1}).\end{array}\right. (37)

Note that a closed-loop system is switched at t=tk+t=t^{+}_{k} or t=ak+t=a^{+}_{k}. Let μ=max{λmax(Γa)/λmin(Γb),λmax(Γb)/λmin(Γa)}1\mu=\max\{\lambda_{max}(\varGamma_{a})/\lambda_{min}(\varGamma_{b}),\lambda_{max}(\varGamma_{b})/\lambda_{min}(\varGamma_{a})\}\geq 1, and next, we discuss the switching situation in two cases:

Case a): if t[tk,ak)t\in[t_{k},a_{k}), it follows from (37) that

V(t)\displaystyle V(t) eλa(ttk)Va(tk)μeλa(ttk)Vb(tk)\displaystyle\leq e^{-\lambda_{a}(t-t_{k})}V_{a}(t_{k})\leq\mu e^{-\lambda_{a}(t-t_{k})}V_{b}(t^{-}_{k})
μeλa(ttk)[eλb(tktk1)Vb(tk1)]\displaystyle\leq\mu e^{-\lambda_{a}(t-t_{k})}[e^{\lambda_{b}(t_{k}-t_{k-1})}V_{b}(t_{k-1})]
μeλa(ttk)eλb(tktk1)[μVa(tk1)]\displaystyle\leq\mu e^{-\lambda_{a}(t-t_{k})}e^{\lambda_{b}(t_{k}-t_{k-1})}[\mu V_{a}(t^{-}_{k-1})]
=μ2eλa(ttk)eλb(tktk1)Va(tk1)\displaystyle=\mu^{2}e^{-\lambda_{a}(t-t_{k})}e^{\lambda_{b}(t_{k}-t_{k-1})}V_{a}(t^{-}_{k-1})
μ2eλa(ttk)eλb(tktk1)[eλa(tk1tk2)Va(tk2)]\displaystyle\leq\mu^{2}e^{-\lambda_{a}(t-t_{k})}e^{\lambda_{b}(t_{k}-t_{k-1})}[e^{-\lambda_{a}(t_{k-1}-t_{k-2})}V_{a}(t_{k-2})]
μk+1eλa|Σs(t0,t)|eλb|Σa(t0,t)|Va(t0).\displaystyle\leq\cdots\leq\mu^{k+1}e^{-\lambda_{a}|\Sigma_{s}(t_{0},t)|}e^{\lambda_{b}|\Sigma_{a}(t_{0},t)|}V_{a}(t_{0}). (38)

Case b): if t[ak,tk+1)t\in[a_{k},t_{k+1}), it follows from (37) that

V(t)\displaystyle V(t) eλb(tak)Vb(ak)μeλb(tak)Vb(ak)\displaystyle\leq e^{\lambda_{b}(t-a_{k})}V_{b}(a_{k})\leq\mu e^{\lambda_{b}(t-a_{k})}V_{b}(a^{-}_{k})
μeλb(tak)eλa(akak1)[μVb(ak1)]\displaystyle\leq\mu e^{\lambda_{b}(t-a_{k})}e^{-\lambda_{a}(a_{k}-a_{k-1})}[\mu V_{b}(a^{-}_{k-1})]
μ2eλa(tak)eλa(akak1)[eλb(ak1ak2)Vb(ak2)]\displaystyle\leq\mu^{2}e^{\lambda_{a}(t-a_{k})}e^{-\lambda_{a}(a_{k}-a_{k-1})}[e^{\lambda_{b}(a_{k-1}-a_{k-2})}V_{b}(a_{k-2})]
\displaystyle\leq\cdots
μk+1eλa|Σs(t0,t)|eλb|Σa(t0,t)|Va(t0).\displaystyle\leq\mu^{k+1}e^{-\lambda_{a}|\Sigma_{s}(t_{0},t)|}e^{\lambda_{b}|\Sigma_{a}(t_{0},t)|}V_{a}(t_{0}). (39)

iv) bounds on DoS attack frequency and duration

Notice that Na(t0,t)=k+1N_{a}(t_{0},t)=k+1 for t[tk,ak)t\in[t_{k},a_{k}) or t[ak,tk+1)t\in[a_{k},t_{k+1}). Thus, for tt0,\forall t\geq t_{0}, it follows from (38) and (39) that

V(t)μNa(t0,t)eλa|Ξs(t0,t)|eλb|Ξa(t0,t)|V(t0).V(t)\leq\mu^{N_{a}(t_{0},t)}e^{-\lambda_{a}|\Xi_{s}(t_{0},t)|}e^{\lambda_{b}|\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t)|}V(t_{0}). (40)

Notice that for all tt0,t\geq t_{0}, |Ξs(t0,t)|=tt0|Ξa(t0,t)||\Xi_{s}(t_{0},t)|=t-t_{0}-|\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t)| and |Ξa(t0,t)|T0+(tt0)/Ta|\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t)|\leq T_{0}+(t-t_{0})/T_{a} by Definition 2. Thus, we have

λa(tt0|Ξa(t0,t)|)+λb|Ξa(t0,t)|\displaystyle-\lambda_{a}(t-t_{0}-|\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t)|)+\lambda_{b}|\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t)|
=λa(tt0)+(λa+λb)|Ξa(t0,t)|\displaystyle=-\lambda_{a}(t-t_{0})+(\lambda_{a}+\lambda_{b})|\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t)|
λa(tt0)+(λa+λb)[T0+(tt0)/Ta].\displaystyle\leq-\lambda_{a}(t-t_{0})+(\lambda_{a}+\lambda_{b})[T_{0}+(t-t_{0})/T_{a}]. (41)

Substituting (41) into (40) yields

V(t)\displaystyle V(t) μNa(t0,t)eλa(tt0|Ξa(t0,t)|)eλb|Ξa(t0,t)|V(t0)\displaystyle\leq\mu^{N_{a}(t_{0},t)}e^{-\lambda_{a}(t-t_{0}-|\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t)|)}e^{\lambda_{b}|\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t)|}V(t_{0})
e(λa+λb)T0eλa(tt0)e(λa+λb)Ta(tt0)\displaystyle\leq e^{(\lambda_{a}+\lambda_{b})T_{0}}e^{-\lambda_{a}(t-t_{0})}e^{\frac{(\lambda_{a}+\lambda_{b})}{T_{a}}(t-t_{0})}
×eln(μ)Na(t0,t)V(t0).\displaystyle\ \ \ \times e^{\ln(\mu)N_{a}(t_{0},t)}V(t_{0}). (42)

By exploiting the attack condition in (13), we can obtain that

ln(μ)Na(t0,t)ln(μ)N0+η(tt0).\ln(\mu)N_{a}(t_{0},t)\leq\ln(\mu)N_{0}+\eta^{*}(t-t_{0}). (43)

Let η=λα(λa+λb)/Taη>0\eta=\lambda_{\alpha}-(\lambda_{a}+\lambda_{b})/T_{a}-\eta^{\ast}>0. Based on another attack condition in (14), and using (43), we further rewrite (42) as

V(t)e(λa+λb)T0+ln(μ)N0eη(tt0)V(t0).V(t)\leq e^{(\lambda_{a}+\lambda_{b})T_{0}+\ln(\mu)N_{0}}\ e^{-\eta(t-t_{0})}V(t_{0}). (44)

Further, it follows from (33), (34), (37) and (44) that

χ~(t)2ςeη(tt0)χ~(t0)2,||\tilde{\chi}(t)||^{2}\leq\varsigma e^{-\eta(t-t_{0})}||\tilde{\chi}(t_{0})||^{2}, (45)

where ς=e(λa+λb)T0+2ln(μ)ςa/ςb\varsigma=e^{(\lambda_{a}+\lambda_{b})T_{0}+2\ln(\mu)}\varsigma_{a}/\varsigma_{b}, ςa=max{λmax(Γa),λmax(Γb)}\varsigma_{a}=\max\{\lambda_{max}(\varGamma_{a}),\lambda_{max}(\\ \varGamma_{b})\}, and ςb=min{λmin(Γa),λmin(Γb)}\varsigma_{b}=\min\{\lambda_{min}(\varGamma_{a}),\lambda_{min}(\varGamma_{b})\}.

Thus, it follows from (45) that x~Xϱ~\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho}, ϱ~+z~\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z}, and y~\tilde{y} are bounded, and converge to zero exponentially. That is, limt(x~Xϱ~)=0\lim_{t\rightarrow\infty}(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})=\textbf{0}, limt(ϱ~+z~)=0\lim_{t\rightarrow\infty}(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})=\textbf{0}, and limty~=0\lim_{t\rightarrow\infty}\tilde{y}=\textbf{0}. It follows from CiXi=IqC_{i}X_{i}=I_{q} in (11) that limtC(x~Xϱ~)=limt(y~ϱ~)=0\lim_{t\rightarrow\infty}C(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})=\lim_{t\rightarrow\infty}(\tilde{y}-\tilde{\varrho})=\textbf{0}, i.e., limtϱ~=0\lim_{t\rightarrow\infty}\tilde{\varrho}=\textbf{0}. Thus, limtz~=0\lim_{t\rightarrow\infty}\tilde{z}=\textbf{0}. Then, based on limty~=0\lim_{t\rightarrow\infty}\tilde{y}=\textbf{0}, the problem in (5) is solvable. Hence, it can be concluded that yiy_{i} converges to yy^{*} exponentially for heterogeneous linear multi-agent systems under DoS attacks over random digraphs. ∎

In the absence of attacks, Theorem 1 is reduced as follows.

Corollary 1: In the absence of attacks, the optimal solution is achieved under the following distributed algorithm, provided that AiBiKiA_{i}-B_{i}K_{i} is Hurwitz and (Ui,Wi,Xi)(U_{i},W_{i},X_{i}) is a solution to (11).

ui\displaystyle u_{i} =Kixi(UiKiXi)ϱi+Wiϑi,\displaystyle=-K_{i}x_{i}-(U_{i}-K_{i}X_{i})\varrho_{i}+W_{i}\vartheta_{i}, (46a)
ϱ˙i\displaystyle\dot{\varrho}_{i} =ϑi=βj𝒩i(t)aij(t)(ϱiϱj+zizj)\displaystyle=\vartheta_{i}=-\beta\sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_{i}(t)}a_{ij}(t)(\varrho_{i}-\varrho_{j}+z_{i}-z_{j})
fi(yi)αβj𝒩i(t)aij(t)(yiyj),\displaystyle\ \ \ \ \ \ -\triangledown f_{i}(y_{i})-\alpha\beta\sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_{i}(t)}a_{ij}(t)(y_{i}-y_{j}), (46b)
z˙i\displaystyle\dot{z}_{i} =αβj𝒩i(t)aij(t)(yiyj),i𝒱.\displaystyle=\alpha\beta\sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_{i}(t)}a_{ij}(t)(y_{i}-y_{j}),i\in\mathcal{V}. (46c)
Proof:

the proof is similar to Step (i), and is omitted. ∎

III-B Distributed Event-Triggered Strategy Against DoS Attacks

The time-based scheme in the subsection A is implemented by fixed and periodic samplings, which require all agents to exchange information synchronously. Let {tki}\{t^{i}_{k}\} denote a sequence of some transmission time instants with 0=t0i<t1i<t1i<tki<0=t^{i}_{0}<t^{i}_{1}<t^{i}_{1}\cdots<t^{i}_{k}<\cdots. Unlike known time-based transmission time instants tkt_{k}, an event-triggered transmission attempt tkit_{k}^{i} will be scheduled to be resilient against DoS attacks. If tkiΞa(t0,t)t_{k}^{i}\in\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t), an information transmission attempt suffers from the DoS attack, and thereby is unsuccessful. If tkiΞs(t0,t)t_{k}^{i}\in\Xi_{s}(t_{0},t), the information can be successfully transmitted. It is thus desirable to develop a new way to update the distributed optimization algorithm and determine the next triggering instants for information transmissions over insecure communication. The main challenges include twofolds: i) how to design a distributed dynamic event-triggered condition without Zeno behavior, and ii) how to illustrate the validity of distributed optimization algorithm to guarantee global exponential convergence.

Now, propose the following distributed optimization algorithm to handle the effect of DoS attacks over random digraphs.

ui\displaystyle u_{i} =Kixi(UiKiXi)ϱi+Wiϑi,\displaystyle=-K_{i}x_{i}-(U_{i}-K_{i}X_{i})\varrho_{i}+W_{i}\vartheta_{i}, (47a)
ϱ˙i\displaystyle\dot{\varrho}_{i} =ϑi=fi(yi)βe¯ϱziαβe¯yi,\displaystyle=\vartheta_{i}=-\triangledown f_{i}(y_{i})-\beta\bar{e}_{\varrho zi}-\alpha\beta\bar{e}_{yi}, (47b)
z˙i\displaystyle\dot{z}_{i} =αβe¯yi,t[tki,tk+1i),i𝒱,\displaystyle=\alpha\beta\bar{e}_{yi},t\in[t^{i}_{k},t^{i}_{k+1}),\ i\in\mathcal{V}, (47c)

where the consensus errors under DoS attacks are described by

e¯ϱzi={eϱzi, ift[tki,tk+1i)t=tkiΞs(t0,t),0, ift=tkiΞa(t0,t),\bar{e}_{\varrho zi}=\left\{\begin{array}[]{c}e_{\varrho zi},\ \text{ if}\ t\in[t^{i}_{k},t^{i}_{k+1})\ \cap\ t=t^{i}_{k}\in\Xi_{s}(t_{0},t),\\ \textbf{0},\ \ \text{ if}\ t=t^{i}_{k}\in\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t),\end{array}\right. (48)
e¯yi={eyi, ift[tki,tk+1i)t=tkiΞs(t0,t),0, ift=tkiΞa(t0,t),\bar{e}_{yi}=\left\{\begin{array}[]{c}e_{yi},\ \ \ \text{ if}\ t\in[t^{i}_{k},t^{i}_{k+1})\ \cap\ t=t^{i}_{k}\in\Xi_{s}(t_{0},t),\\ \textbf{0},\ \ \ \text{ if}\ t=t^{i}_{k}\in\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t),\end{array}\right. (49)

where eϱzi=j𝒩i(t)aij(t)(ϱ^iϱ^j+z^iz^j)e_{\varrho zi}=\sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_{i}(t)}a_{ij}(t)(\hat{\varrho}_{i}-\hat{\varrho}_{j}+\hat{z}_{i}-\hat{z}_{j}), ϱ^i=ϱi(tki)\hat{\varrho}_{i}=\varrho_{i}(t^{i}_{k}), z^i=zi(tki)\hat{z}_{i}=z_{i}(t^{i}_{k}), and eyi=j𝒩i(t)aij(t)(y^iy^j)e_{yi}=\sum_{j\in\mathcal{N}_{i}(t)}a_{ij}(t)(\hat{y}_{i}-\hat{y}_{j}), y^i=yi(tki)\hat{y}_{i}=y_{i}(t^{i}_{k}).

To specify event time instants, denote the measurement errors

e~yi=y^i(t)yi(t),e~ϱzi=ϱ^i(t)+z^i(t)(ϱi(t)+zi(t)).\tilde{e}_{yi}=\hat{y}_{i}(t)-y_{i}(t),\ \tilde{e}_{\varrho zi}=\hat{\varrho}_{i}(t)+\hat{z}_{i}(t)-(\varrho_{i}(t)+z_{i}(t)). (50)

Then, a dynamic event-triggering scheme is developed as

tk+1i={inft>tki{ttki|σgigi(t)ηgi(t)orσhihi(t)ηhi(t)}, iftkiΞs(t0,t),tki+κki, iftkiΞa(t0,t),t^{i}_{k+1}=\left\{\begin{array}[]{c}\underset{t>t^{i}_{k}}{\inf}\{t-t_{k}^{i}|\sigma_{gi}g_{i}(t)\leq\eta_{gi}(t)\ \text{or}\ \sigma_{hi}h_{i}(t)\leq\eta_{hi}(t)\},\\ \text{ if}\ t^{i}_{k}\in\Xi_{s}(t_{0},t),\\ t_{k}^{i}+\kappa^{i}_{k},\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \text{ if}\ t^{i}_{k}\in\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t),\end{array}\right. (51)

where κki>0\kappa^{i}_{k}>0 is a dwell time to be determined, σgi>0\sigma_{gi}>0, σhi>0\sigma_{hi}>0, and the triggering functions gi(t)g_{i}(t), hi(t)h_{i}(t) are given by

gi(t)=e~yi2θgieyi2,hi(t)=e~ϱzi2θhieϱzi2,g_{i}(t)=\tilde{e}_{yi}^{2}-\theta_{gi}e_{yi}^{2},\ h_{i}(t)=\tilde{e}^{2}_{\varrho zi}-\theta_{hi}e^{2}_{\varrho zi}, (52)

where θgi\theta_{gi}, θhi[0,1)\theta_{hi}\in[0,1), and ηgi(t)\eta_{gi}(t), ηhi(t)\eta_{hi}(t) are auxiliary variables satisfying for ηgi(t0)\eta_{gi}(t_{0}), ηhi(t0)\eta_{hi}(t_{0}), kgi,khi>0k_{gi},k_{hi}>0, and δgi,δhi[0,1)\delta_{gi},\delta_{hi}\in[0,1),

η˙gi={kgiηgiδgigi(t), iftkiΞs(t0,t), 0, iftkiΞa(t0,t),\dot{\eta}_{gi}=\left\{\begin{array}[]{c}-k_{gi}\eta_{gi}-\delta_{gi}g_{i}(t),\ \ \text{ if}\ t^{i}_{k}\in\Xi_{s}(t_{0},t),\\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 0,\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \text{ if}\ t^{i}_{k}\in\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t),\end{array}\right. (53)
η˙hi={khiηhiδhihi(t), iftkiΞs(t0,t), 0, iftkiΞa(t0,t).\dot{\eta}_{hi}=\left\{\begin{array}[]{c}-k_{hi}\eta_{hi}-\delta_{hi}h_{i}(t),\ \ \text{ if}\ t^{i}_{k}\in\Xi_{s}(t_{0},t),\\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 0,\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \text{ if}\ t^{i}_{k}\in\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t).\end{array}\right. (54)

Next, we firstly introduce the following lemma.

Lemma 2

Under the dynamical event-triggered scheme (51), the term ηi(t)\eta_{i}(t) below is always positive for ηgi(t0),ηhi(t0)>0\forall\eta_{gi}(t_{0}),\eta_{hi}(t_{0})>0,

ηi(t)=ηgi(t)+ηhi(t)>0,i𝒱.\eta_{i}(t)=\eta_{gi}(t)+\eta_{hi}(t)>0,\ \forall i\in\mathcal{V}. (55)
Proof:

under the proposed event-triggered scheme (51)-(54), the transmission attempts {tki}kN+={tksi}sN+{tkai}aN+\{t^{i}_{k}\}_{k\in\mathrm{N}^{+}}=\{t^{i}_{k_{s}}\}_{s\in\mathrm{N}^{+}}\bigcup\ \{t^{i}_{k_{a}}\}_{a\in\mathrm{N}^{+}} can be generated, where {tksi}sN+\{t^{i}_{k_{s}}\}_{s\in\mathrm{N}^{+}} denotes the successful transmission attempts while {tkai}aN+\{t^{i}_{k_{a}}\}_{a\in\mathrm{N}^{+}} denotes the unsuccessful transmission attempts. Next, two cases are considered:

Case i): choose any tks0iΞs(t0,)t^{i}_{k_{s_{0}}}\in\Xi_{s}(t_{0},\infty) and let a1=mina{tkai>tks0i}a_{1}=\min_{a}\{t^{i}_{k_{a}}>t^{i}_{k_{s_{0}}}\}. Then, when t[tki,tk+1i)t\in[t^{i}_{k},t^{i}_{k+1}), e~yi2(t)θgieyi2ηgi(t)/σgi.\tilde{e}^{2}_{yi}(t)-\theta_{gi}e^{2}_{yi}\leq\eta_{gi}(t)/\sigma_{gi}. Hence, we can obtain from (53) that

η˙gi(t)=kgiηgi(t)δgigi(t)(kgi+δgi/σgi)ηgi(t),\dot{\eta}_{gi}(t)=-k_{gi}\eta_{gi}(t)-\delta_{gi}g_{i}(t)\geq-(k_{gi}+\delta_{gi}/\sigma_{gi})\eta_{gi}(t), (56)

which implies that based on the mathematical induction, we have that for t[tki,tk+1i)[tks0i,tka1i)t\in[t^{i}_{k},t^{i}_{k+1})\in[t^{i}_{k_{s_{0}}},t^{i}_{k_{a_{1}}}),

ηgi(t)\displaystyle\eta_{gi}(t) ηgi(tki)e(kgi+δgi/σgi)(ttki)\displaystyle\geq\eta_{gi}(t^{i}_{k})e^{-(k_{gi}+\delta_{gi}/\sigma_{gi})(t-t^{i}_{k})}\geq\cdots
ηgi(tks0i)e(kgi+δgi/σgi)(ttks0i)>0.\displaystyle\geq\eta_{gi}(t^{i}_{k_{s_{0}}})e^{-(k_{gi}+\delta_{gi}/\sigma_{gi})(t-t^{i}_{k_{s_{0}}})}>0. (57)

Case ii): denote s1=mins{tksi>tka1i}s_{1}=\min_{s}\{t^{i}_{k_{s}}>t^{i}_{k_{a_{1}}}\}, and we have that for t[tki,tk+1i)[tka1i,tks1i)t\in[t^{i}_{k},t^{i}_{k+1})\in[t^{i}_{k_{a_{1}}},t^{i}_{k_{s_{1}}}), it follows from (53) that η˙gi(t)=0\dot{\eta}_{gi}(t)=0. Thus, ηgi(t)\eta_{gi}(t) is time-invariant and since ηgi(t0)>0\eta_{gi}(t_{0})>0, we have

ηgi(t)=ηgi(tki)==ηgi(tka1i)>0.\eta_{gi}(t)=\eta_{gi}(t^{i}_{k})=\cdots=\eta_{gi}(t^{i}_{k_{a_{1}}})>0. (58)

Then, we obtain from both cases that ηgi(t)>0,i𝒱\eta_{gi}(t)>0,\forall i\in\mathcal{V}.

Similarly, it can be derived from (54) that ηhi(t)>0,i𝒱\eta_{hi}(t)>0,\forall i\in\mathcal{V} for both cases by following the same procedure. ∎

Substituting (47)-(49) into (1) yields the following system

χ˙={[(ABK)x+BWϑB(UKX)ϱf~(y)αβ~(t)y^β~(t)(ϱ^+z^)αβ~(t)y^], ift[tki,tk+1i)t=tkiΞs(t0,t),[(ABK)x+BWϑB(UKX)ϱf~(y)0], ift=tkiΞa(t0,t),k=0,1,2,\dot{\chi}=\left\{\begin{array}[]{l}\left[\begin{array}[]{ccc}(A-BK)x+BW\vartheta-B(U-KX)\varrho\\ -\triangledown\tilde{f}(y)-\alpha\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)\hat{y}-\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)(\hat{\varrho}+\hat{z})\\ \alpha\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)\hat{y}\end{array}\right],\\ \text{ if}\ t\in[t^{i}_{k},t^{i}_{k+1})\cap t=t^{i}_{k}\in\Xi_{s}(t_{0},t),\\ \left[\begin{array}[]{ccc}(A-BK)x+BW\vartheta-B(U-KX)\varrho\\ -\triangledown\tilde{f}(y)\\ \textbf{0}\end{array}\right],\\ \text{ if}\ t=t^{i}_{k}\in\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t),k=0,1,2\cdots,\end{array}\right. (59)

where y^,ϱ^,z^\hat{y},\hat{\varrho},\hat{z} are the stack vectors of y^i,ϱ^i,z^i\hat{y}_{i},\hat{\varrho}_{i},\hat{z}_{i}, respectively, and

y^i(t)=yi+e~yi,ϱ^i(t)=ϱi+e~ϱi,z^i(t)=zi+e~zi.\hat{y}_{i}(t)=y_{i}+\tilde{e}_{yi},\ \hat{\varrho}_{i}(t)=\varrho_{i}+\tilde{e}_{\varrho i},\ \hat{z}_{i}(t)=z_{i}+\tilde{e}_{zi}. (60)
Theorem 2

Given Assumptions 1-3, Problem 1 is solvable for any xi(0)x_{i}(0), ϱi(0)\varrho_{i}(0) and zi(0)z_{i}(0) under the proposed resilient distributed optimization algorithm in (47)-(49) together with the distributed event-triggered scheme in (51)-(54), provided that AiBiKiA_{i}-B_{i}K_{i} is Hurwitz, Ui,Wi,XiU_{i},W_{i},X_{i} are solutions to (11), and

Tf>(ln(μ~)+(λ~a+λ~b)κ)/η~,Ta>(λ~a+λ~b)/(λ~aη~),T_{f}>(\ln(\tilde{\mu})+(\tilde{\lambda}_{a}+\tilde{\lambda}_{b})\kappa_{*})/\tilde{\eta}^{\ast},\ T_{a}>(\tilde{\lambda}_{a}+\tilde{\lambda}_{b})/(\tilde{\lambda}_{a}-\tilde{\eta}^{\ast}), (61)

where λ~a,λ~b,u~,κ\tilde{\lambda}_{a},\tilde{\lambda}_{b},\tilde{u},\kappa_{*} are positive scalars to be determined later.

Proof:

the proof includes the following steps:

Step 1 (two intervals classification): two time intervals where (51)-(54) holds and does not hold are characterized. Consider sequences: {tki}k+\{t_{k}^{i}\}_{k\in\mathbb{N}^{+}} and {ak}k+.\{a_{k}\}_{k\in\mathbb{N}^{+}}. The following :={(i,k)𝒱×+ |tkik+𝒜k}\mathcal{F}:=\{(i,k)\in\mathcal{V\times}\mathbb{N}^{+}\text{ }|t_{k}^{i}\in\cup_{k\in\mathbb{N}^{+}}\mathcal{A}_{k}\} is a set of integers related to an updating attempt occurring under attacks. Due to the finite sampling rate, a time interval will necessarily elapse from tki+akt^{i}_{k}+a_{k} to the time when agents successfully sample and transmit. It is upper bounded by sup(i,k)κkiκ\sup_{(i,k)\in\mathcal{F}}\kappa^{i}_{k}\leq\kappa_{*}. Hence, a DoS free interval of a length greater than κ\kappa_{*} ensures that each agent can sample and transmit. The mm-th time interval where (51)-(54) do not need to hold is

𝔄m=[am,am+τm+κ).\mathfrak{A}_{m}=[a_{m},a_{m}+\tau_{m}+\kappa_{*}). (62)

Thus, the time interval [τ,t)[\tau,t) consists of the following two union of sub-intervals: [τ,t)=Ξ~s(τ,t)Ξ~a(τ,t)[\tau,t)=\tilde{\Xi}_{s}(\tau,t)\cup\tilde{\Xi}_{a}(\tau,t) with

Ξ~a(τ,t):=𝔄m[τ,t],Ξ~s(τ,t):=[τ,t]\Ξ~a(τ,t).\displaystyle\hskip 11.99998pt\tilde{\Xi}_{a}(\tau,t):=\cup\ \mathfrak{A}_{m}\cap[\tau,t],\ \tilde{\Xi}_{s}(\tau,t):=[\tau,t]\backslash\tilde{\Xi}_{a}(\tau,t). (63)

Step 2 (Lyapunov stability analysis)
i) consider the time interval Ξ~s(τ,t)\tilde{\Xi}_{s}(\tau,t) over which (51)-(54) hold. Denote Γ~a=diag{2P~a,ΠIq,ΠIq}\tilde{\varGamma}_{a}=\text{diag}\{2\tilde{P}_{a},\Pi\otimes I_{q},\Pi\otimes I_{q}\} and then select

Wa=Va+Vη=12χ~TΓ~aχ~+i=1Nηi(t).W_{a}=V_{a}+V_{\eta}=\frac{1}{2}\tilde{\chi}^{T}\tilde{\varGamma}_{a}\tilde{\chi}+\sum_{i=1}^{N}\eta_{i}(t). (64)

Then, the time derivative of WaW_{a} along (59)-(60) is given by

W˙a\displaystyle\dot{W}_{a} =y~TΠ~CA~(x~Xϱ~)(y~+ϱ~+z~)TΠ~F+y~TΠ~(αβ~(t)y~\displaystyle=\tilde{y}^{T}\tilde{\Pi}C\tilde{A}(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})-(\tilde{y}+\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})^{T}\tilde{\Pi}F+\tilde{y}^{T}\tilde{\Pi}(-\alpha\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)\tilde{y}
β~(t)(ϱ~+z~))(x~Xϱ~)TO(x~Xϱ~)βy~TΠ~~(t)\displaystyle-\beta\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z}))-(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})^{T}O(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})-\beta\tilde{y}^{T}\tilde{\Pi}\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)
×(αe~y+e~ϱz)β(ϱ~+z~)T[Q(t)(ϱ~+z~)+Π~~(t)e~ϱz]+V˙η\displaystyle\times(\alpha\tilde{e}_{y}+\tilde{e}_{\varrho z})-\beta(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})^{T}[Q(t)(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})+\tilde{\Pi}\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)\tilde{e}_{\varrho z}]+\dot{V}_{\eta}
[ϵ0A~24ϵ1](x~Xϱ~)T(x~Xϱ~)+ϵ1Π~C2y~Ty~\displaystyle\leq-[\epsilon_{0}-\frac{||\tilde{A}||^{2}}{4\epsilon_{1}}](\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})^{T}(\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho})+\epsilon_{1}||\tilde{\Pi}C||^{2}\tilde{y}^{T}\tilde{y}
ιminπminy~Ty~αβy~TQ(t)y~βy~TΠ~~(t)(ϱ~+z~)\displaystyle-\iota_{min}\pi_{min}\tilde{y}^{T}\tilde{y}-\alpha\beta\tilde{y}^{T}Q(t)\tilde{y}-\beta\tilde{y}^{T}\tilde{\Pi}\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})
+lmax2πmax24ϵ2y~2+ϵ2ϱ~+z~2β(ϱ~+z~)TQ(t)(ϱ~+z~)\displaystyle+\frac{l^{2}_{max}\pi^{2}_{max}}{4\epsilon_{2}}||\tilde{y}||^{2}+\epsilon_{2}||\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z}||^{2}-\beta(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})^{T}Q(t)(\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z})
+14c1αβΠ~~(t)2y~2+c1e~y2+14c2βΠ~~(t)2y~2\displaystyle+\frac{1}{4c_{1}}||\alpha\beta\tilde{\Pi}\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)||^{2}||\tilde{y}||^{2}+c_{1}||\tilde{e}_{y}||^{2}+\frac{1}{4c_{2}}||\beta\tilde{\Pi}\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)||^{2}||\tilde{y}||^{2}
+c2e~ϱz2+14c2βΠ~~(t)2ϱ~+z~2+c2e~ϱz2\displaystyle+c_{2}||\tilde{e}_{\varrho z}||^{2}+\frac{1}{4c_{2}}||\beta\tilde{\Pi}\tilde{\mathcal{L}}(t)||^{2}||\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z}||^{2}+c_{2}||\tilde{e}_{\varrho z}||^{2}
i=1Nkgiηgii=1Nδgi(e~yi2θgieyi2)+i=1Nθgi(eyi2eyi2)\displaystyle-\sum_{i=1}^{N}k_{gi}\eta_{gi}-\sum_{i=1}^{N}\delta_{gi}(\tilde{e}^{2}_{yi}-\theta_{gi}e^{2}_{yi})+\sum_{i=1}^{N}\theta_{gi}(e^{2}_{yi}-e^{2}_{yi})
i=1Nkhiηhii=1Nδhi(e~ϱzi2θhieϱzi2)+i=1Nθhi(eϱzi2eϱzi2)\displaystyle-\sum_{i=1}^{N}k_{hi}\eta_{hi}-\sum_{i=1}^{N}\delta_{hi}(\tilde{e}_{\varrho zi}^{2}-\theta_{hi}e_{\varrho zi}^{2})+\sum_{i=1}^{N}\theta_{hi}(e_{\varrho zi}^{2}-e_{\varrho zi}^{2})
[x~Xϱ~ϱ~+z~y~]TΩ~a(t)[x~Xϱ~ϱ~+z~y~]i=1Nkgiηgi\displaystyle\leq-\left[\begin{array}[]{ccc}\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho}\\ \tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z}\\ \tilde{y}\end{array}\right]^{T}\tilde{\varOmega}_{a}(t)\left[\begin{array}[]{ccc}\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho}\\ \tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z}\\ \tilde{y}\end{array}\right]-\sum_{i=1}^{N}k_{gi}\eta_{gi} (71)
+i=1N(1δgi)(e~yi2θgieyi2)i=1Nkhiηhi\displaystyle\ \ \ +\sum_{i=1}^{N}(1-\delta_{gi})(\tilde{e}^{2}_{yi}-\theta_{gi}e^{2}_{yi})-\sum_{i=1}^{N}k_{hi}\eta_{hi}
+i=1N(1δhi)[e~ϱzi2θhieϱzi2]\displaystyle\ \ \ +\sum_{i=1}^{N}(1-\delta_{hi})[\tilde{e}_{\varrho zi}^{2}-\theta_{hi}e_{\varrho zi}^{2}]
χ~TΩ~a(t)χ~i=1Nkciηiλ~aWa,\displaystyle\leq-\tilde{\chi}^{T}\tilde{\varOmega}_{a}(t)\tilde{\chi}-\sum_{i=1}^{N}k_{ci}\eta_{i}\leq-\tilde{\lambda}_{a}W_{a}, (72)

where Π~=ΠIq\tilde{\Pi}=\Pi\otimes I_{q}, λ~a=min{λmin(Ω~a),k¯c}\tilde{\lambda}_{a}=\min\{\lambda_{min}(\tilde{\varOmega}_{a}),\underline{k}_{c}\}, k¯c=min{kci}\underline{k}_{c}=\min\{k_{ci}\}, kci=min{kgi1δgiσgi,khi1δhiσhi}>0k_{ci}=\min\{k_{gi}-\frac{1-\delta_{gi}}{\sigma_{gi}},k_{hi}-\frac{1-\delta_{hi}}{\sigma_{hi}}\}>0, c1=1c3θ¯gL~2>0c_{1}=1-c_{3}\overline{\theta}_{g}\|\tilde{L}\|^{2}>0,

c2=(1c3θ¯hL~2)/2>0c_{2}=(1-c_{3}\overline{\theta}_{h}\|\tilde{L}\|^{2})/2>0, θ¯g=max{θgi}\overline{\theta}_{g}=\max\{\theta_{gi}\}, θ¯h=max{θhi}\overline{\theta}_{h}=\max\{\theta_{hi}\}, Ω~a\tilde{\varOmega}_{a} is similar to Ωa\varOmega_{a} with Ω~a2=Ωa2(14c2βΠ~L~2+14c3L~2)I\tilde{\varOmega}^{2}_{a}=\varOmega^{2}_{a}-(\frac{1}{4c_{2}}\|\beta\tilde{\Pi}\tilde{L}\|^{2}+\frac{1}{4c_{3}}\|\tilde{L}\|^{2})\textbf{I}, Ω~a3=Ωa3((14c1+14c2)αβΠ~L~2+14c3L~2)I\tilde{\varOmega}^{3}_{a}=\varOmega^{3}_{a}-((\frac{1}{4c_{1}}+\frac{1}{4c_{2}})\|\alpha\beta\tilde{\Pi}\tilde{L}\|^{2}+\frac{1}{4c_{3}}\|\tilde{L}\|^{2})\textbf{I}.

ii) consider the time interval Ξ~a(τ,t)\tilde{\Xi}_{a}(\tau,t) over which (51)-(54) do not necessarily hold. Let P~b>0\tilde{P}_{b}>0, S~=S¯Iq\tilde{S}=\bar{S}\otimes I_{q} with S¯>\bar{S}> being a diagonal matrix and choose the Lyapunov function candidate as

Wb=12χ~TΓ~bχ~+i=1Nηi(t),Γ~b=[2P~b00S~0S~].W_{b}=\frac{1}{2}\tilde{\chi}^{T}\tilde{\varGamma}_{b}\tilde{\chi}+\sum_{i=1}^{N}\eta_{i}(t),\ \tilde{\varGamma}_{b}=\left[\begin{array}[]{ccc}2\tilde{P}_{b}&\textbf{0}&\textbf{0}\\ &\tilde{S}&\textbf{0}\\ &*&\tilde{S}\end{array}\right]. (73)

Similar to (35), the time derivative of WbW_{b} along (59) is

W˙bχ~TΩ~bχ~λ~bWb,\dot{W}_{b}\leq\tilde{\chi}^{T}\tilde{\varOmega}_{b}\tilde{\chi}\leq\tilde{\lambda}_{b}W_{b}, (74)

where λb=max{σmax(Ω~b),1}>0\lambda_{b}=\max\{\sigma_{max}(\tilde{\varOmega}_{b}),1\}>0, and Ω~b\tilde{\varOmega}_{b} is similarly defined as (36) with ϵ~3=ϵ~1(S~Iq)C2+lmax2πmax24ϵ~2ιminλmin(S~)\tilde{\epsilon}_{3}=\tilde{\epsilon}_{1}||(\tilde{S}\otimes I_{q})C||^{2}+\frac{l^{2}_{max}\pi^{2}_{max}}{4\tilde{\epsilon}_{2}}-\iota_{min}\lambda_{min}(\tilde{S}).

iii) convergence analysis of a piecewise Lyapunov function.

Similar to (37)-(39), let W(t)=Wδ~(t)W(t)=W_{\tilde{\delta}(t)} and δ~(t){a,b}\tilde{\delta}(t)\in\{a,b\}, where WaW_{a} and WbW_{b} are defined in (64) and (73), respectively. Suppose that WaW_{a} is activated in [am1+τm1,am)[a_{m-1}+\tau_{m-1},a_{m}) and WbW_{b} is activated in [am,am+τm+κ)[a_{m},a_{m}+\tau_{m}+\kappa_{*}). Then, by the Comparison lemma, we get

W(t)={eλ~a(ttm1τm1)Wa(tm1+τm1),eλ~b(tam)Wb(am).W(t)=\left\{\begin{array}[]{c}e^{-\tilde{\lambda}_{a}(t-t_{m-1}-\tau_{m-1})}W_{a}(t_{m-1}+\tau_{m-1}),\\ e^{\tilde{\lambda}_{b}(t-a_{m})}W_{b}(a_{m}).\end{array}\right. (75)

Denote μ~=max{λmax(Γ~a)/λmin(Γ~b),λmax(Γ~b)/λmin(Γ~a)}1\tilde{\mu}=\max\{\lambda_{max}(\tilde{\varGamma}_{a})/\lambda_{min}(\tilde{\varGamma}_{b}),\lambda_{max}(\tilde{\varGamma}_{b})/\lambda_{min}(\tilde{\varGamma}_{a})\}\geq 1. Next, we discuss the situation in two cases:

Case a): if t[am1+τm1,am)t\in[a_{m-1}+\tau_{m-1},a_{m}), it follows from (75) that

W(t)\displaystyle W(t) eλ~a(tam1τm1)Wa(am1+τm1)\displaystyle\leq e^{-\tilde{\lambda}_{a}(t-a_{m-1}-\tau_{m-1})}W_{a}(a_{m-1}+\tau_{m-1})
μ~eλ~a(tam1τm1)Wb(am1+τm1)\displaystyle\leq\tilde{\mu}e^{-\tilde{\lambda}_{a}(t-a_{m-1}-\tau_{m-1})}W_{b}(a^{-}_{m-1}+\tau^{-}_{m-1})\leq\cdots
μ~meλ~a|Σ~s(t0,t)|eλ~b|Σ~a(t0,t)|Wa(t0).\displaystyle\leq\tilde{\mu}^{m}e^{-\tilde{\lambda}_{a}|\tilde{\Sigma}_{s}(t_{0},t)|}e^{\tilde{\lambda}_{b}|\tilde{\Sigma}_{a}(t_{0},t)|}W_{a}(t_{0}). (76)

Case b): if t[am,am+τm+κ)t\in[a_{m},a_{m}+\tau_{m}+\kappa_{*}), similarly

W(t)\displaystyle W(t) eλ~b(tam)Wb(am)μ~eλ~b(tam)Wa(am)\displaystyle\leq e^{\tilde{\lambda}_{b}(t-a_{m})}W_{b}(a_{m})\leq\tilde{\mu}e^{\tilde{\lambda}_{b}(t-a_{m})}W_{a}(a^{-}_{m})
eλ~b(tam)[eλ~a(amam1τm1)Wa(am1+τm1)]\displaystyle\leq e^{\tilde{\lambda}_{b}(t-a_{m})}[e^{-\tilde{\lambda}_{a}(a_{m}-a_{m-1}-\tau_{m-1})}W_{a}(a_{m-1}+\tau_{m-1})]
μ~m+1eλ~a|Σ~s(t0,t)|eλ~b|Σ~a(t0,t)|Wa(t0).\displaystyle\leq\cdots\leq\tilde{\mu}^{m+1}e^{-\tilde{\lambda}_{a}|\tilde{\Sigma}_{s}(t_{0},t)|}e^{\tilde{\lambda}_{b}|\tilde{\Sigma}_{a}(t_{0},t)|}W_{a}(t_{0}). (77)

iv) bounds on the attack frequency and duration.

From Definition 1, Na(t0,t)=mN_{a}(t_{0},t)=m for t[am1+τm1,am)t\in[a_{m-1}+\tau_{m-1},a_{m}) and m+1m+1 for t[am,am+τm+κ)t\in[a_{m},a_{m}+\tau_{m}+\kappa_{*}). Thus, for tt0\forall t\geq t_{0},

W(t)μNa(t0,t)eλ~a|Ξ~s(t0,t)|eλ~b|Ξ~a(t0,t)|W(t0).W(t)\leq\mu^{N_{a}(t_{0},t)}e^{-\tilde{\lambda}_{a}|\tilde{\Xi}_{s}(t_{0},t)|}e^{\tilde{\lambda}_{b}|\tilde{\Xi}_{a}(t_{0},t)|}W(t_{0}). (78)

Notice that for all tt0,t\geq t_{0}, |Ξ~s(t0,t)|=tt0|Ξ~a(t0,t)||\tilde{\Xi}_{s}(t_{0},t)|=t-t_{0}-|\tilde{\Xi}_{a}(t_{0},t)| and |Ξ~a(t0,t)||Ξa(t0,t)|+(1+Na(t0,t))κ|\tilde{\Xi}_{a}(t_{0},t)|\leq|\Xi_{a}(t_{0},t)|+(1+N_{a}(t_{0},t))\kappa_{*}. By Definition 2, we have: λ~a(tt0|Ξ~a(t0,t)|)+λ~b|Ξ~a(t0,t)|=λ~a(tt0)+(λ~a+λ~b)[T0+(tt0)/Ta]-\tilde{\lambda}_{a}(t-t_{0}-|\tilde{\Xi}_{a}(t_{0},t)|)+\tilde{\lambda}_{b}|\tilde{\Xi}_{a}(t_{0},t)|=-\tilde{\lambda}_{a}(t-t_{0})+(\tilde{\lambda}_{a}+\tilde{\lambda}_{b})[T_{0}+(t-t_{0})/T_{a}]. Thus, it follows from (78) that

W(t)\displaystyle W(t) e(λ~a+λ~b)T0eλ~a(tt0)e(λ~a+λ~b)τa(tt0)\displaystyle\leq e^{(\tilde{\lambda}_{a}+\tilde{\lambda}_{b})T_{0}}e^{-\tilde{\lambda}_{a}(t-t_{0})}e^{\frac{(\tilde{\lambda}_{a}+\tilde{\lambda}_{b})}{\tau_{a}}(t-t_{0})}
×e[ln(μ~)+(λ~a+λ~b)Na(t0,t)]W(t0).\displaystyle\ \ \ \times e^{[\ln(\tilde{\mu})+(\tilde{\lambda}_{a}+\tilde{\lambda}_{b})N_{a}(t_{0},t)]}W(t_{0}). (79)

From (61), let η~=λ~a(λ~a+λ~b)/τaη~>0\tilde{\eta}=\tilde{\lambda}_{a}-(\tilde{\lambda}_{a}+\tilde{\lambda}_{b})/\tau_{a}-\tilde{\eta}^{\ast}>0 so that

W(t)e(λ~a+λ~b)(T0+κ)+u~N0eη~(tt0)W(t0).W(t)\leq e^{(\tilde{\lambda}_{a}+\tilde{\lambda}_{b})(T_{0}+\kappa_{*})+\tilde{u}N_{0}}e^{-\tilde{\eta}(t-t_{0})}W(t_{0}). (80)

Thus, for certain scalar ς~>0\tilde{\varsigma}>0, we can have

[χ~(t)η(t)]2ς~eη~(tt0)[χ~(t0)η(t0)]2.\left\|\left[\begin{array}[]{cc}\tilde{\chi}(t)\\ \eta(t)\end{array}\right]\right\|^{2}\leq\tilde{\varsigma}e^{-\tilde{\eta}(t-t_{0})}\left\|\left[\begin{array}[]{cc}\tilde{\chi}(t_{0})\\ \eta(t_{0})\end{array}\right]\right\|^{2}. (81)

Hence, we obtain that yiy_{i} converges to yy^{*} exponentially. ∎

Theorem 3

The event-triggering instants determined by (51)-(54) guarantee that no agents will exhibit Zeno behavior.

Proof:

suppose that there exists Zeno behavior. That is, there exists an agent so that at certain time 𝒯0\mathcal{T}_{0}, limttki=𝒯0\lim_{t\rightarrow\infty}t^{i}_{k}=\mathcal{T}_{0}. From the property of limits, we have that for certain ε0>0\varepsilon_{0}>0, there exists a positive integer 𝒩(ε0)\mathcal{N}(\varepsilon_{0}) such that

tki[𝒯0ε0,𝒯0+ε0],k𝒩(ε0),t^{i}_{k}\in[\mathcal{T}_{0}-\varepsilon_{0},\mathcal{T}_{0}+\varepsilon_{0}],\ \forall k\geq\mathcal{N}(\varepsilon_{0}), (82)

which implies that t𝒩(ε0)+1it𝒩(ε0)i<2ε0t^{i}_{\mathcal{N}(\varepsilon_{0})+1}-t^{i}_{\mathcal{N}(\varepsilon_{0})}<2\varepsilon_{0}.

Based on (1), (47) and (60), the upper right-hand Dini derivative of e~yi\|\tilde{e}_{yi}\| and e~ϱzi\|\tilde{e}_{\varrho zi}\| can be derived as

D+e~yi\displaystyle D^{+}\|\tilde{e}_{yi}\| =y˙iCiA~i(xiXiϱi)+ϱ˙i,\displaystyle=\|-\dot{y}_{i}\|\leq\|C_{i}\tilde{A}_{i}(x_{i}-X_{i}\varrho_{i})+\dot{\varrho}_{i}\|, (83a)
D+e~ϱzi\displaystyle D^{+}\|\tilde{e}_{\varrho zi}\| =ϱ˙iz˙iϱ˙i+z˙i,\displaystyle=\|-\dot{\varrho}_{i}-\dot{z}_{i}\|\leq\|\dot{\varrho}_{i}+\dot{z}_{i}\|, (83b)
ϱ˙i\displaystyle\dot{\varrho}_{i} =fi(yi)βe¯ϱziαβe¯yi,\displaystyle=-\triangledown f_{i}(y_{i})-\beta\bar{e}_{\varrho zi}-\alpha\beta\bar{e}_{yi}, (83c)
z˙i\displaystyle\dot{z}_{i} =αβe¯yi,t[tki,tk+1i).\displaystyle=\alpha\beta\bar{e}_{yi},\ t\in[t^{i}_{k},t^{i}_{k+1}). (83d)

Case a): for t[tki,tk+1i)t=tkiΞs(t0,t)t\in[t^{i}_{k},t^{i}_{k+1})\cap t=t^{i}_{k}\in\Xi_{s}(t_{0},t), we get

D+e~yiCiA~i(xiXiϱi)fi(yi)βeϱziαβeyi.D^{+}\|\tilde{e}_{yi}\|\leq\|C_{i}\tilde{A}_{i}(x_{i}-X_{i}\varrho_{i})-\triangledown f_{i}(y_{i})-\beta e_{\varrho zi}-\alpha\beta e_{yi}\|. (84)

From Theorem 2, we have that all the states x~Xϱ~\tilde{x}-X\tilde{\varrho}, ϱ~+z~\tilde{\varrho}+\tilde{z}, y~\tilde{y} are bounded. Thus, for certain scalar C0>0C_{0}>0,

D+e~yiC0.D^{+}\|\tilde{e}_{yi}\|\leq C_{0}. (85)

Since an event is triggered if (51) is satisfied and e~yi(tki)=0||\tilde{e}_{yi}(t^{i}_{k})||=0, we have e~yi(t)2θgieyi2+ηgi(t)/σgiηgi(t)/σgi||\tilde{e}_{yi}(t)||^{2}\geq\theta_{gi}e^{2}_{yi}+\eta_{gi}(t)/\sigma_{gi}\geq\eta_{gi}(t)/\sigma_{gi} . Thus,

e~yi(t)ηgi(t)/σgiηgi(0)/σgiekgi+δgi/σgi2t.||\tilde{e}_{yi}(t)||\geq\sqrt{\eta_{gi}(t)/\sigma_{gi}}\geq\sqrt{\eta_{gi}(0)/\sigma_{gi}}e^{-\frac{k_{gi}+\delta_{gi}/\sigma_{gi}}{2}t}. (86)

Hence, it follows from (85) and (86) that

t𝒩(ε0)+1it𝒩(ε0)i1C0ηgi(0)/σgiekgi+δgi/σgi2t𝒩(ε0)+1i.t^{i}_{\mathcal{N}(\varepsilon_{0})+1}-t^{i}_{\mathcal{N}(\varepsilon_{0})}\geq\frac{1}{C_{0}}\sqrt{\eta_{gi}(0)/\sigma_{gi}}e^{-\frac{k_{gi}+\delta_{gi}/\sigma_{gi}}{2}t^{i}_{\mathcal{N}(\varepsilon_{0})+1}}.

Select ε0\varepsilon_{0} as the solution of 1C0ηgi(0)/σgiekgi+δgi/σgi2𝒯0=2ε0ekgi+δgi/σgi2ε0\frac{1}{C_{0}}\sqrt{\eta_{gi}(0)/\sigma_{gi}}e^{-\frac{k_{gi}+\delta_{gi}/\sigma_{gi}}{2}\mathcal{T}_{0}}=2\varepsilon_{0}e^{\frac{k_{gi}+\delta_{gi}/\sigma_{gi}}{2}\varepsilon_{0}}. Then, we obtain that

t𝒩(ε0)+1it𝒩(ε0)i1C0ηgi(0)/σgiekgi+δgi/σgi2(𝒯0+ε0)=2ε0,t^{i}_{\mathcal{N}(\varepsilon_{0})+1}-t^{i}_{\mathcal{N}(\varepsilon_{0})}\geq\frac{1}{C_{0}}\sqrt{\eta_{gi}(0)/\sigma_{gi}}e^{-\frac{k_{gi}+\delta_{gi}/\sigma_{gi}}{2}(\mathcal{T}_{0}+\varepsilon_{0})}=2\varepsilon_{0},

which contracts (82). Thus, no Zero behavior exists for Case a).

Case b): for t[tki,tk+1i)t=tkiΞs(t0,t)t\in[t^{i}_{k},t^{i}_{k+1})\cap t=t^{i}_{k}\in\Xi_{s}(t_{0},t), D+e~ϱzifi(yi)βeϱziD^{+}\|\tilde{e}_{\varrho zi}\|\leq\|-\triangledown f_{i}(y_{i})-\beta e_{\varrho zi}\|. Following a similar procedure, we can also show that no Zero behavior exists for e~ϱzi\tilde{e}_{\varrho zi}.

Overall, Zero behavior can be avoided for agent ii. ∎

Remark 5

Unlike traditional time-triggered control schemes in (8), an event-based transmission strategy is presented in (47) to save limited communication resources and to be resilient against attacks. The defined {tki}\{t^{i}_{k}\} is an aperiodic transmission sequence determined by (51) for agent i. This means that each agent has its own triggering rule, that is, they transmit data in an asynchronous manner. In addition, the triggering process of each agent does not affect each other, that is, an agent and its neighbors are considered independent from the perspective of activating the triggering rules. Each agent needs to measure its own information and has access to its neighboring information, which essentially reflects the basic requirement of distributed control strategy.

Remark 6

Inspired by [27] and [28], a new dynamical event-triggered communication scheme in (51)-(54) is designed over an insecure and unreliable network. For linear multi-agent systems, the proposed scheme in (51)-(54) generates transmission updates under DoS attacks. General speaking, there exist several methods to exclude Zeno behavior, e.g., a pre-defined dwell time design in [18] or combination with sample-data schemes in [29]. In contrast to the above literature, the dynamical event-triggered communication scheme in (51)-(54) is developed to avoid the continuous communication and involvement of global graph information. In addition, its effectiveness has been verified even in the presence of DoS attacks over random digraphs.

IV Numerical Simulations

In this section, numerical simulation examples are presented to verify the effectiveness of the proposed designs.

Consider a group of agents described by the following general heterogeneous linear dynamics with different dimensions:

x˙i(t)=Aixi(t)+Biui(t),yi(t)=Cixi(t),where,\displaystyle\dot{x}_{i}(t)=A_{i}x_{i}(t)+B_{i}u_{i}(t),\ y_{i}(t)=C_{i}x_{i}(t),\ \text{where}, (87)
Ai\displaystyle A_{i} =[0100],Bi=[0112],CiT=[11],i=1,\displaystyle=\left[\begin{array}[]{cc}0&1\\ 0&0\end{array}\right],B_{i}=\left[\begin{array}[]{cc}0&1\\ 1&-2\end{array}\right],C^{T}_{i}=\left[\begin{array}[]{c}1\\ 1\end{array}\right],\ i=1, (94)
Ai\displaystyle A_{i} =[0112],Bi=[1031],CiT=[11],i=2,\displaystyle=\left[\begin{array}[]{cc}0&-1\\ 1&-2\end{array}\right],B_{i}=\left[\begin{array}[]{cc}1&0\\ 3&-1\end{array}\right],C^{T}_{i}=\left[\begin{array}[]{c}-1\\ 1\end{array}\right],\ i=2, (101)
Ai\displaystyle A_{i} =[0100010.512],Bi=[100110],CiT=[111],i=3.\displaystyle=\left[\begin{array}[]{ccc}0&1&0\\ 0&0&1\\ 0.5&1&-2\end{array}\right],B_{i}=\left[\begin{array}[]{cc}1&0\\ 0&1\\ 1&0\end{array}\right],C_{i}^{T}=\left[\begin{array}[]{c}1\\ -1\\ 1\end{array}\right],i=3. (111)

In order to cooperatively solve the original optimization problem: F(θ)=i=1Nfi(θ),i=1,2,3\mathrm{F}(\theta)=\sum_{i=1}^{N}f_{i}(\theta),\ i=1,2,3, the local objective functions for each agent are described by f1(θ)=2e0.5θ+0.5e0.3θf_{1}(\theta)=-2e^{-0.5\theta}+0.5e^{0.3\theta}, f2(θ)=θ4+2θ2+2f_{2}(\theta)=\theta^{4}+2\theta^{2}+2, and f3(θ)=0.5θ2ln(1+θ2)+θ2f_{3}(\theta)=0.5\theta^{2}\ln(1+\theta^{2})+\theta^{2} [11].

The random digraphs for a team of three agents are shown in Fig. 1, where the random process is captured by the Markov chain with the state space being 𝒮={1,2,3}\mathcal{S}=\{1,2,3\}, and its transition rate matrix is Υ=(0.10.020.080.30.50.20.10.10.2)\Upsilon=\left(\begin{array}[]{ccc}-0.1&0.02&0.08\\ 0.3&-0.5&0.2\\ 0.1&0.1&-0.2\end{array}\right), whose row summation is zero and all off-diagonal elements are nonnegative. The initial distribution is given by [0.5882,0.1500,0.3235].[0.5882,0.1500,0.3235]. As can be seen, each graph is disconnected, while the union of graphs contains a directed spanning tree to satisfy Assumption 3.

Next, executions of resilient distributed optimization algorithms with respect to three different cases are presented. The values of the initial states xi(0)x_{i}(0), ϱi(0)\varrho_{i}(0) and zi(0)z_{i}(0) are randomly chosen in an interval [10,10][-10,10]. The controller gain matrix KiK_{i} is chosen so that AiBiKiA_{i}-B_{i}K_{i} is Hurwitz, which are provided as: K1=[3,5;1.5,1]K_{1}=[3,5;1.5,1], K2=[0.75,1;1.25,4]K_{2}=[0.75,-1;1.25,-4], K3=[2.167,1,0.333;0,3,1]K_{3}=[2.167,1,0.333;0,3,1]. Thus, the gain matrices UiU_{i}, WiW_{i}, XiX_{i} (solution to (11)) can be determined by: U1=[1;0.5]U_{1}=[1;0.5], U2=[0.5;0]U_{2}=[-0.5;0], U3=[1;0]U_{3}=[-1;0], W1=[1.5;0.5]W_{1}=[1.5;0.5], W2=[0.5;2]W_{2}=[-0.5;-2], W3=[0;1]W_{3}=[0;-1], X1=[0.5;0.5]X_{1}=[0.5;0.5], X2=[0.5;0.5]X_{2}=[-0.5;\\ 0.5], and X3=[0;1;0]X_{3}=[0;-1;0], respectively.

Refer to caption
Figure 1: The communication digraphs for a team of three agents.
Refer to caption
Figure 2: The signal r(t)r(t) with respect to random digraphs in Fig. 1.
Refer to caption
Figure 3: Execution of algorithm (46) over random digraphs under α=2\alpha=2, β=1\beta=1: (a) the states yiy_{i}; (b) optimal errors lnyiy\ln||y_{i}-y_{*}||, i=1,2,3i=1,2,3.
Refer to caption
Figure 4: The sum of local objective functions i=13fi(yi)\sum^{3}_{i=1}f_{i}(y_{i}).

Case 1: execution of reliable distributed optimization algorithm (46) over random digraphs and without DoS attacks

In this simulation, the resilient distributed optimization algorithm (46) is performed under only unreliable random digraphs in the absence of DoS attacks. Figs. 2-4 depict the simulation results for the execution of (46). The signal r(t)r(t) in Fig. 2 describes the random process of unreliable digraphs in Fig. 1. Fig. 3 shows the trajectories of both output states yiy_{i} and optimal errors lnyiy\ln||y_{i}-y_{*}||, respectively, while Fig. 4 illustrates the evolution of the sum of local objective functions i=13fi(yi)\sum^{3}_{i=1}f_{i}(y_{i}). It can be seen that these outputs reach consensus and converge to the optimal solution yy_{*}.

To illustrate the effect of the parameter β\beta, Fig. 5 illustrate the simulation results with different β\beta. As we can see, the larger value of β\beta results in a faster convergence as discussed.

Refer to caption Refer to caption
Figure 5: Execution of the proposed algorithm (46) over random digraphs under (a) α=2\alpha=2, β=0.5\beta=0.5; and (b) α=2\alpha=2, β=1.5\beta=1.5.

Case 2: execution of time-based resilient distributed optimization algorithm (8) under DoS attacks over random digraphs

In this simulation, the resilient distributed optimization algorithm (8) with time-based communication is performed under DoS attacks over random digraphs. The simulation result is shown in Fig. 6. The DoS attack signal is simulated in Fig. 6(a) with τa=3s\tau_{a}=3s. Based on (13) and (14), the two conditions are satisfied with Fa(t0,t)=Na(t0,t)tt00.01F_{a}(t_{0},t)=\frac{N_{a}(t_{0},t)}{t-t_{0}}\leq 0.01 and Ta>(λa+λb)/(λaη)=2T_{a}>(\lambda_{a}+\lambda_{b})/(\lambda_{a}-\eta^{\ast})=2. That is, the attack cannot occur more than 0.010.01 times during a unit of time. Figs. 6(b) and 6(c) show the outputs and the errors, while Fig. 6(d) shows the sum of local cost functions. As can be seen, these outputs reach consensus and converge to the solution yy_{*} under DoS attacks over random digraphs.

Refer to caption
Figure 6: Execution of the proposed algorithm (8) under DoS attacks over random digraphs for α=2\alpha=2, β=1\beta=1: (a) Dos attack signals; (b) states yiy_{i}; (c) optimal errors lnyiy\ln||y_{i}-y_{*}||, (d) sum of local objective functions i=13fi(yi)\sum^{3}_{i=1}f_{i}(y_{i}), i=1,2,3i=1,2,3.

Case 3: execution of event-based resilient distributed optimization algorithm (47) under DoS attacks over random digraphs

In this part, the event-triggered resilient distributed optimization algorithm (47) has been performed under attacks over random digraphs. The simulation environments including DoS attacks and control parameters are set the same as those in Case 2. Then, the simulation results are depicted in Fig. 7, from which it can be seen that these outputs reach consensus and can converge to yy_{*}. Thus, the optimization problem is solvable by the proposed distributed algorithm (47) with an event-based communication strategy under DoS attacks over random digraphs. Fig. 8 depicts the event time instants of agents, and there exists no Zeno-behavior.

Refer to caption
Figure 7: Execution of the proposed algorithm (47) under DoS attacks over random digraphs for α=2\alpha=2, β=1\beta=1: (a) Dos attack signals; (b) states yiy_{i}; (c) optimal errors lnyiy\ln||y_{i}-y_{*}||, (d) sum of local objective functions i=13fi(yi)\sum^{3}_{i=1}f_{i}(y_{i}), i=1,2,3i=1,2,3.
Refer to caption
Figure 8: The event time instants of all agents.

V Conclusion

In this paper, resilient exponential distributed convex optimization problems were studied for linear multi-agent systems under DoS attacks over random digraphs. The two types of time-based and event-based resilient distributed optimization algorithms were proposed to solve these problems, respectively. Under both algorithms, the global minimizer was achieved exponentially, provided that an explicit analysis of the frequency and duration of attacks was established. In addition, it was proved that there were no Zeno behavior occurring under the dynamic event-triggered condition. Future work will investigate resilient constrained optimization.

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