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On Equilibrium Determinacy in Overlapping Generations Models with Money

Tomohiro Hirano Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London and Research Associate at the Center for Macroeconomics at the London School of Economics. Email: tomohih@gmail.com.    Alexis Akira Toda Department of Economics, University of California San Diego. Email: atoda@ucsd.edu.
Abstract

This paper provides a detailed analysis of the local determinacy of monetary and non-monetary steady states in Tirole (1985)’s classical two-period overlapping generations model with capital and production. We show that the sufficient condition for local determinacy in endowment economies provided by Scheinkman (1980) does not generalize to models with production: there are robust examples with arbitrary utility functions in which the non-monetary steady state is locally determinate or indeterminate. In contrast, the monetary steady state is locally determinate under fairly weak conditions.

Keywords: local determinacy, money, overlapping generations model, production.

JEL codes: C62, D53, G12.

1 Introduction

It is well known that in overlapping generations (OLG) model with money, equilibrium indeterminacy is possible: there often exists a steady state in which money has value (monetary or bubbly steady state) as well as a continuum of equilibrium paths converging to the steady state in which money has no value (non-monetary or fundamental steady state). The possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy was first pointed out by Gale (1973) in the endowment economy of Samuelson (1958). Somewhat surprisingly, formal analyses of the determinacy of steady states in these classical models are not easy to find.111Galor and Ryder (1991) study the dynamic efficiency in Tirole (1985)’s model without money, which is related to local determinacy of the non-monetary steady state. However, they only provide sufficient conditions using the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. Bose and Ray (1993) study the existence and efficiency of monetary equilibria in Tirole (1985)’s model under high-level assumptions on the savings function. In contrast, we study local (in)determinacy in both non-monetary and monetary economies. Many authors use simple phase diagrams or high-level assumptions to study the local determinacy of equilibria. For instance, Tirole (1985, p. 1502) directly assumes some monotonicity condition on a function that determines the rental rate without providing sufficient conditions on fundamentals. Similarly, Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 268, Endnote 16) state “Care must be taken in using a phase diagram to analyze the dynamics of a difference equation system. […] Thus we must check in this case whether the system is indeed saddle point stable […]. This check is left to the reader”.

In a by now forgotten contribution, Scheinkman (1980) shows that if the old have no endowment and the period utility function satisfies limx0xu(x)>0\lim_{x\to 0}xu^{\prime}(x)>0, then in endowment economies the non-monetary steady state is locally determinate. Santos (1990) significantly generalizes this result and proves the existence of equilibria in which the value of money is bounded away from zero.

This paper revisits these classical models with money and provides a detailed analysis of equilibrium determinacy in Tirole (1985)’s model. We obtain two main results, one negative and one positive. The first and negative result roughly states that, given an arbitrary utility function, by judiciously choosing the production function, we can provide robust examples of equilibrium determinacy or indeterminacy at the non-monetary steady state. This result shows that Scheinkman (1980)’s sufficient condition does not generalize to production economies, and in fact, no conditions on utility function alone are sufficient for determinacy or indeterminacy. The second and positive result states that the monetary steady state (if one exists) is locally determinate under fairly weak conditions.

To illustrate our theoretical results, we provide a complete characterization for the model with Cobb-Douglas utility function and constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. Even in this canonical setting, we show that anything goes for the eigenvalues of the Jacobian at the non-monetary steady state by choosing parameters appropriately. However, we show that whenever a monetary steady state exists, it is always locally determinate, and there exists one locally indeterminate non-monetary steady state and potentially another that is unstable. Our paper highlights the importance of complementing intuition with formal mathematical analysis and shows that monetary economies are inherently unstable with a continuum of equilibria.

2 Determinacy in OLG production economies

2.1 Model

The model description is brief because it is well known. We consider Tirole (1985)’s OLG model with capital accumulation and a constant population normalized to 1. Let U(y,z)=u(y)+βv(z)U(y,z)=u(y)+\beta v(z) be the utility when consumption is (y,z)(y,z) for young and old. We assume uu is twice continuously differentiable, u>0u^{\prime}>0, u′′<0u^{\prime\prime}<0, satisfies the Inada condition u(0)=u^{\prime}(0)=\infty, and likewise for vv. Let F(K,L)F(K,L) be the aggregate neoclassical production function, where K,LK,L are capital and labor inputs. The young supply labor inelastically and invest in capital and an intrinsically useless asset in unit supply, which is initially held by the old.222Shi and Suen (2014) consider elastic labor supply. The old liquidate all resources and consume.

Let PtP_{t} be the asset price, RtR_{t} the rental rate, wtw_{t} the wage rate, xtx_{t} the asset holdings of the young, ktk_{t} the capital holdings of the old, (yt,zt)(y_{t},z_{t}) the consumption of the young and old, and (Kt,Lt)(K_{t},L_{t}) the capital and labor inputs. A competitive equilibrium consists of a sequence of these variables such that 1. each generation maximizes utility subject to the budget constraints yt+kt+1+Ptxt=wty_{t}+k_{t+1}+P_{t}x_{t}=w_{t} for the young and zt+1=Rt+1kt+1+Pt+1xtz_{t+1}=R_{t+1}k_{t+1}+P_{t+1}x_{t} for the old, 2. the firm maximizes profit F(Kt,Lt)RtKtwtLtF(K_{t},L_{t})-R_{t}K_{t}-w_{t}L_{t}, 3. the commodity market clears, so yt+zt+kt+1=F(Kt,Lt)y_{t}+z_{t}+k_{t+1}=F(K_{t},L_{t}), 4. factor markets clear, so Kt=ktK_{t}=k_{t}, Lt=1L_{t}=1, 5. the asset market clears, so xt=1x_{t}=1.

It is easy to show that either Pt=0P_{t}=0 for all tt or Pt>0P_{t}>0 for all tt (Hirano and Toda, 2024, §2). We say that an equilibrium is 1. stationaryor a steady state if Pt=PP_{t}=P is constant, 2. non-monetary(or fundamental) if Pt=0P_{t}=0 for all tt, 3. monetary(or bubbly) if Pt>0P_{t}>0 for all tt. In what follows, we abbreviate monetary and non-monetary steady states as MSS and NMSS, respectively.

2.2 Equilibrium analysis

Define f(k)=F(k,1)f(k)=F(k,1). Profit maximization implies

Rt\displaystyle R_{t} =FK(kt,1)=f(kt),\displaystyle=F_{K}(k_{t},1)=f^{\prime}(k_{t}),
wt\displaystyle w_{t} =FL(kt,1)=f(kt)ktf(kt).\displaystyle=F_{L}(k_{t},1)=f(k_{t})-k_{t}f^{\prime}(k_{t}).

It is convenient to define savings by stkt+1+Ptxt=wtyts_{t}\coloneqq k_{t+1}+P_{t}x_{t}=w_{t}-y_{t}. In a non-monetary equilibrium, because Pt=0P_{t}=0, we have st=kt+1s_{t}=k_{t+1}. In a monetary equilibrium, because capital and the asset are perfect substitutes, agents must be indifferent between holding the two. In either case, the young’s problem reduces to maximizing

u(wtst)+βv(Rt+1st).u(w_{t}-s_{t})+\beta v(R_{t+1}s_{t}).

The strict concavity of u,vu,v and the Inada condition imply that there exists a unique solution st=s(wt,Rt+1)s_{t}=s(w_{t},R_{t+1}), where s(w,R)s(w,R) solves the first-order condition

u(ws)+βRv(Rs)=0.-u^{\prime}(w-s)+\beta Rv^{\prime}(Rs)=0. (2.1)

In equilibrium, because xt=1x_{t}=1, we obtain the equilibrium condition

kt+1+Pt=s(f(kt)ktf(kt),f(kt+1)).k_{t+1}+P_{t}=s(f(k_{t})-k_{t}f^{\prime}(k_{t}),f^{\prime}(k_{t+1})). (2.2)

Furthermore, individual optimality implies the no-arbitrage condition

Pt=1f(kt+1)Pt+1.P_{t}=\frac{1}{f^{\prime}(k_{t+1})}P_{t+1}. (2.3)

Therefore the equilibrium is characterized by the system of nonlinear difference equations (2.2) and (2.3). To study the equilibrium dynamics, define the state variable ξt=(ξ1t,ξ2t)=(kt,Pt)\xi_{t}=(\xi_{1t},\xi_{2t})=(k_{t},P_{t}). Then we may write (2.2), (2.3) as Φ(ξt,ξt+1)=0\Phi(\xi_{t},\xi_{t+1})=0, where

Φ1(ξ,η)\displaystyle\Phi_{1}(\xi,\eta) =η1+ξ2s(f(ξ1)ξ1f(ξ1),f(η1)),\displaystyle=\eta_{1}+\xi_{2}-s(f(\xi_{1})-\xi_{1}f^{\prime}(\xi_{1}),f^{\prime}(\eta_{1})),
Φ2(ξ,η)\displaystyle\Phi_{2}(\xi,\eta) =η2ξ2f(η1).\displaystyle=\eta_{2}-\xi_{2}f^{\prime}(\eta_{1}).

The following lemma is a simple application of the implicit function theorem. Below, we denote the Jacobian of a function gg with respect to a variable xx by DxgD_{x}g.

Lemma 2.1.

Let ξ=(k,P)\xi^{*}=(k,P) be a steady state, so Φ(ξ,ξ)=0\Phi(\xi^{*},\xi^{*})=0. If DηΦ(ξ,ξ)D_{\eta}\Phi(\xi^{*},\xi^{*}) is nonsingular, the equation Φ(ξ,η)=0\Phi(\xi,\eta)=0 can be locally solved as η=ϕ(ξ)\eta=\phi(\xi), where

Dξϕ(ξ)=11sRf′′[swkf′′1swkP(f′′)2(1sRf′′)fPf′′]D_{\xi}\phi(\xi^{*})=\frac{1}{1-s_{R}f^{\prime\prime}}\begin{bmatrix}-s_{w}kf^{\prime\prime}&-1\\ -s_{w}kP(f^{\prime\prime})^{2}&(1-s_{R}f^{\prime\prime})f^{\prime}-Pf^{\prime\prime}\end{bmatrix} (2.4)

and f,f′′f^{\prime},f^{\prime\prime} are evaluated at kk.

At NMSS, setting P=0P=0 in (2.4) yields

Dξϕ=[swkf′′1sRf′′11sRf′′0f].D_{\xi}\phi=\begin{bmatrix}-\frac{s_{w}kf^{\prime\prime}}{1-s_{R}f^{\prime\prime}}&-\frac{1}{1-s_{R}f^{\prime\prime}}\\ 0&f^{\prime}\end{bmatrix}. (2.5)

Studying local determinacy reduces to determining whether the diagonal entries of DξϕD_{\xi}\phi in (2.5) are inside or outside the unit circle. Without further structure, it is difficult to provide general sufficient conditions. We thus approach the problem in reverse, and ask whether we can reverse-engineer a model that generates a desired steady state. The following lemma provides an answer.

Lemma 2.2.

Take any utility functions of the young and old u,vu,v, capital k>0k^{*}>0, rental rate R>0R>0, wage w>kw>k^{*}, and parameter c0c\leq 0. Then there exist discount factor β>0\beta>0 and production function ff with f′′(k)=cf^{\prime\prime}(k^{*})=c such that (k,0)(k^{*},0) is NMSS consistent with the given parameters.

We can show that “anything goes” regarding the local determinacy of NMSS, which is our first main result.

Theorem 1.

Let everything be as in Lemma 2.2 and c0c\leq 0 sufficiently close to 0. Then the following statements are true.

  1. (i)

    If R<1R<1, then NMSS is locally indeterminate: for any (k0,P0)(k_{0},P_{0}) sufficiently close to (k,0)(k^{*},0), there exists a monetary equilibrium converging to NMSS.

  2. (ii)

    If R>1R>1, then NMSS is locally determinate: for any k0k_{0} sufficiently close to kk^{*}, there exists a unique equilibrium converging to NMSS, which is non-monetary.

Theorem 1 implies that no condition on the utility functions u,vu,v alone are sufficient for the local determinacy of NMSS in a production economy. This is very different from endowment economies discussed in Appendix B, for which there exists a condition on vv alone that is sufficient for local determinacy.

Our second main result shows that there exists a condition on vv alone that guarantees the local determinacy of MSS.

Theorem 2.

Let (k,P)0(k,P)\gg 0 be MSS. If f′′<0f^{\prime\prime}<0 and 1sRf′′>01-s_{R}f^{\prime\prime}>0 at the steady state, then (k,P)(k,P) is locally determinate. In particular, a sufficient condition for local determinacy is γv1\gamma_{v}\leq 1, where γv(z)zv′′(z)/v(z)>0\gamma_{v}(z)\coloneqq-zv^{\prime\prime}(z)/v^{\prime}(z)>0 denotes the relative risk aversion of vv.

3 Cobb-Douglas-CES economy

To illustrate Theorems 1 and 2, we present a canonical example. Let the utility function be Cobb-Douglas, so

U(y,z)=u(y)+βv(z)=(1β)logy+βlogzU(y,z)=u(y)+\beta v(z)=(1-\beta)\log y+\beta\log z

with β(0,1)\beta\in(0,1). Let the production function exhibit constant elasticity of substitution (CES), so

F(K,L)={A(αK1ρ+(1α)L1ρ)11ρ+(1δ)Kif 0<ρ1,AKαL1α+(1δ)Kif ρ=1,F(K,L)=\begin{cases*}A\left(\alpha K^{1-\rho}+(1-\alpha)L^{1-\rho}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}+(1-\delta)K&if $0<\rho\neq 1$,\\ AK^{\alpha}L^{1-\alpha}+(1-\delta)K&if $\rho=1$,\end{cases*}

where A>0A>0 is productivity, α(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1), δ(0,1]\delta\in(0,1] is the capital depreciation rate, and 1/ρ1/\rho is the capital-labor substitution elasticity. Below, for brevity we refer to this model as (θ)\mathcal{M}(\theta), where θ=(β,A,α,ρ,δ)\theta=(\beta,A,\alpha,\rho,\delta) lists model parameters.

With Cobb-Douglas utility, the savings function is s(w,R)=βws(w,R)=\beta w, implying sw=βs_{w}=\beta and sR=0s_{R}=0. Therefore the eigenvalues of the Jacobian at NMSS (2.5) are λ1βkf′′(k)>0\lambda_{1}\coloneqq-\beta kf^{\prime\prime}(k)>0 and λ2f(k)>1δ\lambda_{2}\coloneqq f^{\prime}(k)>1-\delta. The following proposition shows that we can reverse-engineer (θ)\mathcal{M}(\theta) that achieves any admissible λ1,λ2\lambda_{1},\lambda_{2}.

Proposition 3.1.

Let β(0,1)\beta\in(0,1), δ(0,1]\delta\in(0,1], k>0k>0, λ1>0\lambda_{1}>0, and λ2>1δ\lambda_{2}>1-\delta be given. Then there exist unique A>0A>0, α(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1), and ρ>0\rho>0 such that the non-monetary steady state capital of (θ)\mathcal{M}(\theta) is kk and the eigenvalues of the Jacobian are λ1,λ2\lambda_{1},\lambda_{2}.

he value added of Proposition 3.1 relative to Theorem 1 is that even in the canonical setting of Cobb-Douglas-CES economy, anything goes for local determinacy of NMSS. However, Proposition 3.1 is silent about the uniqueness of NMSS or the existence of MSS for a given (θ)\mathcal{M}(\theta), which we study next. The following proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence, uniqueness, and local determinacy of MSS.

Proposition 3.2.

In any (θ)\mathcal{M}(\theta), MSS exists if and only if βδ(c1)>1\beta\delta(c-1)>1, where cα1ρ(δ/A)1ρρc\coloneqq\alpha^{-\frac{1}{\rho}}(\delta/A)^{\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}}. MSS is unique and locally determinate whenever it exists.

The following proposition characterizes the existence, uniqueness, and local determinacy of NMSS for the case ρ1\rho\leq 1.

Proposition 3.3.

In any (θ)\mathcal{M}(\theta) with ρ1\rho\leq 1, there exists a unique NMSS. Furthermore, NMSS is locally indeterminate (λ1,λ2(0,1)\lambda_{1},\lambda_{2}\in(0,1)) if and only if MSS exists.

Proposition 3.3 implies that with a CES production function with elasticity of substitution 1/ρ11/\rho\geq 1 (including Cobb-Douglas), whenever MSS exists, NMSS is locally indeterminate. This is consistent with the textbook phase diagram of Blanchard and Fischer (1989, §5.2). However, empirical evidence suggests 1/ρ<11/\rho<1 and hence ρ>1\rho>1 (Oberfield and Raval, 2021; Gechert, Havranek, Irsova, and Kolcunova, 2022). The following theorem provides a characterization for the case ρ>1\rho>1.

Proposition 3.4.

In any (θ)\mathcal{M}(\theta) with ρ>1\rho>1, the following statements are true.

  1. (i)

    NMSS exists if and only if ρρα[βA(ρ1)]1ρ1\rho^{\rho}\alpha[\beta A(\rho-1)]^{1-\rho}\leq 1. The number of NMSS is 2 if the inequality is strict and 1 if equality holds.

  2. (ii)

    Whenever MSS exists, there exist exactly two NMSS, one of which is locally indeterminate (λ1,λ2(0,1)\lambda_{1},\lambda_{2}\in(0,1)) and the other unstable (λ1,λ2>1\lambda_{1},\lambda_{2}>1).

If ρ>1\rho>1, the conditions in Propositions 3.2 and 3.4(i) simultaneously hold (fail) if A>0A>0 is sufficiently large (small). Therefore the coexistence of MSS and NMSS as well as the nonexistence of any steady states are both possible. As discussed in the proof of Proposition 3.4, when condition (i) holds, the first eigenvalues of the two NMSS satisfy λ11λ1\lambda_{1}\leq 1\leq\lambda_{1}^{\prime} (with equality if and only if NMSS is unique). However, the sign of λ21\lambda_{2}-1 depends on other parameters when MSS does not exist.

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Appendix A Proofs

Proof of Lemma 2.1.

A straightforward calculation yields

DξΦ\displaystyle D_{\xi}\Phi =[swξ1f′′(ξ1)10f(η1)],\displaystyle=\begin{bmatrix}s_{w}\xi_{1}f^{\prime\prime}(\xi_{1})&1\\ 0&-f^{\prime}(\eta_{1})\end{bmatrix},
DηΦ\displaystyle D_{\eta}\Phi =[1sRf′′(η1)0ξ2f′′(η1)1].\displaystyle=\begin{bmatrix}1-s_{R}f^{\prime\prime}(\eta_{1})&0\\ -\xi_{2}f^{\prime\prime}(\eta_{1})&1\end{bmatrix}.

If DηΦD_{\eta}\Phi is nonsingular, we may apply the implicit function theorem to obtain

Dξϕ\displaystyle D_{\xi}\phi =[DηΦ]1DξΦ\displaystyle=-[D_{\eta}\Phi]^{-1}D_{\xi}\Phi
=11sRf′′(η1)[swξ1f′′(ξ1)1swξ1ξ2f′′(ξ1)f′′(η1)(1sRf′′(η1))f(η1)ξ2f′′(η1)].\displaystyle=\frac{1}{1-s_{R}f^{\prime\prime}(\eta_{1})}\begin{bmatrix}-s_{w}\xi_{1}f^{\prime\prime}(\xi_{1})&-1\\ -s_{w}\xi_{1}\xi_{2}f^{\prime\prime}(\xi_{1})f^{\prime\prime}(\eta_{1})&(1-s_{R}f^{\prime\prime}(\eta_{1}))f^{\prime}(\eta_{1})-\xi_{2}f^{\prime\prime}(\eta_{1})\end{bmatrix}.

Setting ξ=η=(k,P)\xi=\eta=(k,P) yields (2.4). ∎

Proof of Lemma 2.2.

NMSS conditions are utility maximization (2.1), profit maximization R=f(k)R=f^{\prime}(k^{*}) and w=f(k)kf(k)w=f(k^{*})-k^{*}f^{\prime}(k^{*}), and market clearing condition k=sk^{*}=s. Let us construct such a model with f′′(k)=cf^{\prime\prime}(k^{*})=c. First, given uu, vv, k>0k^{*}>0, R>0R>0, and w>kw>k^{*}, set s=ks=k^{*} and take a discount factor β>0\beta>0 such that u(ws)=βRv(Rs)u^{\prime}(w-s)=\beta Rv^{\prime}(Rs). Next, define the output Yw+RkY\coloneqq w+Rk^{*}. Since w>0w>0, we can take a nonnegative, increasing, and concave function ff such that f(k)=Yf(k^{*})=Y, f(k)=Rf^{\prime}(k^{*})=R, and f′′(k)=cf^{\prime\prime}(k^{*})=c. For instance, for small enough ϵ>0\epsilon>0, we can let

f(k)=Y+R(kk)+c2(kk)2=w+Rk+c2(kk)2f(k)=Y+R(k-k^{*})+\frac{c}{2}(k-k^{*})^{2}=w+Rk+\frac{c}{2}(k-k^{*})^{2}

for k[kϵ,k+ϵ]k\in[k^{*}-\epsilon,k^{*}+\epsilon] and linearly extrapolate outside that range. (The condition w>0w>0 ensures that this ff is nonnegative as long as ϵ>0\epsilon>0 is small enough.) With this ff, we have R=f(k)R=f^{\prime}(k^{*}) and w=YRk=f(k)kf(k)w=Y-Rk^{*}=f(k^{*})-k^{*}f^{\prime}(k^{*}), so the first-order conditions for profit maximization are satisfied. Therefore (k,0)(k^{*},0) is indeed NMSS. ∎

Proof of Theorem 1.

For simplicity, suppose c=0c=0. (The proof for c<0c<0 sufficiently close to 0 is similar.) Since f(k)=Rf^{\prime}(k^{*})=R and f′′(k)=c=0f^{\prime\prime}(k^{*})=c=0, the Jacobian (2.5) reduces to

Dξϕ=[010R],D_{\xi}\phi=\begin{bmatrix}0&-1\\ 0&R\end{bmatrix},

whose eigenvalues are 0,R0,R. If R<1R<1, the steady state (k,0)(k^{*},0) is stable, and therefore for any (k0,P0)(k_{0},P_{0}) sufficiently close to (k,0)(k^{*},0), there exists an equilibrium path converging to the steady state.

If R>1R>1, the steady state (k,0)(k^{*},0) is a saddle point. Therefore for any k0k_{0} sufficiently close to kk^{*}, there exists a unique equilibrium path converging to the steady state. On such a path, because {Pt}\left\{{P_{t}}\right\} is bounded and R>1R>1, we have limtRtPt=0\lim_{t\to\infty}R^{-t}P_{t}=0. Since the transversality condition for asset pricing holds (see Hirano and Toda (2024, §2)), the asset price PtP_{t} must equal its fundamental value, so Pt=0P_{t}=0 for all tt. ∎

Proof of Theorem 2.

A simple application of the implicit function theorem shows

sw(w,R)\displaystyle s_{w}(w,R) =u′′(ws)u′′(ws)+βR2v′′(Rs)(0,1),\displaystyle=\frac{u^{\prime\prime}(w-s)}{u^{\prime\prime}(w-s)+\beta R^{2}v^{\prime\prime}(Rs)}\in(0,1), (A.1a)
sR(w,R)\displaystyle s_{R}(w,R) =βv(Rs)+βRsv′′(Rs)u′′(ws)+βR2v′′(Rs).\displaystyle=-\frac{\beta v^{\prime}(Rs)+\beta Rsv^{\prime\prime}(Rs)}{u^{\prime\prime}(w-s)+\beta R^{2}v^{\prime\prime}(Rs)}. (A.1b)

In MSS, the no-arbitrage condition (2.3) implies f(k)=1f^{\prime}(k)=1. Therefore letting JJ be the Jacobian (2.4) and c=f′′<0c=f^{\prime\prime}<0, we have

t\displaystyle t trJ=1(swk+P)c1sRc,\displaystyle\coloneqq\operatorname{tr}J=1-\frac{(s_{w}k+P)c}{1-s_{R}c},
d\displaystyle d detJ=swkc1sRc.\displaystyle\coloneqq\det J=-\frac{s_{w}kc}{1-s_{R}c}.

Let the characteristic polynomial of JJ be

p(x)det(xIJ)=x2tx+d.p(x)\coloneqq\det(xI-J)=x^{2}-tx+d.

By assumption, 1sRc>01-s_{R}c>0. Since sw>0s_{w}>0 by (A.1a) and c<0c<0, it follows that p(0)=d>0p(0)=d>0. Furthermore,

p(1)=1t+d=Pc1sRc<0.p(1)=1-t+d=\frac{Pc}{1-s_{R}c}<0.

Therefore the two roots λ1,λ2\lambda_{1},\lambda_{2} of pp satisfy 0<λ1<1<λ20<\lambda_{1}<1<\lambda_{2}. Since the steady state is a saddle point, MSS is locally determinate.

Since c<0c<0, the condition 1sRc>01-s_{R}c>0 trivially holds if sR0s_{R}\geq 0. Noting that u′′<0u^{\prime\prime}<0, v′′<0v^{\prime\prime}<0, and v(z)+zv′′(z)=v(z)(1γv(z))v^{\prime}(z)+zv^{\prime\prime}(z)=v^{\prime}(z)(1-\gamma_{v}(z)), by (A.1b) a sufficient condition for sR0s_{R}\geq 0 is γv1\gamma_{v}\leq 1. ∎

Proof of Proposition 3.1.

We focus on the case ρ1\rho\neq 1, though the Cobb-Douglas case with ρ=1\rho=1 can be analyzed by taking the limit ρ1\rho\to 1.

Define g(k)=(αk1ρ+1α)11ρg(k)=(\alpha k^{1-\rho}+1-\alpha)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}. A straightforward calculation yields

g\displaystyle g^{\prime} =αkρgρ,\displaystyle=\alpha k^{-\rho}g^{\rho},
g′′\displaystyle g^{\prime\prime} =ρα(1α)kρ1g2ρ1.\displaystyle=-\rho\alpha(1-\alpha)k^{-\rho-1}g^{2\rho-1}.

The equilibrium condition (2.2) at NMSS is

k=βw=βA(1α)gρA=1β(1α)kgρ.k=\beta w=\beta A(1-\alpha)g^{\rho}\iff A=\frac{1}{\beta(1-\alpha)}kg^{-\rho}. (A.2)

Therefore A>0A>0 is uniquely determined once we determine α,ρ\alpha,\rho. At NMSS, we have

λ1\displaystyle\lambda_{1} =βkf′′(k)=βkAρα(1α)kρ1g2ρ1\displaystyle=-\beta kf^{\prime\prime}(k)=\beta kA\rho\alpha(1-\alpha)k^{-\rho-1}g^{2\rho-1}
=ραk1ρgρ1=ραk1ραk1ρ+1α,\displaystyle=\rho\alpha k^{1-\rho}g^{\rho-1}=\rho\frac{\alpha k^{1-\rho}}{\alpha k^{1-\rho}+1-\alpha}, (A.3a)
λ2\displaystyle\lambda_{2} =f(k)=Aαkρgρ+1δ\displaystyle=f^{\prime}(k)=A\alpha k^{-\rho}g^{\rho}+1-\delta
=αβ(1α)k1ρ+1δ.\displaystyle=\frac{\alpha}{\beta(1-\alpha)}k^{1-\rho}+1-\delta. (A.3b)

Solving (A.3b) for αk1ρ\alpha k^{1-\rho} and substituting into (A.3a), we obtain

λ1=ρβ(λ21+δ)β(λ21+δ)+1ρ=λ1β(λ21+δ)+1β(λ21+δ).\lambda_{1}=\rho\frac{\beta(\lambda_{2}-1+\delta)}{\beta(\lambda_{2}-1+\delta)+1}\iff\rho=\lambda_{1}\frac{\beta(\lambda_{2}-1+\delta)+1}{\beta(\lambda_{2}-1+\delta)}. (A.4)

Therefore ρ\rho is uniquely determined as in (A.4). Because the right-hand side of (A.3b) is strictly increasing in α(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1) and its range is (1δ,)(1-\delta,\infty), there exists a unique α(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1) satisfying (A.3b). ∎

We prove Propositions 3.23.4 by establishing a series of lemmas.

Lemma A.1.

The conclusions of Propositions 3.2, 3.3 hold if ρ=1\rho=1.

Proof.

If ρ=1\rho=1, the equilibrium condition (2.2) at NMSS is

k=s=βA(1α)kαkf[βA(1α)]11α,k=s=\beta A(1-\alpha)k^{\alpha}\iff k_{f}\coloneqq[\beta A(1-\alpha)]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}},

which uniquely exists. At this kfk_{f}, (A.3) implies λ1=α<1\lambda_{1}=\alpha<1 and λ2=αβ(1α)+1δ\lambda_{2}=\frac{\alpha}{\beta(1-\alpha)}+1-\delta. Therefore NMSS is locally indeterminate if and only if λ2<1\lambda_{2}<1, which is equivalent to βδ(c1)>1\beta\delta(c-1)>1 because c=1/αc=1/\alpha. If MSS exists, we have

1=f(k)=Aαkα1+1δkb(Aα/δ)11α.1=f^{\prime}(k)=A\alpha k^{\alpha-1}+1-\delta\iff k_{b}\coloneqq(A\alpha/\delta)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}.

The equilibrium condition (2.2) at k=kbk=k_{b} implies

P=sk=βA(1α)kαk=(Aα/δ)11α(βδ1αα1).P=s-k=\beta A(1-\alpha)k^{\alpha}-k=(A\alpha/\delta)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}\left(\beta\delta\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}-1\right).

Therefore a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence (and uniqueness) of MSS is P>0P>0, or equivalently, βδ(c1)>1\beta\delta(c-1)>1. ∎

Lemma A.2.

Let ρ1\rho\neq 1 and cα1ρ(δ/A)1ρρc\coloneqq\alpha^{-\frac{1}{\rho}}(\delta/A)^{\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}}. Then MSS exists if and only if βδ(c1)>1\beta\delta(c-1)>1, in which case the unique MSS capital is given by k=(1/α1c1)11ρk=\left(\frac{1/\alpha-1}{c-1}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}.

Proof.

The uniqueness of kk follows from the strict concavity of ff.

If MSS exists, using (A.3b), we have

1=f(k)=Aα(g/k)ρ+1δg/k=(Aα/δ)1/ρ.1=f^{\prime}(k)=A\alpha(g/k)^{\rho}+1-\delta\iff g/k=(A\alpha/\delta)^{-1/\rho}.

Define x=αk1ρx=\alpha k^{1-\rho}. Then this condition is equivalent to

x+1αx/α=(Aα/δ)ρ1ρx=1αα1ρ(δ/A)1ρρ1=1αc1,\frac{x+1-\alpha}{x/\alpha}=(A\alpha/\delta)^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}}\iff x=\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha^{-\frac{1}{\rho}}(\delta/A)^{\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}}-1}=\frac{1-\alpha}{c-1}, (A.5)

so c>1c>1 is necessary. Under this condition, the steady state capital is k=(x/α)11ρ=(1/α1c1)11ρk=(x/\alpha)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}=\left(\frac{1/\alpha-1}{c-1}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}.

For this kk to be MSS, it is necessary and sufficient that P=βwk>0P=\beta w-k>0, where ww is the wage. Using (A.2), we obtain

βw/k=βA(1α)gρ/k=βA(1α)α11ρψ(x)11ρ,\beta w/k=\beta A(1-\alpha)g^{\rho}/k=\beta A(1-\alpha)\alpha^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}\psi(x)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}, (A.6)

where ψ(x)(x+1α)ρ/x\psi(x)\coloneqq(x+1-\alpha)^{\rho}/x. Using (A.5), we obtain

x+1α=c(1α)c1=cx\displaystyle x+1-\alpha=\frac{c(1-\alpha)}{c-1}=cx
\displaystyle\iff ψ(x)=(x+1α)ρx=cρxρ1\displaystyle\psi(x)=\frac{(x+1-\alpha)^{\rho}}{x}=c^{\rho}x^{\rho-1}
\displaystyle\iff ψ(x)11ρ=cρ1ρc11α=α11ρ(δ/A)c11α.\displaystyle\psi(x)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}=c^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}}\frac{c-1}{1-\alpha}=\alpha^{-\frac{1}{1-\rho}}(\delta/A)\frac{c-1}{1-\alpha}.

Therefore by (A.6), we obtain

P>0\displaystyle P>0 βA(1α)α11ρα11ρ(δ/A)c11α>1\displaystyle\iff\beta A(1-\alpha)\alpha^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}\alpha^{-\frac{1}{1-\rho}}(\delta/A)\frac{c-1}{1-\alpha}>1
βδ(c1)>1.\displaystyle\iff\beta\delta(c-1)>1.\qed
Proof of Proposition 3.2.

The existence and uniqueness of MSS are immediate from Lemmas A.1 and A.2. Since γv(z)=1\gamma_{v}(z)=1, Theorem 2 implies that MSS is locally determinate. ∎

Lemma A.3.

If ρ<1\rho<1, a unique NMSS exists. If ρ>1\rho>1, NMSS exists if and only if ρρα[βA(ρ1)]1ρ1\rho^{\rho}\alpha[\beta A(\rho-1)]^{1-\rho}\leq 1. The number of NMSS is 2 if the inequality is strict and 1 if equality holds.

Proof.

We use the same notation as in the proof of Lemma A.2. By (A.6), NMSS xx satisfies

βA(1α)α11ρψ(x)11ρψ(x)=1α[βA(1α)]1ρ.\beta A(1-\alpha)\alpha^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}\psi(x)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}\iff\psi(x)=\frac{1}{\alpha[\beta A(1-\alpha)]^{1-\rho}}.

A straightforward calculation yields

ψ(x)=(x+1α)ρ1x2((ρ1)x(1α)).\psi^{\prime}(x)=\frac{(x+1-\alpha)^{\rho-1}}{x^{2}}((\rho-1)x-(1-\alpha)). (A.7)

If ρ<1\rho<1, then ψ(x)<0\psi^{\prime}(x)<0, ψ(0)=\psi(0)=\infty, and ψ()=0\psi(\infty)=0, so a unique NMSS exists. If ρ>1\rho>1, then ψ\psi achieves a unique minimum at m1αρ1m\coloneqq\frac{1-\alpha}{\rho-1} and ψ(0)=ψ()=\psi(0)=\psi(\infty)=\infty. Therefore NMSS exists if and only if

ρρ(1αρ1)ρ1=ψ(m)ψ(x)=1α[βA(1α)]1ρ,\rho^{\rho}\left(\frac{1-\alpha}{\rho-1}\right)^{\rho-1}=\psi(m)\leq\psi(x)=\frac{1}{\alpha[\beta A(1-\alpha)]^{1-\rho}},

which is equivalent to the desired condition. Furthermore, since ψ(x)0\psi^{\prime}(x)\gtrless 0 according as xmx\lessgtr m, we obtain the claim. ∎

Lemma A.4.

If ρ<1\rho<1, then MSS exists if and only if λ2<1\lambda_{2}<1 at NMSS.

Proof.

We use the same notation as in the proof of Lemma A.2. Let xb,xfx_{b},x_{f} and kb,kfk_{b},k_{f} be the xx and kk in the (necessarily unique) MSS and NMSS, where x=αk1ρx=\alpha k^{1-\rho}. Then ρ<1\rho<1, (A.6), the monotonicity of ψ\psi, and the strict concavity of ff imply that MSS exists if and only if

βA(1α)α11ρψ(xb)11ρ>1=βA(1α)α11ρψ(xf)11ρ\displaystyle\beta A(1-\alpha)\alpha^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}\psi(x_{b})^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}>1=\beta A(1-\alpha)\alpha^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}\psi(x_{f})^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} (A.8)
\displaystyle\iff ψ(xb)>ψ(xf)xb<xf\displaystyle\psi(x_{b})>\psi(x_{f})\iff x_{b}<x_{f}
\displaystyle\iff kb<kf1=f(kb)>f(kf)=λ2.\displaystyle k_{b}<k_{f}\iff 1=f^{\prime}(k_{b})>f^{\prime}(k_{f})=\lambda_{2}.\qed
Proof of Proposition 3.3.

The case ρ=1\rho=1 follows from Lemma A.1. If ρ<1\rho<1, then (A.3a) implies λ1(0,1)\lambda_{1}\in(0,1) at NMSS. The conclusion holds by Lemmas A.2 and A.4. ∎

Proof of Proposition 3.4.

(i) Obvious from Lemma A.3.

(ii) Solving for αA1ρ\alpha A^{1-\rho}, the existence conditions for MSS in Proposition 3.2 and for NMSS in Lemma A.3 are, respectively,

αA1ρ\displaystyle\alpha A^{1-\rho} <δ(1/β+δ)ρ,\displaystyle<\delta(1/\beta+\delta)^{-\rho}, (A.9a)
αA1ρ\displaystyle\alpha A^{1-\rho} ρρ[β(ρ1)]ρ1.\displaystyle\leq\rho^{-\rho}[\beta(\rho-1)]^{\rho-1}. (A.9b)

Using calculus, it is straightforward to show that the maximum of the right-hand side of (A.9a) over δ>0\delta>0 is achieved at δ=1β(ρ1)\delta=\frac{1}{\beta(\rho-1)}, in which case the maximum value is equal to the right-hand side of (A.9b). Therefore whenever MSS exists, there exist exactly two NMSS.

Suppose MSS xbx_{b} exists and denote the two NMSS by xf<xfx_{f}<x_{f}^{\prime}. Then ρ>1\rho>1 and (A.8) imply ψ(xb)<ψ(xf)=ψ(xf)\psi(x_{b})<\psi(x_{f})=\psi(x_{f}^{\prime}). Since ψ\psi is strictly quasi-concave, it must be xf<xb<xfx_{f}<x_{b}<x_{f}^{\prime}. Since x=αk1ρx=\alpha k^{1-\rho} and ρ>1\rho>1, we have kf>kb>kfk_{f}>k_{b}>k_{f}^{\prime}. Since ff is strictly concave, we have

0<λ2=f(kf)<f(kb)=1<f(kf)=λ2.0<\lambda_{2}=f^{\prime}(k_{f})<f^{\prime}(k_{b})=1<f^{\prime}(k_{f}^{\prime})=\lambda_{2}^{\prime}.

Again, the strict quasi-concavity of ψ\psi implies xf<m<xfx_{f}<m<x_{f}^{\prime}, where m=1αρ1m=\frac{1-\alpha}{\rho-1}. Therefore using (A.3a), we obtain

0<λ1=ρxfxf+1α<ρmm+1α=1<ρxfxf+1α=λ1.0<\lambda_{1}=\rho\frac{x_{f}}{x_{f}+1-\alpha}<\rho\frac{m}{m+1-\alpha}=1<\rho\frac{x_{f}^{\prime}}{x_{f}^{\prime}+1-\alpha}=\lambda_{1}^{\prime}.

Note this last inequality is independent of whether xbx_{b} exists or not. ∎

Appendix B Determinacy in OLG endowment economies

This appendix reviews the local determinacy of monetary and NMSS in the classical two-period OLG endowment economies.

B.1 Model

Consider the classical two-period OLG model with a single perishable good. Preferences are the same as in §2. Each period, the young and old have endowments (a,b)(a,b), where a>0a>0 and b0b\geq 0. In addition, the initial old are endowed with an intrinsically useless asset (i.e., an asset paying no dividends like fiat money) in unit supply.

Letting Pt0P_{t}\geq 0 be the price of the asset at time tt in units of the consumption good, the budget constraints of generation tt are

Young:\displaystyle\text{Young}: yt+Ptxt\displaystyle y_{t}+P_{t}x_{t} =a,\displaystyle=a,
Old:\displaystyle\text{Old}: zt+1\displaystyle z_{t+1} =b+Pt+1xt,\displaystyle=b+P_{t+1}x_{t},

where xtx_{t} is asset holdings. As usual, a competitive equilibrium is defined by a sequence {(Pt,xt,yt,zt)}t=0\left\{{(P_{t},x_{t},y_{t},z_{t})}\right\}_{t=0}^{\infty} such that 1. each generation maximizes utility subject to the budget constraints, 2. commodity markets clear, so yt+zt=a+by_{t}+z_{t}=a+b, 3. asset markets clear, so xt=1x_{t}=1.

In any equilibrium, the budget constraints imply the equilibrium allocation (yt,zt+1)=(aPt,b+Pt+1)(y_{t},z_{t+1})=(a-P_{t},b+P_{t+1}). Therefore the equilibrium is completely determined by the price sequence {Pt}t=0\left\{{P_{t}}\right\}_{t=0}^{\infty}.

B.2 Equilibrium analysis

Because the non-monetary equilibrium is obviously unique (Pt0P_{t}\equiv 0), we focus on monetary equilibria. Take any monetary equilibrium, so Pt>0P_{t}>0 for all tt. Using the budget constraints to eliminate (yt,zt+1)(y_{t},z_{t+1}), generation tt seeks to maximize

u(aPtxt)+βv(b+Pt+1xt).u(a-P_{t}x_{t})+\beta v(b+P_{t+1}x_{t}).

Taking the first-order condition and imposing the market clearing condition xt=1x_{t}=1, we obtain the equilibrium condition

u(aPt)Pt+βv(b+Pt+1)Pt+1=0.-u^{\prime}(a-P_{t})P_{t}+\beta v^{\prime}(b+P_{t+1})P_{t+1}=0. (B.1)

The following lemma provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of MSS.

Lemma B.1.

There exists MSS if and only if u(a)<βv(b)u^{\prime}(a)<\beta v^{\prime}(b).

Proof.

If MSS P>0P>0 exists, setting Pt=Pt+1=PP_{t}=P_{t+1}=P in (B.1) and dividing by P>0P>0, we obtain

ψ(P)u(aP)+βv(b+P)=0.\psi(P)\coloneqq-u^{\prime}(a-P)+\beta v^{\prime}(b+P)=0.

Since ψ(P)=u′′(aP)+βv′′(b+P)<0\psi^{\prime}(P)=u^{\prime\prime}(a-P)+\beta v^{\prime\prime}(b+P)<0, it follows that

0=ψ(P)<ψ(0)=u(a)+βv(b)u(a)<βv(b).0=\psi(P)<\psi(0)=-u^{\prime}(a)+\beta v^{\prime}(b)\implies u^{\prime}(a)<\beta v^{\prime}(b).

Conversely, suppose u(a)<βv(b)u^{\prime}(a)<\beta v^{\prime}(b). Then

ψ(0)=u(a)+βv(b)>0>=u(0)+βv(b+a)=ψ(a).\psi(0)=-u^{\prime}(a)+\beta v^{\prime}(b)>0>-\infty=-u^{\prime}(0)+\beta v^{\prime}(b+a)=\psi(a).

By the intermediate value theorem, there exists P>0P>0 such that ψ(P)=0\psi(P)=0. Furthermore, since ff is strictly decreasing, such a PP is unique. Therefore there exists a unique MSS. ∎

We next study the local determinacy of equilibria around the steady states. To this end, we write the equilibrium condition (B.1) as Φ(Pt,Pt+1)=0\Phi(P_{t},P_{t+1})=0, where

Φ(ξ,η)=u(aξ)ξ+βv(b+η)η.\Phi(\xi,\eta)=-u^{\prime}(a-\xi)\xi+\beta v^{\prime}(b+\eta)\eta. (B.2)

To apply the implicit function theorem, we compute the partial derivatives

Φξ(ξ,η)\displaystyle\Phi_{\xi}(\xi,\eta) =u(aξ)+u′′(aξ)ξ,\displaystyle=-u^{\prime}(a-\xi)+u^{\prime\prime}(a-\xi)\xi, (B.3a)
Φη(ξ,η)\displaystyle\Phi_{\eta}(\xi,\eta) =βv(b+η)+βv′′(b+η)η.\displaystyle=\beta v^{\prime}(b+\eta)+\beta v^{\prime\prime}(b+\eta)\eta. (B.3b)

Therefore if Φη0\Phi_{\eta}\neq 0, we may locally solve Φ(ξ,η)=0\Phi(\xi,\eta)=0 as η=ϕ(ξ)\eta=\phi(\xi), where

ϕ(ξ)=ΦξΦη=u(aξ)u′′(aξ)ξβv(b+η)+βv′′(b+η)η.\phi^{\prime}(\xi)=-\frac{\Phi_{\xi}}{\Phi_{\eta}}=\frac{u^{\prime}(a-\xi)-u^{\prime\prime}(a-\xi)\xi}{\beta v^{\prime}(b+\eta)+\beta v^{\prime\prime}(b+\eta)\eta}. (B.4)

Let PP be a steady state. If |ϕ(P)|1\left\lvert\phi^{\prime}(P)\right\rvert\neq 1, the Hartman-Grobman theorem (Chicone, 2006, Theorem 4.6) implies that the local behavior of the dynamical system Φ(Pt,Pt+1)=0\Phi(P_{t},P_{t+1})=0 (or Pt+1=ϕ(Pt)P_{t+1}=\phi(P_{t})) is qualitatively the same as that of the linearized system

Pt+1P=ϕ(P)(PtP).P_{t+1}-P=\phi^{\prime}(P)(P_{t}-P).

Therefore if |ϕ(P)|>1\left\lvert\phi^{\prime}(P)\right\rvert>1, then the unique {Pt}\left\{{P_{t}}\right\} converging to PP is Pt=PP_{t}=P and the equilibrium is locally determinate; if |ϕ(P)|<1\left\lvert\phi^{\prime}(P)\right\rvert<1, then for any P0P_{0} sufficiently close to PP, there exists {Pt}\left\{{P_{t}}\right\} converging to PP and the equilibrium is locally indeterminate.

The following proposition characterizes the local determinacy of NMSS.

Proposition B.1 (Gale, 1973, Theorem 4).

Let b>0b>0.

  1. (i)

    If u(a)>βv(b)u^{\prime}(a)>\beta v^{\prime}(b), NMSS is locally determinate, i.e., if {Pt}t=0\left\{{P_{t}}\right\}_{t=0}^{\infty} is an equilibrium with Pt0P_{t}\to 0, then Pt=0P_{t}=0 for all tt.

  2. (ii)

    If u(a)<βv(b)u^{\prime}(a)<\beta v^{\prime}(b), NMSS is locally indeterminate, i.e., for any P0>0P_{0}>0 sufficiently close to 0, there exists a monetary equilibrium {Pt}t=0\left\{{P_{t}}\right\}_{t=0}^{\infty} with Pt0P_{t}\to 0.

Proof.

Setting ξ=η=P=0\xi=\eta=P=0 in (B.4), we obtain ϕ(0)=u(a)/βv(b)>0\phi^{\prime}(0)=u^{\prime}(a)/\beta v^{\prime}(b)>0. The claim follows from the definition of local (in)determinacy. ∎

Combining Lemma B.1 and Proposition B.1, we conclude that whenever MSS exists, there exists an asymptotically monetary equilibrium as well as a continuum of monetary but asymptotically non-monetary equilibria. Wallace (1980) refers to this fact as the tenuousness of monetary equilibria.

We next study the local determinacy of MSS. The following proposition shows that MSS is locally determinate whenever the relative risk aversion of the old is sufficiently low.333When the relative risk aversion of the old is sufficiently high, it is well known that cyclic and chaotic equilibrium dynamics are possible in monetary economies (Grandmont, 1985). See Boldrin and Woodford (1990) for a review of this type of models.

Proposition B.2.

Let u(a)<βv(b)u^{\prime}(a)<\beta v^{\prime}(b). Then MSS P>0P>0 is locally determinate if γv(b+P)<1+b/P\gamma_{v}(b+P)<1+b/P, where γv(z)zv′′(z)/v(z)>0\gamma_{v}(z)\coloneqq-zv^{\prime\prime}(z)/v^{\prime}(z)>0 denotes the relative risk aversion of vv.

Proof.

Setting ξ=η=P>0\xi=\eta=P>0 in (B.3) and using the equilibrium condition (B.1), at MSS we obtain

Φξ+Φη=u′′(aP)P+βv′′(b+P)P<0.\Phi_{\xi}+\Phi_{\eta}=u^{\prime\prime}(a-P)P+\beta v^{\prime\prime}(b+P)P<0.

If Φη>0\Phi_{\eta}>0, dividing both sides by Φη\Phi_{\eta}, we obtain

0>ΦξΦη+1=ϕ(P)+1ϕ(P)>1,0>\frac{\Phi_{\xi}}{\Phi_{\eta}}+1=-\phi^{\prime}(P)+1\iff\phi^{\prime}(P)>1,

implying local determinacy. Therefore it suffices to show Φη>0\Phi_{\eta}>0. Dividing (B.3b) by βv(b+η)>0\beta v^{\prime}(b+\eta)>0 and setting η=P>0\eta=P>0, we obtain

Φηβv(b+P)=1γv(b+P)Pb+P.\frac{\Phi_{\eta}}{\beta v^{\prime}(b+P)}=1-\gamma_{v}(b+P)\frac{P}{b+P}.

Therefore Φη>0\Phi_{\eta}>0 if γv(b+P)<1+b/P\gamma_{v}(b+P)<1+b/P. ∎

Proposition B.1 assumes b>0b>0. We next consider the case b=0b=0.

Proposition B.3 (Scheinkman, 1980).

Let b=0b=0. If lim infz0zv(z)>0\liminf_{z\to 0}zv^{\prime}(z)>0, then NMSS is locally determinate. The assumption holds if γv(z)1\gamma_{v}(z)\geq 1 in a neighborhood of z=0z=0.

Proof.

Since vv is continuously differentiable with v>0v^{\prime}>0, zzv(z)z\mapsto zv^{\prime}(z) is positive and continuous for z>0z>0. Since lim infz0zv(z)>0\liminf_{z\to 0}zv^{\prime}(z)>0, there exists a constant c>0c>0 such that zv(z)czv^{\prime}(z)\geq c for z>0z>0. Take any monetary equilibrium. Setting b=0b=0 in (B.1), we obtain

u(aPt)Pt=βv(Pt+1)Pt+1βc.u^{\prime}(a-P_{t})P_{t}=\beta v^{\prime}(P_{t+1})P_{t+1}\geq\beta c.

Since u(aP)P0u^{\prime}(a-P)P\to 0 as P0P\to 0, PtP_{t} must be bounded away from zero. Therefore the equilibrium is asymptotically monetary and NMSS is locally determinate.

Finally, suppose γv(z)1\gamma_{v}(z)\geq 1 for z(0,δ]z\in(0,\delta]. Then v′′(z)/v(z)1/z-v^{\prime\prime}(z)/v^{\prime}(z)\geq 1/z, so

logv(z)v(δ)=logv(δ)v(z)=zδv′′(z)v(z)dzzδ1zdz=logδz.\log\frac{v^{\prime}(z)}{v^{\prime}(\delta)}=-\log\frac{v^{\prime}(\delta)}{v^{\prime}(z)}=\int_{z}^{\delta}-\frac{v^{\prime\prime}(z)}{v^{\prime}(z)}\mathop{}\!\mathrm{d}z\geq\int_{z}^{\delta}\frac{1}{z}\mathop{}\!\mathrm{d}z=\log\frac{\delta}{z}.

Exponentiating both sides yields

v(z)v(δ)δzzv(z)δv(δ)>0.\frac{v^{\prime}(z)}{v^{\prime}(\delta)}\geq\frac{\delta}{z}\iff zv^{\prime}(z)\geq\delta v^{\prime}(\delta)>0.\qed

Propositions B.1 and B.3 show that the local determinacy of NMSS depends on whether b>0b>0 or b=0b=0. Although the case b=0b=0 is only a single point and is non-generic, it is nevertheless economically relevant because it may be regarded as a situation where the old have no income and must save for retirement. In a more general model, Santos (1990) shows the existence of monetary equilibria in OLG economies when agents have no endowments of some future good under some assumption on the curvature of the utility function.