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SVD-Aided Multi-Beam Directional Modulation Scheme Based on Frequency Diverse Array

Qian Cheng, , Vincent Fusco, , Jiang Zhu, , Shilian Wang, , and Chao Gu This work was supported by a scholarship (No. 201803170247) from China Scholarship Council (CSC). (Corresponding author: Shilian Wang.)Q. Cheng is with the College of Electronic Science, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China, and also with the ECIT Institute, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast BT3 9DT, UK. (e-mail: chengqian14a@nudt.edu.cn)J. Zhu and S. Wang are with the College of Electronic Science, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China (e-mail: {jiangzhu, wangsl}@nudt.edu.cn).V. Fusco and C. Gu are with the ECIT Institute, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast BT3 9DT, UK (e-mail: v.fusco@ecit.qub.ac.uk; chao.gu@qub.ac.uk).
Abstract

With the assistance of singular value decomposition (SVD), a multi-beam directional modulation (DM) scheme based on symmetrical multi-carrier frequency diverse array (FDA) is proposed. The proposed DM scheme is capable of achieving range-angle dependent physical layer secure (PLS) transmissions in free space with much lower complexity than the conventional zero-forcing (ZF) method. Theoretical and simulated results about secrecy rate and complexity verify the improved computational efficiency and considerable memory savings despite a very small penalty of secrecy rate.

Index Terms:
Directional modulation; frequency diverse array; physical layer security; singular value decomposition.

I Introduction

Directional modulation (DM) has increasingly become a promising technique capable of achieving physical layer secure (PLS) communications.

The work in [1] proposed an angle-dependent DM scheme based on phased arrays (PA) by optimizing the phase shifters at the radio frequency (RF) frontend. A low-complexity DM synthesis method was proposed in [2], which transferred the DM synthesis from RF frontend to baseband. Afterwards, multi-beam angle-dependent DM synthesis methods were researched in [3]-[6]. Specifically, the orthogonal vector synthesis approach was implemented in [3], while [4] proposed a robust synthesis method for multi-beam DM scheme with imperfect direction knowledge. The multipath nature of the channel was exploited in [5] to create a multi-user DM transmissions. Artificial noise (AN) aided multi-beam DM system was studied in [6] using zero-forcing (ZF) criterion.

The above-mentioned single- or multi-beam DM schemes can only achieve angle-dependent secure transmissions, the security of which will fail when the eavesdropper is located along the same direction as the desired receiver. To address this problem, the frequency diverse array (FDA) with non-linear frequency increments was introduced to synthesize both range-angle dependent DM in [7]. The work in [8] proposed a random FDA-based range-angle dependent DM synthesis method, while the AN-aided FDA-DM communication over Nakagami-m fading channels was studied in [9].

These FDA-DM schemes [7]-[9] only considered single-beam DM transmissions for a single desired receiver. To achieve range-angle dependent multi-beam FDA-based DM transmissions, one possible approach [10] is to jointly optimizing the frequency increments, the beamforming vector, and the AN orthogonal matrix, which is too complicated to realize practically. The other approach is to extend the ZF-aided multi-beam PA-DM synthesis [6] to multi-beam FDA-DM synthesis [11]. The ZF method, however, consumes a large amount of memory for the orthogonal matrix and the AN vector.

This paper aims to reduce the complexity of the range-angle dependent multi-beam DM system in free space by re-designing the AN vector and orthogonal matrix with the aid of singular value decomposition (SVD). Compared with the conventional ZF method, the proposed SVD method can improve computational efficiency and save much memory with a small loss of secrecy rate. This makes it possible to achieve secure range-angle dependent multi-beam DM transmissions with lower complexity and lower DC power consumption.

Refer to caption
Figure 1: System Model of multi-beam DM based on multi-carrier FDA.

Notations: The operators ()T{(\cdot)^{\rm{T}}}, ()H{(\cdot)^{\rm{H}}}, ()1{(\cdot)^{-1}}, and (){(\cdot)^{\dagger}} represent the transpose, Hermitian transpose, inverse, and Moore-Penrose inverse operations of a matrix, respectively.

II System Model

As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a (2N+12N+1)-element symmetrical linear FDA with multiple carriers [12]. The spacing dd between adjacent elements is designed as half central wavelength, and LL carriers are transmitted via each element. The frequency of the ll-th (l=0,1,,L1l=0,1,\cdots,L-1) carrier for the nn-th (n=N,,0,,Nn=-N,\cdots,0,\cdots,N) element of FDA is designed as

fn,l=f0+Δfn,l=f0+Δfln[(|n|+1)(l+1)]f_{n,l}=f_{0}+\Delta f_{n,l}=f_{0}+\Delta f\ln\left[(|n|+1)(l+1)\right] (1)

where f0f_{0} denotes the central carrier frequency, and Δf\Delta f is a fixed frequency offset satisfying |Δf|f0|\Delta f|\ll f_{0}.

Let rr and θ\theta represent the range between an arbitrary spatial position and the central FDA element, and the azimuth angle, respectively. The normalized steering vector radiated from the transmit antenna array at (r,θ)(r,\theta) is a (2N+1)L×1(2N+1)L\times 1 vector for such a system, which can be expressed as

𝐡(r,θ)\displaystyle{\mathbf{h}}(r,\theta) (2)
=1(2N+1)L[𝐚NT(r,θ)𝐚nT(r,θ)𝐚NT(r,θ)]T\displaystyle=\frac{1}{\sqrt{(2N+1)L}}\left[{\mathbf{a}}_{-N}^{\rm{T}}(r,\theta)\cdots{\mathbf{a}}_{n}^{\rm{T}}(r,\theta)\cdots{\mathbf{a}}_{N}^{\rm{T}}(r,\theta)\right]^{\rm{T}}

where 𝐚n(r,θ)=[ejϕn,0ejϕn,lejϕn,L1]T{\mathbf{a}}_{n}(r,\theta)=\left[e^{j\phi_{n,0}}\cdots e^{j\phi_{n,l}}\cdots e^{j\phi_{n,L-1}}\right]^{\rm{T}} is an L×1L\times 1 sub-steering vector caused by the LL carriers of the nn-th antenna element [12]. The phase of the ll-th entry of 𝐚n(r,θ){\mathbf{a}}_{n}(r,\theta) is

ϕn,l=2π[Δfln[(|n|+1)(l+1)](trc)+f0ndsinθc]\phi_{n,l}=2\pi\left[\Delta f\ln[(|n|+1)(l+1)]\left(t-\frac{r}{c}\right)+\frac{f_{0}nd\sin\theta}{c}\right] (3)

where cc is light speed, d=λ/2d=\left.\lambda\middle/2\right. denotes the spacing between adjacent elements, tt refers to the time variable, and λ=c/f0\lambda=\left.c\middle/f_{0}\right. represents the wavelength of the central carrier.

The multi-beam DM model consists of a transmitter with a (2N+1)(2N+1)-element FDA, KK stationary desired receivers, and UU passive eavesdroppers in different locations. The spatial coordinate of the kk-th (k=1,2,,Kk=1,2,\cdots,K) desired receiver is assumed to be (rdk,θdk)(r_{d}^{k},\theta_{d}^{k}) and the combined set of the KK desired receivers’ spatial coordinates is expressed as

(Υd,Θd)={(rd1,θd1),(rd2,θd2),,(rdK,θdK)}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d})=\left\{(r_{d}^{1},\theta_{d}^{1}),(r_{d}^{2},\theta_{d}^{2}),\cdots,(r_{d}^{K},\theta_{d}^{K})\right\} (4)

A steering matrix 𝐇(Υd,Θd)\mathbf{H}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d}) with size (2N+1)L×K(2N+1)L\times K can be obtained by combining the steering vectors 𝐡(rdk,θdk)\mathbf{h}(r_{d}^{k},\theta_{d}^{k}) of the KK desired spatial positions (Υd,Θd)(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d}), i.e.,

𝐇(Υd,Θd)=[𝐡(rd1,θd1)𝐡(rd2,θd2)𝐡(rdK,θdK)]\mathbf{H}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d})=\left[\mathbf{h}(r_{d}^{1},\theta_{d}^{1})~\mathbf{h}(r_{d}^{2},\theta_{d}^{2})~\cdots~\mathbf{h}(r_{d}^{K},\theta_{d}^{K})\right] (5)

Let 𝐱d=[xd1xd2xdK]T\mathbf{x}_{d}=\left[x_{d}^{1}~x_{d}^{2}~\cdots~x_{d}^{K}\right]^{\rm{T}} denote the confidential baseband symbol vector for the KK desired receivers. The weighted NN-tuple transmitted signal vector of the FDA is designed as

𝐬=β1Ps𝐏1𝐱d+αβ2Ps𝐏2𝐳\mathbf{s}=\beta_{1}\sqrt{P_{s}}\mathbf{P}_{1}\mathbf{x}_{d}+\alpha\beta_{2}\sqrt{P_{s}}\mathbf{P}_{2}\mathbf{z} (6)

where PsP_{s} is the total transmit power constraint, β1\beta_{1} and β2\beta_{2} are the power splitting factors satisfying β12+β22=1\beta_{1}^{2}+\beta_{2}^{2}=1, α\alpha denotes the normalization factor for the inserted AN, and 𝐳\mathbf{z} is the inserted complex AN vector with each entry having zero mean and variance σz2\sigma_{z}^{2}. In order to obtain a desired standard modulation constellation at the desired receivers while distorting the received signals at other undesired receivers, the normalization matrix 𝐏1\mathbf{P}_{1} and the orthogonal matrix 𝐏2\mathbf{P}_{2} should satisfy the following criteria:

𝐇H(Υd,Θd)𝐏1=𝐈,𝐇H(Υd,Θd)𝐏2=𝟎\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d})\mathbf{P}_{1}=\mathbf{I},~~\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d})\mathbf{P}_{2}=\mathbf{0} (7)

In this paper, the normalization matrix is directly designed as the Moore-Penrose inverse matrix of the steering matrix 𝐇H(Υd,Θd)\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d}), i.e.,

𝐏1=𝐇(Υd,Θd)[𝐇H(Υd,Θd)𝐇(Υd,Θd)]1\displaystyle\mathbf{P}_{1}=\mathbf{H}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d})\left[\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d})\mathbf{H}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d})\right]^{-1} (8)

which satisfies 𝐇H(Υd,Θd)𝐏1=𝐈K\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d})\mathbf{P}_{1}=\mathbf{I}_{K}, and the size of which is (2N+1)L×K(2N+1)L\times K.

It is known that the null space of a matrix can be derived from its SVD. Therefore, in order to design the orthogonal matrix 𝐏2\mathbf{P}_{2}, we perform the SVD operation on the steering matrix 𝐇H(Υd,Θd)\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d}), which is now expressed as

𝐇H(Υd,Θd)=𝐔[𝐃𝟎][𝐕1𝐕0]H\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d})=\mathbf{U}\left[\mathbf{D}~\mathbf{0}\right]\left[\mathbf{V}_{1}~\mathbf{V}_{0}\right]^{\rm{H}} (9)

Next, we can obtain a null space, that is, 𝐕0(2N+1)L×(2N+1K)\mathbf{V}_{0}\in\mathbb{C}^{(2N+1)L\times(2N+1-K)} for 𝐇H(Υd,Θd)\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d}) from (9), which means 𝐇H(Υd,Θd)𝐕0=𝟎K×(2N+1K)\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d})\mathbf{V}_{0}=\mathbf{0}_{K\times(2N+1-K)}. Therefore, the orthogonal matrix of the SVD method can be designed as

𝐏2=𝐕0\mathbf{P}_{2}=\mathbf{V}_{0} (10)
TABLE I: Complexity Comparisons Between ZF- and SVD-Aided Multi-Beam DM Systems
Items ZF method SVD method
Orthogonal matrix 𝐏2\mathbf{P}_{2} 𝐏2ZF=𝐈(2N+1)L[𝐇H(Υd,Θd)]𝐇H(Υd,Θd)\mathbf{P}_{2}^{\rm{ZF}}=\mathbf{I}_{(2N+1)L}-\left[\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d})\right]^{\dagger}\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d}) 𝐇H(Υd,Θd)=𝐔[𝐃𝟎][𝐕1𝐕0]H\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d})=\mathbf{U}\left[\mathbf{D}~\mathbf{0}\right]\left[\mathbf{V}_{1}~\mathbf{V}_{0}\right]^{\rm{H}}𝐏2SVD=𝐕0\mathbf{P}_{2}^{\rm{SVD}}=\mathbf{V}_{0}
Size of 𝐏2\mathbf{P}_{2} (2N+1)L×(2N+1)L(2N+1)L\times(2N+1)L (2N+1)L×(2N+1K)(2N+1)L\times(2N+1-K)
Artificial noise 𝐳\mathbf{z} 𝐳ZF(2N+1)L×1\mathbf{z}^{\rm{ZF}}\in\mathbb{C}^{(2N+1)L\times 1} 𝐳SVD(2N+1K)×1\mathbf{z}^{\rm{SVD}}\in\mathbb{C}^{(2N+1-K)\times 1}
Time complexity of calculating 𝐏2\mathbf{P}_{2} 𝒪((2N+1)2L2K){\mathcal{O}}\left((2N+1)^{2}L^{2}K\right) 𝒪((2N+1)LK2){\mathcal{O}}\left((2N+1)LK^{2}\right)
Space complexity of storing 𝐏2\mathbf{P}_{2} and 𝐳\mathbf{z} 𝒪((2N+1)2L2){\mathcal{O}}\left((2N+1)^{2}L^{2}\right) 𝒪((2N+1)L(2N+1K)){\mathcal{O}}\left((2N+1)L(2N+1-K)\right)

The normalized line-of-sight (LoS) channel is considered in this paper. In fact, the proposed method can also hold over fading channels like Nakagami-m fading [9], as long as the channel state information (CSI) is perfectly estimated. After passing through an LoS channel, the combined vector of the received signals at the desired receivers can be expressed as

𝐲(Υd,Θd)\displaystyle\mathbf{y}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d}) =𝐇H(Υd,Θd)𝐬+𝐰d=β1Ps𝐇H(Υd,Θd)𝐏1𝐱dUsefulSignal\displaystyle=\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d})\mathbf{s}+\mathbf{w}_{d}=\underbrace{\beta_{1}\sqrt{P_{s}}\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d})\mathbf{P}_{1}\mathbf{x}_{d}}_{\rm{Useful~Signal}} (11)
+αβ2Ps𝐇H(Υd,Θd)𝐏2𝐳ArtificialNoise+𝐰dAWGN\displaystyle~~~+\underbrace{\alpha\beta_{2}\sqrt{P_{s}}\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d})\mathbf{P}_{2}\mathbf{z}}_{\rm{Artificial~Noise}}+\underbrace{\mathbf{w}_{d}}_{\rm{AWGN}}
=β1Ps𝐱d+𝐰d\displaystyle=\beta_{1}\sqrt{P_{s}}\mathbf{x}_{d}+\mathbf{w}_{d}

where 𝐰d𝒞𝒩(𝟎K×1,σwd2𝐈K)\mathbf{w}_{d}\sim{\cal CN}(\mathbf{0}_{K\times 1},{\sigma_{w_{d}}^{2}}\mathbf{I}_{K}) is the circularly symmetric complex additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector with each entry having zero mean and variance σwd2\sigma_{w_{d}}^{2}.

Similarly, the received signal of an arbitrary eavesdropper at (re,θe)(r_{e},\theta_{e}), (re,θe)(rdk,θdk)(r_{e},\theta_{e})\neq(r_{d}^{k},\theta_{d}^{k}), can be expressed as

y(re,θe)\displaystyle y(r_{e},\theta_{e}) =𝐡H(re,θe)𝐬+we=β1Ps𝐡H(re,θe)𝐏1𝐱dDistortionSignal\displaystyle=\mathbf{h}^{\rm{H}}(r_{e},\theta_{e})\mathbf{s}+{w}_{e}=\underbrace{\beta_{1}\sqrt{P_{s}}\mathbf{h}^{\rm{H}}(r_{e},\theta_{e})\mathbf{P}_{1}\mathbf{x}_{d}}_{\rm{Distortion~Signal}} (12)
+αβ2Ps𝐡H(re,θe)𝐏2𝐳ArtificialNoise+weAWGN\displaystyle~~~+\underbrace{\alpha\beta_{2}\sqrt{P_{s}}\mathbf{h}^{\rm{H}}(r_{e},\theta_{e})\mathbf{P}_{2}\mathbf{z}}_{\rm{Artificial~Noise}}+\underbrace{{w}_{e}}_{\rm{AWGN}}

where we𝒞𝒩(0,σwe2){w}_{e}\sim{\cal CN}(0,{\sigma_{w_{e}}^{2}}) is the AWGN with zero mean and variance σwe2{\sigma_{w_{e}}^{2}}. It is worth emphasizing that the first term of (12) denotes distortion signal for the undesired receiver, and the second term is the inserted AN which cannot be eliminated at the undesired receiver due to the fact that the designed 𝐏2\mathbf{P}_{2} is non-orthogonal to its steering vector 𝐡H(re,θe)\mathbf{h}^{\rm{H}}(r_{e},\theta_{e}).

III Performance Analysis

III-A Secrecy Rate

We assume the UU eavesdroppers are located at (reu,θeu)(r_{e}^{u},\theta_{e}^{u}), 1uU1\leq u\leq U, respectively, which satisfy (reu,θeu)(rdk,θdk)(r_{e}^{u},\theta_{e}^{u})\neq(r_{d}^{k},\theta_{d}^{k}) for u{1,2,,U}\forall u\in\left\{1,2,\cdots,U\right\} and k{1,2,,K}\forall k\in\left\{1,2,\cdots,K\right\}.

The achievable rate of the link from the transmitter to the kk-th desired receiver can be calculated by [9]

R(rdk,θdk)=log2[1+γ(rdk,θdk)]R(r_{d}^{k},\theta_{d}^{k})=\log_{2}\left[1+\gamma(r_{d}^{k},\theta_{d}^{k})\right] (13)

where γ(rdk,θdk)\gamma(r_{d}^{k},\theta_{d}^{k}) is the ratio of signal to interference plus noise (SINR) at the kk-th desired receiver with the expression of

γ(rdk,θdk)\displaystyle\gamma(r_{d}^{k},\theta_{d}^{k}) =β12Ps𝐡H(rdk,θdk)𝐏1𝐏1H𝐡(rdk,θdk)σwd2+α2β22Ps𝐡H(rdk,θdk)𝐏2𝐏2H𝐡(rdk,θdk)\displaystyle=\frac{\beta_{1}^{2}P_{s}\mathbf{h}^{\rm{H}}(r_{d}^{k},\theta_{d}^{k})\mathbf{P}_{1}\mathbf{P}_{1}^{\rm{H}}\mathbf{h}(r_{d}^{k},\theta_{d}^{k})}{\sigma_{w_{d}}^{2}+\alpha^{2}\beta_{2}^{2}P_{s}\mathbf{h}^{\rm{H}}(r_{d}^{k},\theta_{d}^{k})\mathbf{P}_{2}\mathbf{P}_{2}^{\rm{H}}\mathbf{h}(r_{d}^{k},\theta_{d}^{k})} (14)

Similarly, the achievable rate of the link from the transmitter to the uu-th eavesdropper is expressed as

R(reu,θeu)=log2[1+γ(reu,θeu)]R(r_{e}^{u},\theta_{e}^{u})=\log_{2}\left[1+\gamma(r_{e}^{u},\theta_{e}^{u})\right] (15)

where

γ(reu,θeu)\displaystyle\gamma(r_{e}^{u},\theta_{e}^{u}) =β12Ps𝐡H(reu,θeu)𝐏1𝐏1H𝐡(reu,θeu)σwe2+α2β22Ps𝐡H(reu,θeu)𝐏2𝐏2H𝐡(reu,θeu)\displaystyle=\frac{\beta_{1}^{2}P_{s}\mathbf{h}^{\rm{H}}(r_{e}^{u},\theta_{e}^{u})\mathbf{P}_{1}\mathbf{P}_{1}^{\rm{H}}\mathbf{h}(r_{e}^{u},\theta_{e}^{u})}{\sigma_{w_{e}}^{2}+\alpha^{2}\beta_{2}^{2}P_{s}\mathbf{h}^{\rm{H}}(r_{e}^{u},\theta_{e}^{u})\mathbf{P}_{2}\mathbf{P}_{2}^{\rm{H}}\mathbf{h}(r_{e}^{u},\theta_{e}^{u})} (16)

Therefore, the secrecy rate of the proposed multi-beam DM system can be defined as

Rs=maxk{1,,K}[minu{1,,U}(R(rdk,θdk)R(reu,θeu))]+R_{s}=\max\limits_{k\in\left\{1,\cdots,K\right\}}\left[\min\limits_{u\in\left\{1,\cdots,U\right\}}\left(R(r_{d}^{k},\theta_{d}^{k})-R(r_{e}^{u},\theta_{e}^{u})\right)\right]^{+} (17)

where []+=max{0,}[\cdot]^{+}=\max\{0,\cdot\}.

III-B Time Complexity

Both the normalization matrices of the ZF method in [6][11] and the proposed SVD method are designed as [𝐇H(Υd,Θd)]\left[\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d})\right]^{\dagger}, so the complexity depends on the orthogonal matrix 𝐏2\mathbf{P}_{2} and the inserted AN 𝐳\mathbf{z}, as shown in Table I.

Here, we consider the time complexity of calculating the orthogonal matrix 𝐏2\mathbf{P}_{2}. For the ZF method, the orthogonal matrix is designed as 𝐏2ZF=𝐈(2N+1)L[𝐇H(Υd,Θd)]𝐇H(Υd,Θd)\mathbf{P}_{2}^{\rm{ZF}}=\mathbf{I}_{(2N+1)L}-\left[\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d})\right]^{\dagger}\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d}), the time complexity of which is 𝒪((2N+1)2L2K){\mathcal{O}}\left((2N+1)^{2}L^{2}K\right) [6][13]. For the SVD method, the orthogonal matrix can be directly obtained from the SVD of 𝐇H(Υd,Θd)\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d}), which means the time complexity of calculating 𝐏2SVD\mathbf{P}_{2}^{\rm{SVD}} lies in the time complexity of calculating the SVD of 𝐇H(Υd,Θd)\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d}). Since the size of 𝐇H(Υd,Θd)\mathbf{H}^{\rm{H}}(\Upsilon_{d},\Theta_{d}) is K×(2N+1)LK\times(2N+1)L, (K<(2N+1)LK<(2N+1)L), the time complexity of calculating 𝐏2SVD\mathbf{P}_{2}^{\rm{SVD}} can be obtained by 𝒪(K2(2N+1)L){\mathcal{O}}\left(K^{2}(2N+1)L\right) [13].

Additionally, the Moore-Penrose inverse operation of a matrix can be acquired using SVD algorithm [13], which means the normalization matrix 𝐏1SVD\mathbf{P}^{\rm{SVD}}_{1} can be directly calculated using the output of SVD. But for the ZF method, the normalization matrix 𝐏1ZF\mathbf{P}^{\rm{ZF}}_{1} has to be calculated independently.

Refer to caption
Figure 2: Secrecy rate and BER performances of ZF- and SVD-aided DM systems. (a) Secrecy rate versus SNR; (b) BER versus angle; (c) BER versus range.
Refer to caption
Figure 3: Total amount of memory and ratio of SVD to ZF required by the orthogonal matrix 𝐏2\mathbf{P}_{2} and the AN 𝐳\mathbf{z} versus (a) NN with L=7L=7 and K=3K=3; (b) LL with N=8N=8 and K=3K=3; (c) KK with N=8N=8 and L=7L=7.

III-C Space Complexity

The sizes of the orthogonal matrix 𝐏2\mathbf{P}_{2} and the AN 𝐳\mathbf{z} can impact the the memory consumption significantly. As shown in Table I, the size of the orthogonal matrix 𝐏2ZF\mathbf{P}_{2}^{\rm{ZF}} of the ZF method is (2N+1)L×(2N+1)L(2N+1)L\times(2N+1)L, and the size of the inserted AN 𝐳ZF\mathbf{z}^{\rm{ZF}} is (2N+1)L×1(2N+1)L\times 1. By contrast, the size of the orthogonal matrix 𝐏2SVD\mathbf{P}_{2}^{\rm{SVD}} of the proposed SVD method is (2N+1)L×(2N+1K)(2N+1)L\times(2N+1-K), and the size of the inserted AN 𝐳SVD\mathbf{z}^{\rm{SVD}} is (2N+1K)×1(2N+1-K)\times 1.

We define a metric ζ\zeta as the ratio of the total memory consumed by 𝐏2SVD\mathbf{P}_{2}^{\rm{SVD}} and 𝐳SVD\mathbf{z}^{\rm{SVD}} to that of the ZF method, i.e.,

ζ\displaystyle\zeta =(2N+1)L×(2N+1K)+(2N+1K)(2N+1)L×(2N+1)L+(2N+1)L×100%\displaystyle=\frac{(2N+1)L\times(2N+1-K)+(2N+1-K)}{(2N+1)L\times(2N+1)L+(2N+1)L}\times 00\% (18)
=(2N+1)2L(2N+1)(LK1)K(2N+1)2L2+(2N+1)L×100%\displaystyle=\frac{(2N+1)^{2}L-(2N+1)(LK-1)-K}{(2N+1)^{2}L^{2}+(2N+1)L}\times 00\%

It is worth noting that ζ1/L\zeta\to\left.1\middle/L\right. when KK is determined and NN\to\infty, which means the proposed SVD method can consume at most 1/L\left.1\middle/L\right. of the memory required by the ZF method, thereby reducing the amount of memory and lowering DC power consumption requirements.

IV Simulation Results

In our simulations, the parameters are set as f0=10f_{0}=10 GHz, Δf=2\Delta f=2 kHz, β1=0.9\beta_{1}=0.9, Ps=1P_{s}=1, N=8N=8, L=7L=7, K=3K=3, and Gray-coded π/4\left.\pi\middle/4\right.-QPSK, respectively. The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is set as 1010 dB. Without loss of generality, we further assume σwd2=σwe2\sigma_{w_{d}}^{2}=\sigma_{w_{e}}^{2}, and the locations of the KK desired receivers are (rd1,θd1)=(150km,50)(r_{d}^{1},\theta_{d}^{1})=(150\rm{km},50^{\circ}), (rd2,θd2)=(180km,40)(r_{d}^{2},\theta_{d}^{2})=(180\rm{km},-40^{\circ}), and (rd3,θd3)=(260km,0)(r_{d}^{3},\theta_{d}^{3})=(260\rm{km},0^{\circ}), respectively.

Fig. 2(a) shows the secrecy rate versus SNR (dB) for ZF- and SVD-aided multi-beam DM systems, where the eavesdroppers’ locations are randomly selected in the simulations. It is observed that the SVD method requires slightly higher SNR (dB) than the ZF method in order to achieve the same secrecy rate. For example, only 0.5 dB of additional SNR is required for the SVD method to match the ZF method when Rs=8R_{s}=8 bits/s/Hz and U=2U=2. The secrecy loss is due to that the size of the inserted AN of the SVD method is smaller than that of the ZF method, which makes the SINRs of eavesdroppers a little higher than that of the ZF method.

Fig. 2(b) and (c) illustrate the simulated BER performances for ZF and SVD methods versus angle and range, respectively. In the angle dimension, the BER lobes of the ZF method are slightly narrower than the proposed SVD method around the desired receivers. In the range dimension, both ZF and SVD methods can achieve almost the same BER performances.

In order to illustrate the time complexity, we conducted 10410^{4} Monte Carlo experiments to record the average time consumption of calculating 𝐏2\mathbf{P}_{2} using MATLAB111Computer configurations: Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-1620 v2 @ 3.7 GHz; 8.0 GB RAM; 64-bit operating system. MATLAB version: R2016a.. The result shows that the average time consumptions of ZF and SVD methods are 0.22580.2258 and 0.19330.1933 ms, respectively, which verifies that the computational efficiency of the proposed SVD method is better than that of the ZF method.

Moreover, Fig. 3 shows the total amount of memory required by the orthogonal matrix 𝐏2\mathbf{P}_{2} and the AN 𝐳\mathbf{z}, and the ratio ζ\zeta of SVD to ZF versus NN, LL and KK, respectively. From Fig. 3(a), the SVD method only consumes up to 14.29%14.29\% of the memory required by the ZF method with L=7L=7 and K=3K=3, which is due to ζ1/L\zeta\to\left.1\middle/L\right. when NN\to\infty as shown in (18). From Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 2(c), the ratio of SVD to ZF decreases as LL and KK increases. Therefore, the SVD method is more efficient than the ZF method with respect to memory required.

V Conclusion

A new SVD-aided low-complexity range-angle dependent multi-beam DM scheme based on symmetrical multi-carrier FDA was proposed. The proposed SVD method outperforms the ZF method in regard to the computational complexity and the amount of memory required for processing, while introducing only a small performance loss of secrecy rate. The SVD method opens a way to reduce the implementing complexity and lower DC power consumption requirements for range-angle dependent multi-beam DM systems.

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