The role of FDI along transitional dynamics of the host country in an endogenous growth model
Abstract
We investigate the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the transitional dynamics of host countries by using an optimal growth model. FDI may be beneficial for the host country because local people can work for multinational firms to get a favorable salary. However, if the host country only focuses on FDI, it may face a middle-income trap. We show that if the host country invests in research and development, its economy may have sustained growth. Moreover, in this case, FDI helps the host country only at the first stages of its development process.
Keywords: Optimal growth, FDI, R&D, fixed cost.
JEL Classifications: D15, F23, F4, O3, O4.
1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, opening up to the global economy and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) have been significant policy priorities in developing countries to promote their economic development. The main argument is that multinational enterprises (MNEs) would boost investment, bring new technologies and (management) skills, and generate FDI spillovers on domestic firms. However, the effects of FDI on the host country’s development are far from clear.
Overall, empirical literature finds that the effect of FDI on the host country’s economic growth is relatively weak (Carkovic and Levine, 2005; Gunby et al., 2017) and the link between FDI and growth varies over time (Bénétrix et al., 2023). More precisely, whether this effect is significant or not depends on local conditions such as the host country’s income levels, institutional strength (Baiashvili and Gattini, 2020), the level of human capital (Li and Liu, 2005), or the development of local financial markets (Alfaro et al., 2004, 2010). For instance, the impact is positive in countries with high development level of human capital or financial markets (Borensztein et al., 1998; Alfaro et al., 2004). Besides, there is an inverted-U sharped connection between the extent of FDI impact and the host country’s income-levels. The effect is larger for low- to middle-income countries, before declining from transition to high-income ones (Baiashvili and Gattini, 2020).111See, for example, Almfraji and Almsafir (2014) for a literature review on the FDI-growth’s relationship.
Despite substantial empirical research on the nexus FDI-growth,222Over the five decades of research on FDI, the link FDI-GDP (economic growth) is the most often investigated. Indeed, 107 of 500 published articles considered in Paul and Feliciano-Cestero (2021) study the impacts of FDI on the host country’s economic growth. there is still a lack of theoretical analysis. Hence, our paper aims to understand the role of FDI along the transitional dynamics of the host economy by investigating fundamental questions:
-
(i)
What is the optimal strategy of a country receiving FDI?
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(ii)
How can FDI help the host country escape the middle-income trap and potentially achieve economic growth in the long run?
We address these questions by using an optimal growth model with FDI and endogenous growth. Let us briefly describe the ingredients of our model. The host country is assumed to be a small open economy with three goods: consumption, physical capital, and new goods. These commodities are freely tradable with the rest of the world. There are two agents: a representative agent of the host country and an MNE. The representative agent has three choices for investment: (1) buy physical capital to produce consumption good, (2) invest in training to improve her/his skills and then work for MNE in order to get a salary, and (3) invest in research and development (R&D) to get innovations. If innovations are good enough, they will improve the productivity of domestic firms.
First, we show that if the host country has a low initial resource and a weak research process efficiency, it should never invest in R&D but focus on FDI. In this case, its economy converges to a steady state, which is higher than that of the economy without FDI.
Second, consider a low-income country so that the country cannot immediately invest in R&D and new technology (because the fixed cost in R&D is so high). In this situation, we prove that if the leverage of new technology is high enough or the country has good potential in R&D, the optimal strategy of the country should be as follows:
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Stage 1: the country should train specific workers.
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Stage 2: specific workers will work for the MNE to get a favorable salary and improve the country’s income and capital accumulation.
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Stage 3: once the country’s income is high enough, it should focus on R&D to create new technology that increases the domestic firms’ total factor productivity (TFP). Thanks to this, its economy may have economic growth in the long run.
Our model also shows that a country may get economic growth in the long run without FDI. Our analyses suggest that FDI only plays a role as a catalyst for the host country’s economic growth, especially in the first stages of the host country’s development process.
This research has two significant contributions to the literature. First, we theoretically advance the understanding of how FDI affects economic growth. The existing literature provides some theoretical models to study the effect of FDI on growth. Looking back to history, Findlay (1978) examines the role of FDI in a dynamic framework by assuming that the sequences of domestic and foreign firms’ capital stocks are determined by a continuous time dynamical system.333This system’s parameters include domestic and foreign firms’ technological efficiency that are exogenous. A key insight in Findlay (1978) is his assumption of the ‘contagion’ effect: the level of efficiency of domestic firms depends on (but is lower than) that of the advanced part of the world. Wang (1990) develops this idea by assuming that there is technology diffusion: the host country’s human capital stock is an increasing function of the ratio of foreign investment to domestically owned capital. By using this modeling of FDI and a two-country model with free capital mobility and exogenous propensities to save, Wang (1990) shows that opening to FDI has beneficial implications for the host country.
Notice, nevertheless, that in Wang (1990), the propensity to save is exogenous. Some other research considers models with endogenous saving rates. In a continuous time model with a continuum of varieties of capital goods,444For this kind of growth models, see Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991). Borensztein et al. (1998) model FDI as the fraction of varieties produced by foreign firms in the total varieties of products. Under specific setups (Cobb-Douglas production and CRRA utility functions), they compute the rate of growth in the steady state equilibrium, which is an increasing function of the fraction of varieties produced by foreign firms in the total varieties of products. Berthélemy and Démurger (2000) extend Borensztein et al. (1998)’s model by endogenizing the numbers of varieties produced by domestic and foreign firms. As in Borensztein et al. (1998), Berthélemy and Démurger (2000) focus on the steady state equilibrium and compute the growth rate of the host country in the case of Cobb-Douglas production and CRRA utility functions. Using a continuous time product variety-based endogenous growth, Alfaro et al. (2010) study the role of local financial markets in enabling FDI to promote growth through backward linkages.555In Alfaro et al. (2010), the development level of the local financial market is modeled by the difference between the instantaneous borrowing rate and the lending rate. They focus on the balanced growth path and their calibration shows that an increase in FDI leads to higher growth rates in financially developed countries compared to those observed in financially poorly developed ones.
Unlike the above studies, we focus neither on the steady state nor on the balanced growth path with specific functions. Instead, we explore the global and transitional dynamics of the optimal paths in endogenous growth models with FDI and without restrictions on the utility function.666Nguyen-Huu and Pham (2018, 2024) study the nexus between FDI spillovers and industrial policy of a host country in a two-period and an exogenous growth models respectively. However, they do not consider endogenous growth. To be best of our knowledge, we are the first to do so. Consequently, our results seem to be more robust. Moreover, our analyses of transitional dynamics allow us to better understand the optimal strategy for the host countries (as we have explained), while the existing literature does not.
Second, our paper also contributes to the literature on optimal growth with thresholds (see Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Bruno et al., 2009; Le Van et al., 2010, 2016 among others) and increasing returns (see Romer, 1986; Jones and Manuelli, 1990; Kamihigashi and Roy, 2007 among others). Our added value is to show the role of FDI. We point out that FDI may partially contribute to the capital accumulation of the host country and hence enable the country to overcome the threshold at the first stage of its development process. However, whether a host country can obtain growth in the long run does not depend on FDI but on the local conditions (mainly its innovation capacity and the efficiency of its investment in R&D). From a technical point of view, our analysis is far from trivial because of the presence of both domestic and foreign firms. For instance, the method used in Bruno et al. (2009), Le Van et al. (2010) cannot be directly applied in our model.
2 An endogenous growth model with FDI
Let us start with a benchmark model in which there is a small open economy with three kinds of goods: consumption, physical capital, and so-called new goods. The consumption good is taken as numéraire. The price (in terms of consumption good) of physical capital is exogenous and denoted by .
In each period, there is an MNE in the host country. It produces the new good by using two inputs: physical capital and specific labor. We assume that there is no domestic firm in this sector.
At each date , the foreign firm (without market power) chooses units of physical capital and units of specific labor in order to maximize its profit:
(1) |
where is the exogenous price (in terms of consumption good) of the new good.
Assumption 1.
We assume that , where .
There is a representative agent in the host country. Taking prices and wages as given, the agent chooses the allocation of resources to maximize the intertemporal welfare of the whole population.
The host country has three choices for investment at each date . First, it can buy units of physical capital to produce units of the consumption good at period , where .
Second, it can use units of the consumption good for training to generate units of specific labor, where . The latter works for the MNE to get a total wage of (units of the consumption good).
The last choice is to invest in R&D to create new technology: If the host country invests units of the consumption good in R&D at period , it will obtain units of new technology in period , where represents the efficiency of the research process. We assume that . The new technologies can improve the old sector’s productivity, but only if the amount of investment in R&D exceeds a critical threshold such that , where represents a fixed cost. In this case, the productivity goes up to where the parameter indicates the efficiency or the leverage of the new technology.777To introduce R&D, we can also write, for example, instead of . However, the main results have similar insights.
To sum up, the representative agent solves the dynamic growth problem below:
(2) |
subject to
(3a) | ||||
(3b) | ||||
(3c) |
for every . Here, is a rate of time preference while is the instantaneous utility function.
We require the following assumption.
Assumption 2.
The utility function is in , strictly increasing, concave, and . Assume that .
We assume that , implying the fixed cost is not too low.
At initial date, assume that while are given.
We provide a formal definition of equilibrium.
Definition 1.
An intertemporal equilibrium is a list satisfying 3 conditions:
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(i)
Given , is a solution of the problem ,
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(ii)
Given , is a solution of the problem
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(iii)
Labor market clears: .
At equilibrium, we have . Hence, the first order conditions of the problem imply that, for every :
(4) |
Wage depends not only on the foreign firm TFP but also on the prices of physical capital and new goods.
Denote the total savings of the host country. In our framework, it is equal to the aggregate investment. By using Equation (4), the problem can be rewritten as follows:
(5) |
for any , and where and is defined by
(6a) | ||||
where | (6b) |
Notice that the function is continuous, strictly increasing and . However, it may be non-concave and non-smooth.
Remark 1.
In the absence of the MNE and R&D, we recover an economy without FDI. In this case, the problem becomes the standard Ramsey optimal growth model with the budget constraint: . We can prove that , where is defined by .
Let us now consider a case where there is the MNE but no R&D. In this case, the problem becomes
(7) |
where the function is defined by
(8) |
We can check that is strictly increasing, strictly concave, smooth and satisfies Inada condition . By using the standard argument in the dynamic programming, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1.
Assume that there is the MNE, but the country does not invest in R&D. Then, converges to defined by
(9) |
Moreover, increases in , and .
In a particular case where , the value can be explicitly computed by:
(10) |
The property means that with the presence of the MNE, the economy’s investment stock converges to a steady state which is higher than that of the economy without FDI. Moreover, the steady state level is increasing in the TFP of the old sector, wage, as well as the TFP of the MNE. It implies that the effect of FDI on the steady state output depends on both FDI and the host country’s circumstances. This is consistent with several studies mentioned in the Introduction section.
3 Roles of FDI on the economy’s dynamics
We now investigate the global dynamics of the allocation to explore the role of FDI. We first provide some static analysis (Subsection 3.1) and then global dynamic analysis (Subsection 3.2).
3.1 Static analysis
In this subsection, given the savings , we study the optimal allocation of the host country. Formally, we look at the optimization problem . First, it is easy to see that this problem has a solution. However, since the objective function is not concave, the uniqueness of solutions may not be ensured.
We start our exposition by the following result.
Proposition 2.
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(i)
If then at optimum, we have for any .
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(ii)
If and , then at optimum.
Proof.
See Appendix A.1. ∎
Point (i) of Proposition 2 indicates that if either the efficiency of the research process or the initial resource is low or the fixed cost is high, the host country may not invest in R&D. Besides, point (ii) implies that the country invests in R&D when and are high enough (because depends neither on nor ).
If we have increasing return to scale (i.e., ), then condition in point (ii) in Proposition 2 is satisfied for any high enough. It suggests that the host country should invest in R&D once it is rich enough. We complement Proposition 2 by the following result.
Proposition 3.
Assume that .
(1) There exists a unique such that: (i) for any , and (ii) and at optimum for any .
(2) We also have . Moreover, we have if , and if . At , the left derivative is and the right derivative is .
Proof.
See Appendix A.1. ∎
Proposition 3 plays a crucial role in our analysis. It is in line with Lemma 3 in Bruno et al. (2009). However, notice that the method used in Bruno et al. (2009), Le Van et al. (2010) cannot be directly applied in our model.888Indeed, their method relies on the set defined on page 291 of Bruno et al. (2009). In our model with FDI and , this trick no longer works.
Let us provide a sketch of our proof. First, we introduce functions and
Observe that . More importantly, we have that
(11) |
Second, we prove that is strictly increasing in . The value is in fact the unique solution of the equation .
3.2 Global dynamic analysis
In this subsection, we explore the global dynamics of equilibrium. First, we have the monotonicity of the savings path .
Proposition 4.
The optimal path is monotonic. Moreover, does not converge to zero.
Proof.
See Appendix A.2. ∎
Second, we study the boundedness of the allocation. Let us define the sequence as , where the function is given in (8). Denote and be uniquely defined by:
(12) |
Notice that and depend on (i) the productivity and capital elasticity of the consumption good sector, (ii) the efficiency of specific labor training , and (iii) wage ,999If , we can explicitly compute that but not on the TFP of the potential domestic firm in the new sector.
It is important to mention some properties of the function and the threshold .
Lemma 1.
(1) for every and for every .
(2) In equilibrium, we have
Proof.
See Appendix A.2. ∎
By consequence, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 (middle income trap).
Proof.
See Appendix A.2. ∎
Proposition 5 indicates that when the host country has both a low initial resource (in the sense that ) and a weak research process efficiency (in the sense that ), it never invests in R&D ( for ). In this case, both savings and the output are bounded from above (this can be viewed as a middle income trap). More precisely, converges to the same value , defined by (9), as in the economy with FDI but without investment in R&D.
We now study the case under which the economy may grow without bound.
Proposition 6 (convergence and growth with increasing return to scale).
Assume that , , and
(13) | ||||
(14) |
Then, for any level of initial resource, we have . Moreover,
(15) |
Proof.
See Appendix A.2. ∎
Condition (13) ensures that the marginal productivity of function is high enough in the sense that , where is the Dini derivative of function .101010The Dini derivatives of a function are defined by and . This happens if and are high enough because the function is strictly increasing in and .
Notice that the conditions given in Proposition 6 do not depend on the initial resource which is less than . So, our theoretical results lead to an interesting implication: Consider a low-income country characterized by condition . According to Proposition 2, we have , i.e., the country cannot immediately improve the local firm TFP. Now, suppose that the leverage of new technology is high enough and conditions in Proposition 6 hold. In this case, the country obtains a sustained growth (in the sense that ). Moreover, the sequence is increasing in time. According to point (ii) of Proposition 2, there is a date along the optimal path such that the country should focus on R&D from date on (i.e., and for any ). Therefore, the optimal strategy of the country should be as follows.
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First, the country should train specific workers.
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Second, specific workers will work for the MNE to improve the country’s income and capital accumulation.
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Third, once the country’s resource is high enough, it should focus on R&D to create new technology that increases the country’s TFP. Hence, its economy may grow faster and converge to a high-income country.
Proposition 6 is related to the economic growth literature with increasing return to scale (Romer, 1986; Jones and Manuelli, 1990; Bruno et al., 2009; Le Van et al., 2010). Our main contribution is to introduce and study the role of FDI in an optimal growth model. In our model, FDI is beneficial to the host country but only at the first stages of its development process. Moreover, the property and condition (15) indicate that in the long run, when the host country’s resource is high enough, it should focus on domestic investment in physical capital and R&D but not on FDI.
Remark 2 (growth without FDI).
It is interesting to note that conditions in Proposition 6 can be satisfied even if . In other words, a host country may get economic growth in the long run even in the absence of FDI. The key factors for such growth are the efficiency of investment in R&D (parameter ), the new technology’s leverage on the firm TFP (parameter ), and increasing return to scale.
In the case of decreasing return to scale, the capital stock may converge to a finite steady state, which is higher than that of an economy described in Proposition 1. Formally, we have the following result.
Proposition 7 (decreasing return to scale).
Let be such that . Assume that . The optimal path increasingly converges to a finite value and . Moreover, if and are high enough.
Proof.
See Appendix A.2. ∎
So far, we have provided several theoretical results to show the role of FDI on the host country. In general, the host country benefits from FDI. However, the effect of FDI on economic growth depends not only on the nature of FDI but, more importantly, on the circumstances of the host country (initial resources, domestic firms’ TFP, education system, efficiency of R&D process, …). Indeed, look back at Proposition 1, if the host country only focuses on FDI, the steady state , that is higher than the steady state of the economy without FDI, is increasing in the local conditions (the domestic TFP , the efficiency of the training process ) and the TFP of the MNE. Moreover, according to Propositions 6 and 7, if the country invests in R&D and the local conditions are good enough, the host country may get a sustained growth in the long run. This may happen even the country does not receive FDI.
4 Conclusion
We have investigated the nexus between FDI, R&D and growth in a host country by using infinite-horizon optimal growth models. According to our results, the very question does not rely on whether or not developing countries should attract inward FDI, but instead on how they implement policies to benefit from FDI spillovers. We have proved that FDI can act as a catalyst, helping a host developing country to avoid a middle income trap and potentially attain a higher income. However, to reach sustained economic growth in the long run, the host country should focus on domestic investment and R&D.
Appendix A Formal proofs
A.1 Static analysis
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let . Since , there exists such that . Define by
(A.1) |
where such that (so that ). Precisely, . With such , we have , and hence, we can verify that
(A.2) |
is increasing in and . It will be higher than when and are high enough because does not depend on .
∎
Proof of Proposition 3.
We need an intermediate step.
Claim 1.
Assume that . Denote , and
We have that . The function is well-defined on the interval , and . On the interval , the function is strictly increasing, continuously differentiable and is strictly increasing in and there exists a unique such that . Moreover, .
Proof of Claim 1.
If , then condition implies that . Then , and hence .
Consider the case . Let be an optimal point. It is clear that and .
If , then , and .
If at optimal, we write FOCs
(A.3) | ||||
(A.4) |
It follows that or equivalently
(A.5) |
The left hand side (LHS) is strictly decreasing in because . When , the LHS equals because . When , the LHS equals
(A.6) |
Observe that if and only if
Therefore, we get that:
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1.
If , then and . In this case, we have
because and .
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2.
If , then the equation (A.5) has a unique in the interval . The optimal point is given by and . Moreover, when increases, we have , and increase.
We have where is uniquely given by (A.5) and . By computing directly or using the envelop theorem, we have
(A.7) because and .
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3.
When tends to , we have tends to and therefore tends to because .
To sum up, the function is continuously differentiable and
∎
We now prove Proposition 3. Observe that
(A.8) |
Let be an optimal point. Since is differentiable, we have the FOC
Let be the unique pair such that . Then, we have .
Since , we have . Therefore, we have and hence . It follows that
(A.9) |
So, is strictly increasing.
When is small enough, is negative. When is high enough, is positive (see, for example, point (ii) of Proposition 2). So, there exists a unique such that .
According to (11) and , we have , and .
∎
A.2 Dynamic analysis
Proof of Proposition 4.
Since the function is continuous, strictly increasing, we can use the standard argument in dynamic programming (Amir, 1996) to prove that the optimal path is monotonic.
We now prove that does not converge to zero. First, following Kamihigashi and Roy (2007), we have Euler condition in the form of inequality
(A.10) |
where the Dini derivatives of function are defined by and .
Suppose that . According to budget constraints and the fact that , we have . Since , there exists such that for every . Consequently, and hence for every . This leads to a contradiction to the fact that . ∎
Proof of Lemma 1.
(1) If , then . If , then since is concave.
(2) It is obvious that . We prove by induction argument. First, we see that Second, assume that . If , then , then . If , then and hence .
∎
Proof of Proposition 5.
We will prove, by induction argument, that and .
When . We have , So, .
Assume that and . This implies that , because otherwise we can reduce and augment in order to get a higher utility, which is a contradiction.
Since , we have that . Since , we have .
Hence, and therefore . We have finished our proof.
∎
Proof of Proposition 6.
We need intermediate steps.
Lemma 2.
Assume that . For any solution of the problem , there exists the following limits
(A.11) |
Proof of Lemma 2.
Observe that, when is high enough, we have at optimal. It is also to see that . By consequence, we can write FOCs for the problem as follows (we have FOCs even the objective function is not concave):
(A.12) | ||||
(A.13) | ||||
(A.14) |
where is the multiplier associated to the constraint The first and the third equations imply that
(A.15) |
while the second and third conditions imply that
(A.16) |
By consequence, we obtain
(A.17) | |||
(A.18) |
From this, we get . By combining this with the fact that , we obtain .
Notice that for high enough.
We will prove that when tends to infinity, is bounded from above, and hence . To do so, we firstly prove that . Indeed, according to (A.18), we have
(A.19) |
Suppose that there is a sequence tends to infinity such that . Notice that
for any high enough, which implies that . However, this will follow that
(A.20) |
is bounded away from zero (because ), a contradiction.
So, we get that . By combining this with (A.15), we have that is bounded from above and hence . Combining with (A.17), we obtain (A.11).
∎
Lemma 3.
Assume that . We have
(A.21) | |||
(A.22) |
By consequence, when and are high enough and , we have .
Proof of Lemma 3.
Part 1. We prove (A.21). Let . Consider the function
(A.23a) | ||||
subject to: | (A.23b) |
When , we have and at optimal. We will quantify .
Let be the multiplier associated to the constraint , we have FOCs
(A.24) | ||||
(A.25) | ||||
(A.26) |
FOCs imply that and hence
(A.27) |
because and .
Since , we have
(A.28) | ||||
(A.29) | ||||
(A.30) |
Thus, we get that
(A.31) |
Since , we have
(A.32) |
which implies that
(A.33) |
Denote . We have
because .
By combining this with and , we have
(A.35) | ||||
(A.36) | ||||
(A.37) |
At point , the right Dini derivative of is
(A.38) |
When , we have and hence because is decreasing.
Part 2. We prove that, when and are high enough and , we have .
Observe that is increasing in and when is high enough.
When , we have and therefore is strictly increasing in . In this case, it is easy to see that when is high enough.
We now prove that when or is high enough. As in proof of point (ii) of Proposition 2, we have that: If , then
(A.39) |
At point which depends on and , we have and hence
We prove that tends to zero when or goes to infinity. Indeed, let, for example, tend to infinity. If , by using the property , we get that
where is high enough, a contradiction.
So, when or is high enough, is low enough and hence since .
∎
We are now ready to prove Proposition 6. According to Lemma 3, we have when and are high enough. According to Proposition 4.6 in Kamihigashi and Roy (2007), we have that . According to Lemma 2, we obtain point 2 of Proposition 6.
∎
Proof of Proposition 7.
We observe that
By using , it is easy to prove that is bounded from above. Since is monotonic, it must converge to a finite value, say . So, we have that , where the Dini derivatives of a function are defined by and (see, for instance, Kamihigashi and Roy (2007)).
We consider three cases:
-
1.
If , then is differentiable at and which in turn implies that .
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2.
If , then is differentiable at and which in turn implies that (because is decreasing).
-
3.
If , then we have So, .
Suming up three cases, we have that in any case. Since , we have . Hence is increasing in . Moreover, when and are high enough, we have . In this case, we have . According to the three cases mentioned above, we must have .
∎
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